Court of Federal Claims – Page 10

Spirit Lake Employee Group’s Contract Claims against Feds Dismissed

August 29, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here are the materials in Council for Tribal Employment Rights v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

1-Council for Tribal Employment Rights Complaint

25-US Motion to Dismiss

46-Council Response

48-Council Motion for Partial Summary J

49-US Reply

53-US Opposition

DCT Order Dismissing Complaint

An excerpt:

Council for Tribal Employment Rights (“Council”), a national intertribal nonprofit organization which represents the employment interests of certain Indian tribes, seeks $500,000 in damages for the alleged breach of two agreements which involved the Council, the Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development (“the Office”), a component of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“the Bureau”), U.S. Department of the Interior, and the Spirit Lake Tribe (“Spirit Lake” or “the Tribe”), a federally recognized Indian tribe. Both agreements were executed as amendments to an existing contract between the Office and Spirit Lake. The first, Amendment 2, involved the provision of funds to support a Native Construction Careers Initiative (“NCCI”) commercial construction training program, and called upon the Council to conduct the training program. The second, Amendment 6, allocated funds to support training projects approved by the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”). The statement of work for that Amendment referenced an FHWA training program agreement which contemplated that the Council would provide training to develop certain certification programs for road construction activities.

Federal Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Klamath Claims Committee v. United States

August 26, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Unpublished opinion here:

12-5130.Opinion.8-20-2013.1

Briefs here.

Lower court materials here and here.

Most Claims Dismissed in Quapaw Tribe v. US Trust Breach Action

July 18, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher3 Comments

Here are the materials in Quapaw Tribe v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

An excerpt:

Plaintiff, the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma, is a federally recognized Indian nation. The Quapaw Tribe commenced this action on September 11, 2012 by filing a complaint for money damages arising from Defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary and trust obligations owed to the Quapaw Tribe. The complaint contains three causes of action.

On November 13, 2012, Defendant filed a motion for partial dismissal of the complaint, asserting that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or that Plaintiff had failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted. In the alternative, Defendant requested that the Court order Plaintiff to file a more definite statement of its claims. Defendant excepted from its motion Plaintiff’s claims for annuity payments under the Treaty of 1833 and leasing claims for the Quapaw Industrial Park. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion on December 28, 2012, and Defendant filed a reply on January 11, 2013. The Court heard oral argument on June 4, 2013.

Under Rule 8 of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), a pleading must include “a short and plain statement” of the basis for jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s claims, as well as a demand for the relief sought. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s complaint generally meets the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, and therefore, Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement is denied. However, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action, as they are barred by the statute of limitations.

Some Claims against US Dismissed in Quapaw Tribal Members Trust Breach Action

July 18, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in Goodeagle v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

DCT Order

US Partial Motion to Dismiss

Goodeagle Response

US Reply

An excerpt:

Plaintiffs in this case are Grace M. Goodeagle, Thomas Charles Bear, Edwina Faye Busby, Phyllis Romick Kerrick, Jean Ann Lambert, Florence Whitecrow Mathews, A rdi na Revard Moore, Tamara Anne Romick Parker, and Fran Wood, all of whom are enrolled members of the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma. Plaintiffs commenced this action on June 28, 2012 by filing a complaint for money damages arising from Defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary and trust obligations owed to the Quapaw Tribe and its members. The complaint contains eight causes of action.

On August 27, 2012, Defendant filed a motion for partial dismissal of the complaint, asserting that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or that Plaintiffs had failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted. In the alternative, Defendant requested that the Court order Plaintiffs to file a more definite statement of their claims. Defendant limited its motion to the third, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action, and did not challenge the first, second, fourth, and seventh causes of action. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion on November 26, 2012, and Defendant filed a reply on December 23, 2012. The Court heard oral argument on June 4, 2013.

For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ complaint generally meets the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) to show “a short and plain statement” of the basis for jurisdiction and Plaintiffs’ claims, as well as a demand for the relief sought. Thus, the Court denies Defendant’s request for Plaintiffs to file a more definite statement of their claims as to the third cause of action. The Court grants Defendant’s motion to the extent the third cause of action is meant to apply to more than losses under actual leases. That cause of action is not timely as to “hypothetical leases” where town lots might have been leased but were not. The Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action, as the consequential harm to Plaintiffs’ land from the mining activities does not constitute a continuing trespass, and therefore the claim is untimely. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action alleges mismanagement of trust assets, and also is untimely. Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action is not ripe for adjudication, and therefore dismisses it without prejudice.

Two Papers from Elizabeth Kronk

May 23, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Indian Claims and the Court of Federal Claims: A Legal Overview, Historical Accounting and Examination of the Court of Federal Claims’ and Federal Circuit’s Impact on Federal Indian Law
6 Journal of the Federal Circuit Historical Society 59 (2012)
Elizabeth Ann Kronk
Abstract:

Many would argue that the history of the federal government’s relationship with Indian tribes is replete with examples of atrocities and shameful actions on the part of the federal government (which is not to say that Indian tribes have been historical angels). Through the Court of Federal Claims, and its predecessor the Indian Claims Commission, Indian tribes have been able to pursue monetary claims against the federal government for these historic and modern injustices. The history of Indian claims in the United States Court of Federal Claims is an interesting and multifaceted one. Although many Indian tribes regularly bring claims to the Court of Federal Claims today, this was not always the case. This article seeks to trace the history of Indian claims in the Court of Federal Claims and also discusses how decisions of the Court of Federal Claims and United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have significantly impacted the development of federal Indian law. To accomplish this goal, the article begins with a general examination of federal Indian law and of the history of Indian claims in the Court of Federal Claims. The article then examines some key decisions of the Court of Federal Claims and Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that have significantly impacted the development of federal Indian law.

One Statute for Two Spirits: Same-Sex Marriage in Indian Country
JURIST Forum, April 2013
Elizabeth Ann Kronk

Abstract:

On March 15, 2013, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians (LTBB) became the third tribal nation to recognize same sex unions. The LTBB statute, Waganakising Odawak Statute 2013-003, defines marriage as “the legal and voluntary union of two persons to the exclusion of all others.” The Coquille Tribe, in 2009, and Suquamish Tribe, in 2011, both previously recognized same sex unions. Unlike the Coquille Tribe, located within Oregon, and the Suquamish Tribe, located within Washington, LTBB’s tribal territory is located within Michigan, a state that does not currently recognize same sex marriages. Accordingly, some may question the authority of LTBB and similarly situated tribal nations to enact provisions, such as the Waganakising Odawak Statute 2013-003, that conflict with state policy. This article addresses issues surrounding the authority of tribal nations to enact provisions allowing for same-sex marriage or unions.

Court of Federal Claims Allows Bristol Bay Area Health Corp. CSC Claims against US to Proceed

April 19, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in the slow-moving Bristol Bay Area Health Corp. v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

4-18-13 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

US Motion to Dismiss

Bristol Bay Opposition

Bristol Bay Supplemental Brief

US Supplemental Brief

Federal Circuit Briefs in Klamath Claims Committee v. US — UPDATED 8-26-13

March 7, 2013August 26, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here:

Lower court materials here and here.

Federal Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Fifth Amendment Claim re: Colorado River Indian Tribes’ Reservation Lease

February 20, 2013February 20, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in McGuire v. United States.

Briefs:

McGuire Opening Brief

Federal Appellee Brief

McGuire Reply

An excerpt:

Jerry McGuire leased a plot of farmland in Arizona from the Colorado River Indian Tribes (“CRIT”) with the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). He filed this Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim after the BIA removed a bridge that he used to access portions of the leased property. McGuire does not claim that removal of the bridge was itself a taking, but rather that the BIA’s alleged refusal to authorize replacement of the bridge was a taking of his property rights. After trial the Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims Court”) denied McGuire’s regulatory takings claim. McGuire appeals. Because we hold that McGuire’s regulatory takings claim never ripened and that, even if McGuire’s claim had ripened, he had no cognizable property interest, we affirm.

Lower court materials here.