From SCOTUSblog:
Docket: 09-326
Title: Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.
Issue: Whether the doctrine of laches is applicable to a cancellation petition filed pursuant to Section 1064(3) of the Lanham Act.
cert petition
Supreme Court Indian Law Petitions Set for This Week’s Conference
Two important cert petitions, Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court (09-187) and Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. (09-326) are set for this Friday’s Conference.
Our sense is that the Court will decline to hear either case, and there’s no word from SCOTUSBlog on these petitions yet. However, the Court’s interest is always heightened when a tribal court asserts jurisdiction over a non-Indian, as is the case in the Elliott case. And there appears to be a circuit split (on trademark grounds) in the Harjo case, with one side of the split supposedly involving an opinion from then-Third Circuit judge Alito. So there is a possibility in each case.
Here are the materials in Elliott:
And here are the materials in Harjo:
Shinnecock Member Asks Supreme Court to Overturn Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
Here is the cert petition in Smith v. Shulman, a tax case — Smith v Shulman Cert Petition
Questions presented:
I. Whether a “rebate” to a reservation Indian is income?
II. Whether a District Court is barred by statute from exercising subject matter jurisdiction, when an Indian treaty provides a free trade right and a procedural dispute resolution right?
III. Whether this Court should overturn The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)insofar as the case provides the legal underpinning of United States’ jurisdiction over Indian reservations, where this Court interpreted the Commerce Clause language of “with” to mean “over” and found Indian tribes to be “domestic dependent nations” rather than “foreign nations,” an error in Constitutional interpretation and a historical wrong against Native Americans?
Law Professor Amicus Brief Supporting Harjo Cert Petition
Here — Law Professor Amicus Brief
The cert petition is here, and the rest of the amicus briefs and materials are here.
Cert Petition in Roy v. Minnesota — Is There a Treaty Right to Possess Firearms?
Interesting arguments in this one — Roy v Minnesota Cert Petition
Questions presented (check out no. 5 — a treaty right to possess firearms?):
1. DOES THE STATE OF MINNESOTA LACK SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY BECAUSE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IS “CIVIL-REGULATORY” IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE?
2. DOES THE PETITIONER HAVE A RIGHT TO POSSESS FIREARMS THAT IS PROTECTED AS A RESERVED RIGHT IN THE 1854 AND 1855 TREATIES WITH THE CHIPPEWA?
3. DID THE MINNESOTA APPELLATE COURT IMPROPERTLY DENY REVIEWOF THIS MATTER BECAUSE THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADDRESS OR REVIEW THE RELEVANT AND APPLICABLE 1854 AND 1855 TRIATIES WITH THE CHIPPEWA?
4. DO PETITIONER’S TREATY RIGHTS BELONG TO HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL TRIBAL AS WELL AS A TRIBAL AND BAND MEMBER OF THE MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBE, AS WELL AS COLLECTIVELY TO THE BANDS THAT ARE SIGNATORY TO THE TREATIES OF 1854 AND 1855?
5. DOES THE PETITIONER HAVE A TREATY RIGHT TO POSSESS FIREARMS AS A PRE-EXISTING RIGHT IN LIGHT OF THIS COURT’S 2008 DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. HELLER (2008 WL 2520816)?
Supreme Court Denies Cert in Rocky Barrett Tax Case
Here is the order list — the docket no. is 09-32, and the notice is on page 3.
Pyke v. Cuomo Cert Petition
Second Circuit opinion here.
Questions presented:
1. Whether a summary judgment motion which turns on the adequacy of plaintiffs’ evidence of intentional discrimination must be denied where a “plausible” inference of invidious intent can be drawn from all of the evidence, circumstantial and direct, taken as a whole?
2. Whether this Court should resolve a conflict among the circuits on the issue of what standards to apply in considering the strength of summary judgment evidence in cases of alleged intentional discrimination?
3. Whether Congress’s enactment of 25 U.S.C. §232 obviated any distinctions based on geography or sovereignty regarding New York’s duty to provide police protection to Native Americans residents of reservations within the State?
