Standing

ICWA Decision out of Missouri on Tribal Intervenor (Relator) Standing and Writ of Prohibition

Kate Fort
opinion_sd37148Download

From the facts in this opinion, it’s clear this is a pretty contested post termination of parental rights/foster care adoption case from the southern district of Missouri (Poplar Bluff, Springfield). What is not in the opinion but is available on the Westlaw decision page are the attorneys involved in the case. I’m sure it’s some local southern Missouri attorneys:

Attorneys for Relator – Heidi Doerhoff Vollet of Jefferson City, MO; James R. Layton of St. Louis, MO
Attorney for Respondent Judge – Scott S. Sifferman Acting Pro Se
Attorneys for Minor – William Petrus of Mt. Vernon, MO (GAL); Matthew D. McGill, David W. Casazza, Robert Batista, Todd Shaw of Washington, D.C.
Attorneys for Respondents Foster Parents – Toni M. Fields of Cassville, MO; Paul Clement, Erin Murphy of Washington, D.C.; Kevin Neylan of New York, NY

Huh.

Even so! In this case, the Court of Appeals found the Choctaw Nation had standing to to bring the writ of prohibition against the judge and the Court of Appeals entered the writ (Respondent is the trial judge)(also, this is why formal legal intervention is so important for tribes whenever possible)(also why it’s good to find local family law attorneys who can talk about things like “writs of prohibition” with expertise):

In his brief, Respondent argues that the Choctaw Nation does not have standing to seek this writ of prohibition. On two occasions, Respondent granted the Choctaw Nation the right to intervene in this protective custody proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c), and also granted the Choctaw Nation the right to intervene in Foster Parents’ adoption proceeding. We see no error in these rulings. The Choctaw Nation has standing to seek
this writ of prohibition.

***

Respondent did not have the express or implied authority to interfere in the Children’s Division’s administrative review of a nonfinal administrative recommendation for adoption, and then substitute Respondent’s judgment for that of the Children’s Division and compel the Children’s Division to reach or adhere to a particular recommendation.

Transfer to Tribal Court Case from Colorado [ICWA]

Kate Fort

Here is a case that continues to demonstrate the importance of ensuring a state ICWA law allows transfer of cases post-termination. Navajo Nation intervened and appealed the decision to deny transfer (and to move the children back to the former, non-ICWA compliant foster home, who opposed the transfer to tribal court).

Additional important issues in this case including the appealability of a final order, standing of former foster parents (they had none), and post-termination transfer to tribal court.

We acknowledge that ICWA only addresses a request to
transfer jurisdiction during foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). It does not mention such a request during preadoptive or adoptive placement proceedings. See id. Even so, the Children’s Code, as it existed at the time the juvenile court denied transfer, permits a juvenile court to consider transfer of jurisdiction to a tribal court “[i]n any of the cases identified in subsection (1) of this section involving an Indian child.” § 19-1-126(1), (4)(a). The cases identified in subsection (1) include “pre-adoptive and adoption proceedings.” § 19-1-126(1).

Grandparent Standing Case in Arizona Court of Appeals

Kate Fort

Here.

While the Court of Appeals found that the grandmother didn’t have standing and properly dismissed the case, opinion notes the Tribal Court had already been exercising jurisdiction over the child in a concurrent child custody matter.

Tribal Standing Issue in California Court of Appeals ICWA Decision

Kate Fort

Here

Mother next contends the juvenile court’s order granting the Tribe’s petitions for modification, and giving full faith and credit to an amended tribal customary adoption order, must be reversed because the Tribe did not have standing to file section 388 petitions for modification. We reject her contention.

Campbell v. British Columbia: Costs Awarded To Crown and Sunshine Logging

Peter Scott Vicaire

There’s no legal sunshine for the unsuccessful aboriginal petitioners (Sinixt Nation Society, Representative Body of the Sinixt Nation) who were not only deemed to have no standing back in February, but now the B.C Supreme Court has also awarded costs to both the Crown and Sunshine Logging Ltd.  Here’s the decision.  It provides an interesting analysis of costs in the context of what constitutes public interest actions.

Continue reading →