tribal membership – Turtle Talk

Under the Major Crimes Act, Tribes and the federal government have exclusive jurisdiction over certain “major crimes” committed by an “Indian” in “Indian Country.” In 2012, George Nobles—a “First Descendant” of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians—was arrested for robbery and murder on the tribal trust lands of the Eastern Band. Defined by Cherokee law, First Descendants have at least one parent who is a tribal member but are themselves one generation short of the Tribe’s blood quantum requirement for membership. At the time of Nobles’s arrest, First Descendants were recognized by the Eastern Band as “Indian” under Cherokee common and statutory law. Thus, under the Major Crimes Act, only the Eastern Band or the federal government should have been able to prosecute Nobles. Both crimes were “major,” both took place in Indian Country, and Nobles—as a First Descendant—was Indian.

But in State v. Nobles, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that Nobles was just not Indian enough and authorized state jurisdiction. And in doing so, the court overrode a determination that was the Tribe’s to make. State v. Nobles contradicts fundamental precepts of federal Indian law and strikes at the sovereignty of the Eastern Band and similarly-situated Tribes. Where Indian status refers to the political relationship between an individual and a particular Tribe, that Tribe must have the final word on questions of Indian status. Part I of this Comment introduces State v. Nobles and explores Indian Country jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act. Part II sets forth three principles of federal Indian law against which the facts of Nobles must be viewed and argues that these principles demand deference to Tribes on Indian status. Part III uses these principles to discuss the errors in Nobles. Lastly, Part IV argues that deference to Tribes on Indian status is necessary for robust tribal sovereignty and proposes a more cabined use of the “Rogers test” for Indian status consistent with that understanding.

Squaxin Island Tribal Court Holds Disenrollment Action Was Arbitrary and Capricious

January 15, 2026Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in In re the Disenrollment Appeal of Selvidge-Brownfield:

Selvidge-Brownfield-Brownfield-Brown-Creekpaum-2026.01.12-Decision-on-Appeal Download

Quinault Tribal Court Orders in Matter Involving Attempted Disenrollment of Two Tribal Members

January 9, 2026Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Tarabochia v. Quinault Indian Nation:

CV23-015CorrectedJudgmentOrderDefendants

CV23-015CorrectedPlaintiffJudgment

CV23-015CorrectedSummaryJudgmentOrder

CV23-015JudgmentAwardingEquitableRelief

CV23-015TarabochiavQINOrder

Quinault Disenrollments Vacated

November 10, 2025Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the order in Tarabochia v. Quinault Indian Nation:

CV23-015CorrectedSummaryJudgmentOrder.pdf Download

Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court Holds Creek Freedmen & Descendants Entitled to Same Rights as Other Creek Citizens

July 23, 2025Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Citizenship Board of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Grayson and Kennedy:

Doc.-49-Order-and-Opinion-07232025.pdf Download

Briefs here (MCN website) and here.

California Federal Court Rejects Chukchansi Disenrollees’ Effort to Reopen Tillie Hardwick Case

June 19, 2025Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the new materials in Hardwick v. United States (N.D. Cal.):

420 Motion to Reopen

425 Federal Response

431 Reply

434 Tribe Objections to Reply

437 Response to Objections

440 DCT Order

Aaron Mills on Anishinaabe Law and Kinship

May 13, 2025Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Aaron Mills has published “First Nations’ Citizenship and Kinship Compared: Belonging’s Stake in Legality” in the American Journal of Comparative Law.

Here is the abstract:

Many First Nation individuals appear to accept that debates about belonging to First Nations political community are properly framed as debates about citizenship. Interlocutors frequently identify the ongoing significance of kinship, but fold it into their conception of citizenship. This Article resists citizenship’s orthodoxy. Kinship is not a unique feature of First Nations citizenship, but rather is its own model of belonging to a political community: a model internal to First Nations law, understood on its own terms. There are, then, two models of belonging to First Nations political community, citizenship and kinship, within and over which debates about belonging play out.

For First Nations political communities using their own systems of law, kinship is a source of fundamental legal interests, just as citizenship is a source of fundamental rights and freedoms in modern liberal democracies. However, comparativists, legal theorists, and political theorists have struggled to appreciate this reality because internal (or settler) colonialism disconnects kinship from legality conceptually and thus institutionally. Those connections must be reestablished.

To that end, this Article shows that, functionally, kinship is a full answer to citizenship. The argument is made in two interwoven parts, each of which turns on the picture of kinship as a structural feature of First Nations law, understood on its own terms. First, kinship is citizenship’s political equal insofar as it offers a justificatory account of belonging to a political community; second, kinship is citizenship’s legal equal insofar as it, too, serves as a foundation for fundamental legal interests. The gravamen of this Article is, thus, twofold. First, one is not hearing what First Nations law says about belonging if one is only willing or able to listen in the language of citizenship. Second, the stakes in one’s choice of model are significant: citizenship and kinship structure legality in fundamentally different ways.