Website here.
tribal membership
Nooksack Federal/State Litigation Update
Tageant v. Ashby (state court tort suit removed to federal court)
1-0.-7-12-19-notice-of-removal-to-federal-court.pdf
6.-7-17-19-defendant-michael-ashbys-motion-for-certification-of-employment.pdf
14.-8-5-19-united-states-opposition-to-defendants-motion-for-certification-of-federal-employment.pdf
16.-8-9-19-defendant-mike-ashbys-reply-in-support-of-motion-for-certification-of-employment.pdf
Adams v. Elfo (federal court habeas corpus suit)
6.-8-13-19-amended-petition-for-writ-of-habeas-corpus.pdf
Adams v. Dodge (state court tort suit)
8-13-19-first-amended-complaint.pdf
Doucette v. Zinke (federal APA suit)
Update in San Pasqual Band Membership Suits
Here are the materials in Alegre v. United States (S.D. Cal.):
50-1 Individual Defendants MTD
Nooksack Update: Rabang v. Kelly II (9th Cir.); Doucette v. Bernhardt (W.D. Wash))
District court materials (prior post here):
28 Doucette v. Bernhardt 3-7-19 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
34 Doucette v. Bernhardt 5-31-19 Reply re Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
Ninth Circuit materials:
Muscogee Freedmen Descendants Forced to Exhaust Tribal Remedies
Here is the order in Muscogee Creek Indian Freedmen Band v. Bernhardt (D.D.C.):
Briefs here.
Morning Sun: “Tribal appeals panel hears three family enrollment cases”
Here.
Fletcher: “Law, Politics, and the Constitution”
Here, on SSRN.
The abstract:
The question whether Congress may create legal classifications based on Indian status under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is now reaching a critical point. Critics claim the Constitution allows no room to create race or ancestry based legal classifications. The critics are wrong.
When it comes to Indian affairs, the Constitution is not colorblind. Textually, I argue, the Indian Commerce Clause and Indians Not Taxed Clause serve as express authorization for Congress to create legal classifications based on Indian race and ancestry, so long as those classifications are not arbitrary, as the Supreme Court stated a century ago in United States v. Sandoval and more recently in Morton v. Mancari.
Should the Supreme Court reconsider those holdings, I suggest there are significant structural reasons why the judiciary should refrain from applying strict scrutiny review of Congressional legal classifications. The reasons are rooted in the political question doctrine and the institutional incapacity of the judiciary. Who is an Indian is a deeply fraught question to which judges have no special institutional capacity to assess.
Saginaw Chippewa Disenrollees’ Suit Dismissed
Rabang v. Kelly I: Ninth Circuit Awards Nooksack Disenrollees $91K in Prevailing Party Fees
Adrea Korthase on the Definition of “Indian Child” in the Era of Assisted Reproductive Technology
Adrea Korthase has published Seminal Choices: The Definition of “Indian Child” in a Time of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.
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