Here are the materials in Runs After v. United States:
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Runs After v. United States:
Lower court materials here.
Here is the new pleading in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik (D. S.D.):
OST13(NoticeOfSupplementalAuthority)
Here:
The initial response to the motions to dismiss is here.
Here are the new materials in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik (D. S.D.):
Here is the complaint in Bettor Racing Inc. v. NIGC (D. S.D.):
Here is the brief:
OST Motion for Class Certification
OST Reply re Class Certification
Complaint is here.
Here are the materials in FTC v. Payday Financial LLC (D. S.D.):
DCt Order Denying Defendants’ Motion
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary J
From the opinion:
The pending motion for partial summary judgment presents the issue of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians who contract with a company doing business from an Indian reservation. The “pathmarking” case on tribal authority over nonmembers is Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997) (describing Montana as “pathmarking” and applying Montana to evaluate tribal court jurisdiction authority over non-Indians.) In Montana, the Supreme Court recognized two areas in which Indian tribes have sovereign power to exercise authority over nonmembers on their reservation. The first such “Montana exception” recognizes tribal authority over “the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with a tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. The precise question presented in this case is one of first impression: When a company conducting business from an Indian reservation enters into a commercial contract with a non-Indian, is it an unfair and deceptive practice for the company to include forum selection and consent to tribal jurisdiction provisions in [2] the contract and to then expect to litigate any alleged breach of contract claim against the non-Indian in tribal court? This Court determines that, under the circumstances of this case and on the sole issue currently before this Court, such contract provisions are not unfair and deceptive when the non-Indian has entered into “consensual relationships [with tribal] members” with a sufficient connection to on-reservation activities to make the consent to jurisdiction and forum selection provisions enforceable under the first Montana exception. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. However, in this case, two open issues prompt this Court to deny Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: (1) This Court’s record lacks information establishing that the Defendants are in fact “members” of the tribe for purposes of the first Montana exception; and (2) an ambiguity in the contract exists as to under what circumstances the non-Indian is consenting to tribal court jurisdiction in addition to binding arbitration.
Here.
An excerpt:
Three Indian parents, the Oglala Sioux Tribe, and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe filed a class-action lawsuit to challenge the continued removal of Indian children in Pennington County, South Dakota from their homes based on insufficient evidence and without proper hearings, in violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and the constitutional right to due process.
Congress enacted ICWA to put in place federal safeguards for the removal of Indian children from their homes to both protect the interests of Indian children and give Indian tribes a voice in the process, because of an alarming number of Indian children who were removed from their homes and their tribes. Family separation can be particularly difficult for Indian children because not only are children separated from their parents, but because they are often placed with non-Indian families, they also experience separation from their culture.
When children are removed from their parents based on an allegation of neglect or abuse, a substantive hearing should normally be held in order to determine whether their children should continue to be separated from them. Instead, the lawsuit contends, Pennington County officials hold a cursory hearing in 48 hours that sometimes lasts no more than a minute, where all of the documents are kept a secret from the parents and they are not permitted to introduce any evidence, and their children are then removed for a minimum of 60 days and usually 90 days, according to the complaint. Most parents are also unfairly coerced by the court to “work with” the state Department of Social Services (DSS), which essentially authorizes the department to hold the children for at least two months under whatever terms DSS wants. DSS rarely seeks to assist the family.
The ACLU filed the lawsuit along with the ACLU of South Dakota and Dana Hanna of the Hanna Law Office in Rapid City. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of three parents in Pennington County, as well as the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, which are federally recognized Indian tribes with reservations in South Dakota.
Here is the complaint, to be filed today:
OST1 Complaint with Exhibits 3 4 6
From the complaint:
Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) in part because officials in South Dakota and other states were removing scores of Indian children from their homes based on insufficient evidence, and in perfunctory and inadequate hearings, in violation of federal law. Yet today, despite the added protections of ICWA, officials in Pennington County, South Dakota are removing scores of Indian children from their homes based on insufficient evidence, and in perfunctory and inadequate hearings, in violation of federal law.
Attached to this complaint as “Exhibit 1” is the transcript of one such Pennington County hearing. This hearing, involving Plaintiff Madonna Pappan, her husband, and their two children, lasted little more than sixty seconds. The court did not permit the Pappans to see the petition that had been filed against them by state officials. When Mr. Pappan asked what he was permitted to discuss, the court changed the subject and, a few seconds later, terminated the hearing. The court immediately entered an order (attached as “Exhibit 2”) which found that “active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs” to the Pappans, and that taking the Pappan children away from their parents “is the least restrictive alternative available,” even though no evidence was introduced during the hearing on those issues. The order stripped the Pappans of custody over their children for at least sixty days and gave that custody to the officials who had filed the secret petition. As discussed below, Plaintiffs Rochelle Walking Eagle and Lisa Young, like many other Indian parents in Pennington County, were treated similarly during their hearings, and their children were removed from their custody. This lawsuit seeks a speedy end to such a disgraceful process.
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