Second Read-Through of Baby Veronica Transcript

By Matthew Fletcher and Kate Fort

This second read-through incorporates a broader analysis of how the argument went on the merits.

Best Interests of the Child

While it’s true oral argument advocates exaggerate their arguments in order to make a point, Lisa Blatt’s arguments in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl today were particularly onerous. From claiming that this case “involves accretion and conscripting other people’s children to grow the tribal population based solely on biological link” (p. 19, lines 16-18) to her comment about the white adoptive parents being at “the back of the bus” (page 62 line 20), she pushed so much anti-tribal and racial animus claims it is hard to keep up. Beyond that, her claim that there was no best interest determination was just plain wrong—as Charles Rothfeld pointed out immediately — the first line out of his mouth:

It is simply false to say that this child’s custody was transferred without a best interest determination, as is apparent from any reading of the lower court decisions in this case. (page 30, lines 20-23)

The Justices did seem to get the distinction between a best interests determination and determining the unfitness of a parent. They also seemed to understand that the father in this case is a fit parent, ready, willing, and able to parent his child. They appeared to recognize that allowing a best interests of the child standard to be used against a fit parent would create rights for a child far beyond what has been acknowledged so far by the Court: (pages 36-37, lines 20-25, 1-3):

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But I think Justice Breyer is quite wrong because a standard that says results in serious emotional or physical damage to the child is far from a best interest standard.
JUSTICE SCALIA: It sure is. And do you know of any State that — that applies best interest of the child standard to termination of parental rights as opposed to adoption?
MR. ROTHFELD: Absolutely not.

Interpretation of Sections 1912(d) and (f)

Perhaps because of its commitment to preserving the OSG’s reputation for objectivity, the federal government was of little help to tribal interests. The SG’s admittedly confusing position of claiming 1912(d) applies (what we know as active efforts, what Blatt characterized as an “exhaustion obligation” (page 8, line 11) and what Justice Kagan called the “curing provision” (page 58, line 14)), but 1912(f) does not (the heightened standard for termination of parental rights), the government may have done more harm than good. In fact, the interpretation about how ICWA is a balancing statute between two sovereigns, the state and the tribe may not be all that persuasive to the Court. This line of argument may be the deciding factor for the case. In a vast majority of cases, a child would not be in the custody of her parents when there is a termination of parental rights hearing. In an abuse and neglect case (which this is not), the child would have been removed, and the court would make the determination about “continued custody” while the child was in foster or family care — not, generally, while the child was in the actual physical custody of the parent. To interpret 1912(f) otherwise eliminates the provision for virtually all parents under ICWA.

Another question is if Justice Scalia believes everything  he was saying in oral argument. He is “quite sure” (page 42, line 13) he is right on how tribal membership is determined and ended up shutting down Chief Justice Roberts concern about random groups of people calling themselves tribes and getting the protection of ICWA. Scalia also talked about the legislative policy of the law, argued with the government about the separation of sections 1912 (d) and (f), and stated an “Indian family” is a father, a mother, and a kid, with no additional requirements.

Assorted Weirdness — Chief Justice Roberts Edition

The Chief had to go there — he asks counsel for the Birth Father about blood quantum on pages 38-29, lines 25-25, 1-6:

If — if you had a tribe, is there at all a threshold before you can call, under the statute, a child an “Indian child”? 3/256ths? And what if the tribe — what if you had a tribe with a zero percent blood requirement; they’re open for, you know, people who want to apply, who think culturally they’re a Cherokee or — or any number of fundamentally accepted conversions.

It’s so easy to attack the Cherokee Nation on blood quantum. On one hand, everyone and their brother thinks they have a Cherokee princess in the ancestry. On the other hand, there’s sort of a Cherokee obsession about blood quantum when it comes to the Freedmen. The Cherokees do use a lineal descendancy membership rule. But you still have to prove blood quantum, using the 19th century rolls, and yes even 3/256ths will do the trick. But the Chief Justice’s obsession with fractions, as one our of esteemed and fearless commentators noted in an email to us just now, “very easily could have been applied to John Ross — our chief at time of removal. He was 1/8th Cherokee, which by the CJ’s logic is almost zero Cherokee. Almost zero Cherokee was enough to get your butt marched west. And his wife, probably not all Cherokee either, died in Little Rock along the way.

Assorted Weirdness — Adoptive Parents as Victim

Ms. Blatt’s final entreaty to the Court was that a ruling against her clients would”relegat[e] adoptive parents to the back of the bus….” (page 62, line 19-20). Naturally, since Chief Justice Roberts is an adoptive parent, she probably thinks she has a receptive audience. Why she felt she needed to do this baffles me. If it was wasn’t clear already from the Chief’s snarkily false comments about Indian identity, she has his vote. What’s this about?

