Here:
Other briefs TK.
Lower court materials here.
Here is the opinion in City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa II:
City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 8th Circuit Decision
An excerpt:
We remand to the district court for its reconsideration of the Band’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and direct it to consider all of the factors outlined here and in our prior remand order. Accordingly, the district court must give proper weight to the congressional intent that tribes be the primary beneficiaries of Indian gaming as well as other relevant factors we have previously identified. These include the facts that the City was on notice in 2009 of relevant actions and policies of the Gaming Commission and its warning in the 2011 Notice of Violation that the tribe would violate IGRA by making further rent payments to the city. As discussed in our prior City of Duluth opinion, such change in the governing law is also relevant to the question of whether an exceptional circumstance compels a grant of Rule 60(b)(6) relief. City of Duluth, 702 F.3d at 1154-55; see In re Pac. Far E. Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
Briefs are here.
Here are the briefs in United States v. Drapeau:
An excerpt:
Santana Drapeau was convicted of two counts of domestic assault by an habitual offender. In support of those charges the United States offered evidence of Drapeau’s three prior domestic abuse convictions in Crow Creek Tribal Court. In each instance Drapeau entered a no contest plea; in two of the three he did so without a lawyer. Over Drapeau’s objection under Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404, the District Court admitted testimony about the underlying facts giving rise to those convictions. The District Court admitted that evidence based on a flawed understanding of whether the court or the jury decided what was a qualifying predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 117.
The District Court denied Drapeau’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the use of no contest pleas obtained without counsel as qualifying predicate offenses. Drapeau acknowledges that this issue is controlled by United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), but presents it here in order to preserve it for review by this Court en banc and through petition for writ of certiorari.
We’ve commented on this issue extensively here and here. Right now, there is no circuit split as both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have allowed use of the tribal court convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 117, a habitual offender statute. The cases are Cavanaugh and Shavanaux. There’s a Ninth Circuit case from the 1980s — United States v. Ant (882_F.2d_1389) — that is in disagreement with these cases but in a different context (confessions).
Ah, there is a clean split that I forgot about! United States v. Bryant in the CA9.
A case worthy of watching.
I wrote a short paper about these issues more generally a while back: Sovereign Comity
Here is the opinion in Capps v. Olson.
An excerpt:
Sheriff’s Deputy David Olson shot and killed Christopher Capps (Capps).
Capps’s parents, Jerry and Jaylene Capps, sued Deputy Olson for using excessive
force against their son in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Deputy Olson alleges Capps
was charging towards him with a weapon at the time of the shooting. Capps’s parents allege Deputy Olson shot Capps in the back when Capps was unarmed. Deputy
Olson moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court1
denied Deputy Olson’s motion, holding that outstanding questions of fact precluded
a grant of qualified immunity. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Here is the opinion in United States v. Brown.
An excerpt:
Appellees Michael Brown, Jerry Reyes, Marc Lyons, and Frederick Tibbetts were indicted under the Lacey Act which makes it unlawful to “sell . . . any fish . . . taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of . . . any Indian tribal law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1). The indictments alleged that appellees had netted fish for commercial purposes within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation in violation of the Leech Lake Conservation Code, then sold the fish. Appellees are Chippewa Indians, and they moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that their prosecution violates fishing rights reserved under the 1837 Treaty between the United States and the Chippewa. The district court granted the motions to dismiss. The 1 United States appeals, arguing that its application of the Lacey Act did not infringe on appellees’ fishing rights. We affirm.
Briefs:
Here is the opinion in Brooks v. Roy.
An excerpt:
According to Brooks, he was placed into a 12-step program at New Dimensions because there is no alternative program at MCF-Faribault for those of a Native American faith. He says that the program “conflicts with his Native American religious faith” because it forces him to “profess beliefs that are inconsistent with his faith, which he does not wish to do.” Brooks does not, however, specify his religion or allege which principles of his religion are compromised or unaccommodated at MCF-Faribault. Instead, he requests to participate in what he asserts is a culturally appropriate treatment program available at the Mash-ka-wisen treatment center in Sawyer, Minnesota, which is 191 miles north of MCF-Faribault. Brooks says the defendants denied his request, and he appealed their decision until, he alleges, he had exhausted his administrative remedies.
Briefs:
Here is the unpublished opinion in United States v. Bear Runner.
Here is the opinion. An excerpt:
Based upon the record evidence, the district court in this matter has done just that–accurately discerned the contemporaneous intent and understanding of the 1882 Act. The court carefully reviewed the relevant legislative history, contemporary historical context, subsequent congressional and administrative references to the reservation, and demographic trends, and did so in such a fashion that any additional analysis would only be unnecessary surplus. Ever mindful to “resolve any ambiguities in favor of the Indians,” there is nothing in this case to overcome the “presumption in favor of the continued existence” of the Omaha Indian Reservation. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 344 (quotation omitted); Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 606 F.3d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Briefs here.
Lower court materials here.
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