Barrett v. United States Cert Petition Materials
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. Cert Petition
Here it is — Harjo Petition for Writ of Certiorari
The question presented:
The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia reversed the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board’s order scheduling cancellation of
the disputed marks and granted summary judgment
to Pro-Football, Inc., finding that the doctrine of
laches precluded consideration of Petitioners’
cancellation petition brought pursuant to Section
14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). On
appeal, a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit
agreed and, after a remand, ultimately affirmed the
District Court’s decision in full. The District of
Columbia Circuit’s decision and the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v.
Auto. Club De L’Ouest De La France, 245 F.3d 1359,
1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2001), are in conflict with the
holding of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2001)
(Alito, J.), that petitions made pursuant to Section
14(3) may be filed “at any time,” rendering defenses
such as laches and statutes of limitation
inapplicable.
A single question is presented for review:
1. Whether the doctrine of laches is applicable
to a cancellation petition filed pursuant to Section
1064(3) of the Lanham Act despite the plain
meaning of the statutory language stating that such
a petition may be filed “at any time.”
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reversed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s order scheduling cancellation of the disputed marks and granted summary judgment to Pro-Football, Inc., finding that the doctrine of laches precluded consideration of Petitioners’ cancellation petition brought pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). On appeal, a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit agreed and, after a remand, ultimately affirmed the District Court’s decision in full. The District of Columbia Circuit’s decision and the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Auto. Club De L’Ouest De La France, 245 F.3d 1359, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2001), are in conflict with the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.), that petitions made pursuant to Section 14(3) may be filed “at any time,” rendering defenses such as laches and statutes of limitation inapplicable.
A single question is presented for review:
1. Whether the doctrine of laches is applicable to a cancellation petition filed pursuant to Section 1064(3) of the Lanham Act despite the plain meaning of the statutory language stating that such a petition may be filed “at any time.”
Harjo v. Redskins Case Has Potential for Supreme Court
Or so says this IP firm’s website, which asserts that there is a trademark-related circuit split:
We do not believe that the issues raised in this case are going away. In the
first place, there is considerable question as to the correctness of the rulings by the District
Court and the D.C. Circuit that laches is applicable to a case such as this. Section 14(3) of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), provides that a petition to cancel a registered mark
because, inter alia, it has become generic, was obtained by fraud, or is disparaging, may be
brought “at any time”. With the D.C. Circuit’s Harjo opinion, there is now a split among the
circuits regarding this issue that could give rise to a cert petition. In addition, following the
Circuit Court’s original remand decision, a group of six Native Americans, all of whom only
recently reached the age of majority, filed a new cancellation petition with the TTAB. Although
this proceeding has been stayed pending the outcome of the Harjo lawsuit, it will be activated
in the event that the D.C. Circuit’s decision on laches stands.
We do not believe that the issues raised in this case are going away. In the first place, there is considerable question as to the correctness of the rulings by the District Court and the D.C. Circuit that laches is applicable to a case such as this. Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), provides that a petition to cancel a registered mark because, inter alia, it has become generic, was obtained by fraud, or is disparaging, may be brought “at any time”. With the D.C. Circuit’s Harjo opinion, there is now a split among the circuits regarding this issue that could give rise to a cert petition. In addition, following the Circuit Court’s original remand decision, a group of six Native Americans, all of whom only recently reached the age of majority, filed a new cancellation petition with the TTAB. Although this proceeding has been stayed pending the outcome of the Harjo lawsuit, it will be activated in the event that the D.C. Circuit’s decision on laches stands.
It gets more interesting. This is consistent with the Harjo plaintiffs’ lawyer asserts (WaPo article), who suggests that one of the split is a Third Circuit decision authored by then-Judge Alito. Maybe there is a chance for this case to be heard.
Still haven’t seen the cert petition. No indication on the SCOTUS site that anything’s been filed.
Oh, and here’s an update on that notorious Quinn Emmanuel lawyer who got fired after emailing the firm questioning whether its successful representation of the Redskins was a good thing.
Turtle Talk 
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