We found this to be terrifically offensive.

Last we checked, it costs adoptive parents $27,500 to adopt a child (see here: In re TSW, page 127). The vast majority of American Indian families (and other people of color, frankly), who reside in the poorest socioeconomic categories in the United States when it comes to income, cannot afford to adopt a child. We fear Ms. Blatt is arguing for the power of white families to adopt; she is most certainly arguing for the power of wealthy families to adopt).  

The Possible Line-Up?

As Matthew said at Fed Bar, a decision in Adoptive Couple that rides on constitutional law (federal common law, or federal Indian law) likely will be more ideological than tribal interests can withstand (as in, they don’t have the votes). We think this one is going to be decided through an interpretation of the statute, as SCOTUSblog’s analysis of the oral argument seems to confirm.

Assuming Justice Scalia is not being facetious (but, seriously, how can one predict?), oral arguments made it sound like Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Scalia voting for father, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Thomas (he never votes for Indians) against, with Breyer and Ginsberg up in the air. As Justice Sotomayor stated, we can’t believe any of them “want to be that judge” (page 24, lines 9-10), the judge who takes the child away from her father after nearly two years.

First Read-Through on Baby Veronica Oral Argument Transcript

This first analysis will have two components. The first component is an account of how many questions each side received. The rule of thumb — the side getting the most questions from the bench loses.

I have two counts: the first being mere interruptions (as noted in the transcript) and the second being a more careful count of actual questions (and by questions I include interjections and statements).

Count 1 (total interruptions): Petitioner side (both Blatt and Clement) interrupted 71 times; Respondent side (both Rothfield and Kneedler) interrupted 72 times. Blatt (arguing 20 minutes, including rebuttal), interrupted 59 times; Clement (arguing 10 minutes, plus additional time granted by Roberts, C.J.) interrupted 13 times). Rothfield (arguing 20 minutes, plus additional time granted by Roberts, C.J.) interrupted 53 times. Kneedler (arguing 10 minutes) interrupted 19 times.

Count 2 (total questions): Petitioner side — 57 questions; Respondent side — 66 questions.

In either count, the petitioner has a slight edge. Based on questions and interruptions in total, it is clear that Paul Clement (to whom the Court granted a short period of extra time) was the most successful in oral argument, followed by Charles Rothfield. Both Lisa Blatt and, especially, Ed Kneedler, faced more scrutiny than did the others.

The second component is a quick look at whether this case will be decided on constitutional/federal common law grounds or statutory interpretation grounds. This is more important to me than who wins, even. As those of you who heard my talk at Fed Bar last Thursday, I believe this case is a winner for Indian country overall if it is decided on statutory interpretation grounds, even if the Cherokee Nation and the Father lose, because it will mean that the Indian Child Welfare Act survives to fight again another day. With a few exceptions, mostly relating to questions from the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, constitutional/federal common law questions rarely came into the discussion today, even during Mr. Clement’s portion of argument (he had raised questions on the constitutionality of ICWA). However, both Mr. Clement (who raised then-DOJ lawyer Patricia Wald’s constitutionality analysis), and Ms. Blatt (who offered up a canned attack on the broadest possible implications of the case at the end), both raised the question, to be sure. Even so, the vast, vast majority of the discussion involved the interpretation of ICWA, not the constitutionality of ICWA.

So, given these factors, my prediction is that the petitioners stand a better chance to win, but the Indian Child Welfare Act stand a good chance of survival.

Kate Fort and I will be posting more on the argument as the day moves on.

Baby Veronica Oral Argument Transcript

Here.

TT analysis to follow shortly.

NYTs Editorial Board Opposes Cherokee Parent in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Ugh.

Here.

John Echohawk et al. on Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: “The Adoption Industry’s Ugly Side”

John Echohawk, Jaqueline Pata, and Terry Cross have a scathing op-ed on Politico here.

An excerpt:

Poke beneath the basic facts, though, and you will find the ugly underbelly of the American adoption business. All across this country – but especially in states that are home to multiple Native American Tribes – unethical adoption attorneys are purposely circumventing the federal law that is meant to protect Native American children. Even worse are the continuing attempts by some adoption lawyers to take advantage of active duty service members in the process of being deployed to combat, or in active deployments.

