Here:
Briefs:
Mother next contends the juvenile court’s order granting the Tribe’s petitions for modification, and giving full faith and credit to an amended tribal customary adoption order, must be reversed because the Tribe did not have standing to file section 388 petitions for modification. We reject her contention.
Here is the opinion in American Cargo Express v. Superior Court:
Here is the opinion in Sharp Image Gaming v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians (Cal. Ct. App.). An excerpt:
We conclude that IGRA preempts state contract actions based on unapproved “management contracts” and “collateral agreements to management contracts” as such agreements are defined in the IGRA regulatory scheme. Thus, the trial court erred by failing to determine whether the ELA and the Note were agreements subject to IGRA regulation, a necessary determination related to the question of preemption and the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. We further conclude that the ELA is a management contract and the Note is a collateral agreement to a management contract subject to IGRA regulation. Because these agreements were never approved by the NIGC Chairman as required by the IGRA and were thus void, Sharp Image’s action is preempted by IGRA. Consequently, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Briefs here.
Here is the opinion in United Auburn Indian Community v. Brown.
Here is the unpublished opinion in Citizens for a Better Way v. Brown.
Here.
There’s a fair amount going on in the description of this case (active efforts, involvement of the tribe, CA statutory tribal adoption), but we were interested in this near the end of the opinion:
Mother relies on the tribal representative’s response to the termination of reunification services. In an October 23, 2014, e-mail correspondence, the tribal representative wrote, “[W]e … believe that it was a HUGE disservice to the family to discontinue active efforts. Here in the State of Alaska, the department must provide active efforts right up until the day of reunification, guardianship is finalized or termination of parental rights.”
The tribal representative’s concern appears to have been the California practice of discontinuing reunification services at the review hearing held several months prior to the selection and implementation hearing. Whether a “disservice” or not, the juvenile court terminated services at the point contemplated by our dependency scheme.
The evidence that mother transferred custody of the minors to the paternal grandmother as an Indian custodian was equivocal and compromised. Although maternal grandmother took N.J. to the emergency room, she gave conflicting information regarding whether she had custody of the children. For example, while she told police that she provided care for the minors, mother had custody of them. Likewise, she told doctors that mother had custody of N.J. and that N.J. lived with mother. Indeed, maternal grandmother’s inconsistent and equivocal answers regarding who had custody of the minors was one reason that they were placed in protective custody.
Additional facts undercut any claim that maternal grandmother was an Indian custodian. L.J. was found with father at maternal grandmother’s house the day N.J. was admitted to the hospital. While the Citizen Potawatomi Nation had a specific procedure for establishing an Indian custodian, maternal grandmother did not avail herself of this procedure to establish herself as the minors’ Indian custodian. While the tribe was represented at the hearing on maternal grandmother’s request to be recognized as an Indian custodian, the tribe did not claim she was the minors’ custodian and did not object to the trial court’s ruling denying the request and reinstating the orders terminating parental rights. Finally, we find it telling that an alleged Indian custodian of the minors did not visit or request contact with the minors since October 1, 2012, five days after they were placed in protective custody.
Here.
Mother did not have standing to challenge a violation of placement preferences once her parental rights were terminated.
Here.
Grandmother argued child is Native Hawaiian and registered with OHA. Mother argued child is affiliated with Mooretown Rancheria. Mooretown Rancheria argued same. Lower and appellate courts held under a significant contacts discussion child is affiliated with Mooretown, and registration with OHA doesn’t disturb the Mooretown affiliation for the application of ICWA.
Side note–Looks like California law doesn’t list the preference of the parent in the significant contacts determination. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 224.1(2). The updated Guidelines and proposed Regs both list preference of the parent first as allowable considerations. (B.4 (C)(1) & 23.109(c)(1)(i). Regardless, the outcome in this case is consistent with both.
Here is the opinion in Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown:
We don’t have all the briefs, but here is what we do have:
NP Fresno Land Acquisitions Brief
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