Here is the opinion in In re K.F.:

Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyoming v. Herrera, which affirmed that the Crow Tribe’s treaty-reserved right to hunt in the Big Horn National Forest remained intact following Wyoming’s statehood, the State continued to prosecute Mr. Herrera for taking an elk in the Forest. The State argued that notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Herrera, Mr. Herrera was precluded from asserting his treaty defense because he (being in privity with the Crow Tribe as a Tribal member) was bound by the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, which held that the Tribe’s treaty right was extinguished upon Wyoming’s statehood. Accordingly, the Crow Tribe sought relief from the Repsis judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b), so that the State could not continue to use Repsis. The Wyoming Federal District Court initially denied the Tribe’s Rule 60(b) motion, but the Tenth Circuit has now vacated that decision, remanding to the district court to consider the merits of the Tribe’s Rule 60(b) motion.
Here is the decision:
And a long excerpt:
Contrary to the Department’s assertion and the apparent corresponding view of the District Court, the “reason to know” standard does not necessarily require an evidentiary showing, and certainly not by the parents, that a child or parent may be eligible for tribal membership. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.107-08. Nor does ICWA require that an assertion of potential tribal eligibility be certain. Gerardo, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 802; Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 511. See also 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.107(a), (c), -108(a). Any more stringent construction as suggested by the State would defeat ICWA’s manifest purpose and command. Certainly, a “reason to know” is a low standard, but not an unlimited one. In re Jeremiah G., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 207-08 (Cal. App. 2009); In re Z.H., 740 N.W.2d 648, 653-54 (Iowa App. 2007). A “reason to know” requires something more than a bare, vague, or equivocal assertion of possible Indian ancestry without reference to any identified Indian ancestors with a reasonably suspected tribal connection. See Jeremiah G., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 207-08; Z.H., 740 N.W.2d at 653-54. Pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(1), Mother’s asserted belief that she may be eligible for enrollment in the Crow Tribe was minimally sufficient to constitute a reason to know that the children were Indian children under the circumstances of this case.
¶22 We are further troubled by the Department’s apparent view that it has no affirmative duty to make further inquiry or provide tribal notice and inquiry when parents are not cooperative. Lack of parental cooperation is immaterial, is not a basis for equitable waiver or estoppel, and does not otherwise relieve state agencies and courts of the duty to comply with ICWA requirements. Kahlen 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512. ICWA vests Indian children and related Indian tribes with a federal right, independent of but on par with the right of Indian and related Indian tribes with a federal right, independent of but on par with the right of Indian parents, to specified tribal notice and eligibility determinations regardless of the conduct or disregard of the parents. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 49-53, 109 S. Ct. at 1609-11; Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The practical difficulty or inability of a state agency to identify the correct tribe or substantiate an assertion of requisite Indian ancestry does not relieve the agency of its duty to comply with ICWA requirements. See Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
News coverage of the event here.
LA Times article about Lummi Nation’s opposition here.
The Crow Tribe signed an agreement August 7, 2015, to become a 5% shareholder of Gateway Pacific Terminal, which is a partnership to open shipping ports in Washington. The deal coincides with Cloud Peak Energy’s arrangement to pay Gateway Pacific Terminal $32 million to construct a port on Puget Sound that can ship 60 million tons of exports a year including coal mined on the Crow Reservation to Asian markets. The Tribe leased coal to Cloud Peak Energy from its sole mine in 2013, but a new mine on the reservation could bring 20 million tons annually through the new port.
Although the Tribe does not owe any money up front it could be responsible for 5% of an estimated $700 million construction budget. Final approval is still required from the Crow Tribe and the federal government. Environmental surveys and plans are being conducted currently and there is opposition from both environmental and native groups including the Lummi Nation, who exercise fishing rights near the proposed port site.
Opinion here.
Applying § 15-35-102(11), MCA, to disallow a state tax deduction does not undermine the Tribe’s sovereign authority to tax or govern itself. The Legislature has simply chosen to limit the class of governments to which payment of taxes constitutes a deductible expense for coal producers. By so doing, the Legislature did not implicate tribal sovereignty.
Moreover, as the Department notes, WRI lacks standing to raise a claim implicating the Tribe’s sovereignty. See Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. State, 237 Mont. 117, 128-29, 772 P.2d 829, 835-36 (1989) (Taxpayer corporation had standing to challenge a state property tax, but did “not have standing to assert the Tribes’ sovereign right of self-government in doing so.”). The District Court did not err in so concluding.
Appellant’s Brief
Appellee’s Brief
Reply Brief
Here.
An excerpt:
Two families from the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana can proceed with a lawsuit against an F.B.I. agent that accuses him of failing to properly investigate crimes against American Indians on and around the reservation, the United States Supreme Court has ruled.
Ninth Circuit materials here.
Here is the very interesting opinion in In the Matter of Not Afraid: Montana SCT Decision in In re Not Afraid.
Here.
An excerpt from yesterday’s NYTs article (full article here):
Nearly 30 years ago, a group called the Custer Battlefield Preservation Committee began buying up land around the monument — some 3,300 acres in all — in an effort to stave off development. The group has since tried to donate the land, which it bought for $14 million that was raised through donations, to the Park Service.
But the service has said that unless Congress or the president changes the battlefield’s boundaries, it does not have the legal authority to accept the land.
Moreover, any land deal would need approval from the Crow tribe, which has considerable political influence in Montana and has resisted such a large land transfer.
The tribe cites a 1920 federal law, known as the Crow Act, which it says limits nontribal members to ownership of about 2,000 acres on the reservation, which is almost 2.3 million acres.
“We are trying to explain the advantages of adding on to the historical site right in the middle of their country, which would bring tourists — who need to eat, sleep and buy souvenirs — and produce jobs for Crow people,” said Harold G. Stanton, president of the Custer committee.
Here is the unpublished opinion in Harris v. Parisien.
And an excerpt from a local news article (Billings Gazette):
A federal appeals court has rejected a Billings woman’s claim that her rights were violated when the Crow Tribe of Indians adopted a new constitution in 2001.
Frances Harris is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe. She sued in U.S. District Court, seeking to invalidate the 2001 tribal constitution because it eliminated a voting district for tribal members who do not live on the Crow Indian Reservation.
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