Brown’s case is a sad example of both of these disturbing trends. At its very heart, this case is about a father’s deep desire to raise his daughter, named Veronica. Veronica’s mother and Brown were engaged when she was conceived, but her mother broke off the engagement while Brown was serving in the Army and stationed at Fort Sill, Okla. Unbeknownst to Brown, his fiancé began the process of placing her child up for adoption.

In the final months of pregnancy, the mother cut off all communication with Brown and worked closely with an agency and attorney to place the child with a non-Indian couple from South Carolina, the Capobiancos. Brown was not informed of Veronica’s birth on September 15, 2009. Instead, Veronica was placed with the Capobiancos three days after her birth in Oklahoma, and they relocated her to South Carolina shortly thereafter.

Four months later, the day before Brown’s scheduled deployment to Iraq, the couple’s lawyer (who was also the lawyer for the adoption agency) finally served Brown with notice of their intent to adopt Veronica. The notice was served to Brown in the parking lot of a mall.

National Law Journal Appellate Lawyer of the Week — Chrissi Ross Nimmo

An excerpt (the full article text is available on the Cherokee Nation website):

Nimmo was born in Tahlequah, Oklahoma, the capital of Cherokee Nation. She was raised in Warner, Oklahoma, which, she likes to say, is probably the only town in the country with a college and no stoplight. “It’s that small,” she said. She has a master’s in business administration from Northeastern State University in Tahlequah and a law degree from the University of Tulsa College of Law.

The Cherokee Nation’s attorney general’s office is midsized “by Oklahoma standards,” 10 attorneys. Nine are tribal citizens and one is an “honorary” Cherokee. They are prosecutors in Cherokee court and in-house counsel to Cherokee Nation by advising its departments, handling contracts and appeals before administrative boards, among other duties.

Nimmo joined the attorney general’s office right out of law school in 2008. “I was in the top five percent of my class and did some internships at some big law firms in Tulsa,” she recalled. “I quickly realized that was not what I wanted to do when I graduated. Part of it was I wanted to be in a courtroom. I also didn’t want to do solo. This is a great place to work. As an attorney, I’m salaried and don’t do billable hours. Why would you ever leave that?

“Indian law is a tight knit group of attorneys. Whether you work in-house for a tribe or represent a tribe, every Indian law decision in an appellate court can affect all tribes.”

Cal. COA Decides Tribal Customary Adoption Case involving Pit River Tribe

Here is the opinion in In re A.M.

The court’s syllabus:

M.W., mother of the minor, and the Pit River Tribe (Tribe) appeal from orders terminating parental rights after reversal of the previous termination orders and remand in case No. C067143 for a new hearing on mother‟s petition for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother argues the court erred in denying her petition for modification (§ 388) and failed to apply the Indian child exception to termination of parental rights. The Tribe raises various issues related to tribal customary adoption (TCA) and the Yolo County Department of Employment and Social Services‟ (Department) inaction with respect to TCA. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Audio of Casey Family Programs Press Briefing

Last Monday, the Casey Family Programs held a press briefing on the amicus brief in support of ICWA in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. The audio is here.

The press release and other information is here and can also be found through a previous posted blog here.

One of the organizations that signed onto the brief was National Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA), which was holding their annual conference last week. As a CASA volunteer and volunteer coordinator, I had the opportunity of attending the conference. I also assisted in the presentation of an ICWA workshop to other CASA volunteers and staff. If anyone would like the handout we used in the presentation or more information let me know.

New Mexico COA Reverses Parental Rights Termination in Case Involving Child Eligible for Navajo Membership

Here is the opinion in State, ex rel., Children, Youth, and Families Department v. Marsalee P.

An excerpt:

We examine in this appeal of a parental termination order circumstances that require the district court and Petitioner Children, Youth and Families Department (the Department) to fulfill obligations under the Abuse and Neglect Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 32A-4-1 to -34 (1993, as amended through 2009). We hold that the district court erred by terminating Mother’s parental rights without ensuring that the Department had complied with Section 32A-4-22(I) of the Abuse and Neglect Act, which mandates that the Department “shall pursue the enrollment” on behalf of children eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights and remand to the district court.

Andrew Cohen on Baby Veronica in The Atlantic

A powerful read. Update — We’ll keep this on the front page of Turtle Talk for a few days.

Here.

An excerpt:

The United States Supreme Court next Tuesday hears argument in a head-spinning case that blends the rank bigotry of the nation’s past with the glib sophistry of the country’s present. The case is about a little girl and a Nation, a family and a People. The question at the center of it has been asked (and answered) over and over again on this blessed continent for the past 400 years: Is the law of the land going to preclude or permit yet another attempt to take something precious away from an Indian?

Update: Kate Fort’s post on the case here on the Faculty Lounge.