Here.
Also the ICT article is here.
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma
Title VII Claim against Cherokee Nation-Owned Company Proceeds
Here are the materials so far in Nepomuceno v. Cherokee Medical Services (S.D. Cal.):
An excerpt:
CMS has not come forward with any evidence of how CMS was formed, who owns CMS, how CMS is managed, and where profits from the business go. Therefore, CMS has not established that it is an arm of the Cherokee Nation entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from suit, and the Court denies CMS’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. CMS may reassert tribal sovereign immunity in a motion for summary judgment. However, any such motion should not be filed until Plaintiff has had the opportunity to conduct adequate discovery on the issue.
Michigan COA Decision on In re Morris
The Michigan Court of Appeals heard the ICWA notice case that the Michigan Supreme Court originally remanded back to Wayne County for notice. That case, In re Morris, details what is required of Michigan courts when notifying tribes of a potential ICWA case.
The decision is here. There is finally extensive detail on what DHS did or did not put in the notice to the three Cherokee tribes, something the Supreme Court demanded in Michigan ICWA cases.
Since respondent could not obtain any additional information regarding his relatives, it would be unreasonable to expect petitioner to find it. Imposing this burden on petitioner would also encourage parents, who can best research their own ancestry, to delay the proceedings by providing limited information. Because it would often take a long time to uncover ancestry details, a requirement that ICWA tribal notices include every detail of a child’s ancestry would undermine ICWA ’ s 10-day provision, which prevents unreasonable delays. It would also jeopardize concepts of permanency and finality. The trial court did not err by finding that there was compliance with the ICWA’s notification requirements.
NYTs “Disunion” Series Profiles Cherokee Nation after the Civil War
Here.
Fascinating. My favorite part:
By 1862, Ross had become disillusioned with the Confederate government. The first major military engagements in Indian Territory proved disastrous for both the Confederacy and the Cherokees. Retreating from Indian Territory, the Confederacy left the Cherokees open to Union advances and without supplies for Cherokee troops and destitute civilians. Although Ross believed the Confederacy was shirking its treaty promises, the Confederate colonel Douglas H. Cooper called upon Ross to fulfill his obligations by ordering all Cherokee men of fighting age to “take up arms to repel invasion.”
Union Capt. Harris S. Greeno was aware of Ross’s dissatisfaction with the Confederacy, and he ordered the arrest of Ross and his family at their plantation home, Rose Cottage, in present-day eastern Oklahoma. They were quickly paroled and escorted to Union territory, and they retreated to his wife’s family home in Philadelphia. Ross would spend the remainder of the war attempting to convince the Lincoln administration of the Cherokee’s loyalty and commitment to the Union cause.
National Indian Child Welfare Association Resources on Baby Veronica Case
Here.
Useful site, especially the Media Fact Check Matrix.
Birth Father/Cherokee Nation Cert Opposition Brief in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
Here:
Vann v. Salazar (Cherokee Freedmen) to be Argued before D.C. Circuit Tomorrow
Here is the order:
Supreme Court Denies Cert in Nielson v. Ketchum (Cherokee ICWA Case)
Our prior post on the case is here.
In re T.S.W., Kansas ICWA Case on Finality for Appeal and Placement in Private Adoptions
Here.
The Kansas Supreme Court again comes out with strong language in support of ICWA. In addition, the case, which has a complicated procedural history given the actions of the private adoption agency, provides an interesting analysis of what is a “final order” in an ICWA case and a discussion of the collateral order doctrine:
Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude the district court’s order permitting a deviation from ICWA’s placement preferences did not dispose of the entire merits of the case and left open the possibility of future action by the district court with respect to T.S.W.’s placement. Thus, the Tribe has not appealed from a “final order, judgment or decree” under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 59-2401a(b)(1), and we lack statutory authority to hear this appeal.
But that holding does not end our analysis. Alternatively, the Tribe urges us to exercise jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. That doctrine, which we sparingly apply, provides a narrow exception to the final order requirement. It “allows appellate courts to reach ‘not only judgments that “terminate an action,” but also a “small class” of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed “final.” [Citation omitted.]'” Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 291 Kan. at 611-12 (quoting Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605, 175 L. Ed. 2d 458 [2009]).
This case is also an illustration of the difficulties of ICWA and private adoptions. The adoption agency initially refused to consider any placements provided by the Cherokee Nation if the families couldn’t pay the $27,500 fee:
In this case, we need not extensively consider whether the Agency followed the placement preferences before seeking a deviation from those preferences. It did not. While the Agency made some effort to satisfy the second placement preference when it requested the Tribe provide available adoptive family profiles, the Agency impermissibly qualified its request in at least two ways. First, the Agency provided the Tribe with Mother’s extensive “criteria” for any prospective adoptive family. Second, the Agency specified that prospective adoptive families be able to pay the Agency’s $27,500 fee requirement. And while the Agency eventually indicated a willingness to modify its fee based on an unspecified sliding scale, the parties never agreed as to the parameters of that scale because Mother chose a non-Indian family based on profiles presented to her from the Agency.
Essentially, the Agency grafted its substantial fee requirement as well as Mother’s placement criteria (which ironically specified that the adoptive parents be Caucasian) onto ICWA’s placement preferences. Common sense dictates that ICWA’s placement preferences cannot be undermined in this manner. In fact, the Agency’s actions appear to fly in the face of Congress’ intent in enacting ICWA. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37 (ICWA “‘seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society’ . . . by establishing ‘a Federal policy that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community'” and ensuring that Indian child welfare determinations are not based on a white, middle-class standard that often forecloses placement with an Indian family).
The Court found that the agency and the lower court did not follow the placement preferences of ICWA, even after the Nation provided 17-20 (!) potential adoptive families for the child, and reversed the decision.
Kevin Maillard on the Elizabeth Warren Cherokee Controversy
Here (h/t to R.M.).
An excerpt:
For the Cherokee Nation, Warren is “Indian enough;” she has the same blood quantum as Cherokee Nation Chief Bill John Baker. For non-Natives, this may be surprising. They expect to see “high cheekbones,” as Warren described her grandfather as having, or tan skin. They want to know of pow wows, dusty reservations, sweat lodges, peyote and cheap cigarettes. When outsiders look at these ostensibly white people as members of Native America, they don’t see minorities. As a result, Warren feels she must satisfy these new birthers and justify her existence.
Looked at from the inside, however, the Warren controversy is all new. When the Brown campaign accused Elizabeth Warren of touting herself as American Indian to advance her career, this was news to Native law professors. We have a good eye for welcoming faculty to the community and identifying promising scholars. We know where people teach, what they have published and we honor them when they die. Harvard Law School named its first Native American tenured professor? Really? In our small indigenous faculty town, we would have heard about it already.
Turtle Talk 
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