Tribal Governance News: Sault Tribe Citizens to Vote on New Constitution Establishing 3-Branch Government

Citizens of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, Michigan’s largest federally recognized Tribe with more than 50,000 citizens, will vote on a proposed new Constitution that would significantly restructure its Tribal government.

The Tribe’s current Constitution, adopted in 1975, vests governing authority in a Board of Directors and provides for a Chairperson to be elected by the voters of the Tribe who then serves as a member of the Board. The proposed Constitution would establish three co-equal branches, including a 12-member Tribal Council, an executive branch led by an independently elected Tribal Ogemaa, and a constitutionally established judiciary consisting of a Trial Court called the Court of Gweyakwaadziwin (Honesty) and a Supreme Court called the Court of Nbwaakawin (Wisdom). It also expressly provides that the Tribal citizens are the source of governmental authority and that powers not granted to the government are reserved to the citizenship.

The proposal also includes a detailed Bill of Rights protecting, among other things, religious and cultural beliefs; speech and press; privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures; criminal process rights; equal protection, application, and opportunity under the law; whistleblower protection; the right to own, bear, and use arms; and property rights. It also expressly addresses sovereign immunity and waivers of immunity, suits against elected officials and employees acting in their official capacity or within the scope of their authority, and the right of citizens to bring Tribal Court actions to enforce constitutional rights.

Anishinaabe language and law are reflected throughout the proposed Constitution. The Preamble invokes Anishinaabe Bimaadziwin (the Anishinaabe way of life) and the Seven Grandfather Teachings, and Tribal courts would have jurisdiction over matters arising under Tribal customs as well as the Tribe’s Constitution, treaties, and laws.

The proposal also constitutionalizes the Mackinac Band as a seventh historical band for citizenship purposes, resolving a longstanding difference between the existing Constitution which does not include the Mackinac Band, and the Tribe’s Membership Ordinance, which does.

The Board unanimously voted May 19 to move the proposal to a federally administered Secretarial Election. The Tribe’s updated election information is available on its Secretarial Election page.

Creek Freedmen Sue in Federal Court to Enforce Treaty Right to Citizenship in Light of Creek Nation Refusal to Allow Enrollment

Here is the complaint in Grayson v. Hill (W.D. Okla.):

Tribal Supreme Court decision is here.

Links to other materials here.

Chris Pappen

Tenth Circuit Holds Screenshot of Tribal Membership Website is Sufficient Evidence to Show Indian Status

Here is the opinion in United States v. Lynn.

Briefs:

Kirsty Gover on Membership and Self-Identification under UNDRIP

Kirsty Gover has posted: “Membership and Self-identification in The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: a Commentary on Article 33” on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

This chapter addresses two broad themes within the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIPS): self-identification and membership, as addressed in international jurisprudence on UNDRIP Article 33.  The article protects the rights of Indigenous Peoples to ‘determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions’. It should be read with Article 9, which protects the right of individuals ‘to belong to an indigenous community or nation’. Together the articles protect both individual and collective self-identification, but UNDRIP does not specify what should happen when groups and individuals disagree on a person’s membership status. Recent applications of the UNDRIP in international forums link ‘self-identification’ to collective self-determination, in a way that prioritises the authority of group decisions on membership. This is a positive step that promises a more nuanced and jurisdictional approach to identity issues, one that supports the authority of Indigenous law and can potentially bring international human rights law closer to a fully realised appreciation of Indigenous-State legal pluralism. This chapter outlines the history of Article 33, discusses its recent application and interpretation and explains its potential impact on membership disputes.

Muscogee (Creek) Nation SCT Denies Enforcement and Contempt Motions Citing Separation of Powers and Closes Freedmen Citizenship Case

Here is the order in Citizenship Board of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Grayson and Kennedy:

Prior post here.

Federal Circuit Affirms Rejection of Federal Liability for Shooting of Ute Tribal Citizen

Here is the opinion in Jones v. United States.

Briefs:

Prior posts here and here.

New Scholarship on Indian Status Cases in North Carolina

Daniel G. Sullivan has published “When You’re Just Not “Indian” Enough: The Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty in State v. Nobles and the Case for Deference to Tribes on Questions of Indian Status” in the North Carolina Law Review.

Here is the abstract:

Under the Major Crimes Act, Tribes and the federal government have exclusive jurisdiction over certain “major crimes” committed by an “Indian” in “Indian Country.” In 2012, George Nobles—a “First Descendant” of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians—was arrested for robbery and murder on the tribal trust lands of the Eastern Band. Defined by Cherokee law, First Descendants have at least one parent who is a tribal member but are themselves one generation short of the Tribe’s blood quantum requirement for membership. At the time of Nobles’s arrest, First Descendants were recognized by the Eastern Band as “Indian” under Cherokee common and statutory law. Thus, under the Major Crimes Act, only the Eastern Band or the federal government should have been able to prosecute Nobles. Both crimes were “major,” both took place in Indian Country, and Nobles—as a First Descendant—was Indian.

But in State v. Nobles, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that Nobles was just not Indian enough and authorized state jurisdiction. And in doing so, the court overrode a determination that was the Tribe’s to make. State v. Nobles contradicts fundamental precepts of federal Indian law and strikes at the sovereignty of the Eastern Band and similarly-situated Tribes. Where Indian status refers to the political relationship between an individual and a particular Tribe, that Tribe must have the final word on questions of Indian status. Part I of this Comment introduces State v. Nobles and explores Indian Country jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act. Part II sets forth three principles of federal Indian law against which the facts of Nobles must be viewed and argues that these principles demand deference to Tribes on Indian status. Part III uses these principles to discuss the errors in Nobles. Lastly, Part IV argues that deference to Tribes on Indian status is necessary for robust tribal sovereignty and proposes a more cabined use of the “Rogers test” for Indian status consistent with that understanding.

Squaxin Island Tribal Court Holds Disenrollment Action Was Arbitrary and Capricious

Here is the opinion in In re the Disenrollment Appeal of Selvidge-Brownfield:

Quinault Tribal Court Orders in Matter Involving Attempted Disenrollment of Two Tribal Members

Here are the materials in Tarabochia v. Quinault Indian Nation:

CV23-015CorrectedJudgmentOrderDefendants

CV23-015CorrectedPlaintiffJudgment

CV23-015CorrectedSummaryJudgmentOrder

CV23-015JudgmentAwardingEquitableRelief

CV23-015TarabochiavQINOrder

Quinault Disenrollments Vacated

Here is the order in Tarabochia v. Quinault Indian Nation: