Ninth Circuit Affirms Indian Country Capital Murder Conviction

Kinda, somewhat interesting case arising on the Colville Reservation, where the defendant wasn’t indicted for more than 10 years after the crime — United States v. Gallaher. Here is the court’s take:

The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 conditionally eliminated the death penalty for Native American defendants prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act or the General Crimes Act, subject to the penalty being reinstated by a tribe’s governing body. See 18 U.S.C. § 3598. In 2005, a federal grand jury indicted defendant-appellant James H. Gallaher, Jr., for first degree murder, more than 14 years after he killed Edwin Pooler on the Colville Indian Reservation in eastern Washington. Because the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation have not reinstated the death penalty, Gallaher argues that he is not subject to the death penalty and thus the five year federal statute of limitations for noncapital crimes applies to his offense. See id. §§ 3281-82. We disagree and hold that first degree murder remains a capital offense, regardless of whether capital punishment can be imposed in a particular case.

There was a dissenter (Judge Tashima), who argued:

In my view, the Federal Death Penalty Act removes first degree murder committed within the boundaries of “Indian country” from the realm of offenses punishable by death and delegates to the tribes the authority to determine the availability of the death penalty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3598. The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation has not elected to make the death penalty available for first degree murder on the Colville Reservation. Thus, capital punishment has been clearly eliminated for the crime for which Gallaher was indicted. Because Gallaher has not been indicted for an “offense punishable by death,” see 18 U.S.C. § 3281, the five-year statute of limitations applies, see 18 U.S.C. § 3282.

Here are the materials:

Gallaher Opening Brief

US Appellee Brief in Gallaher

Gallaher Reply Brief

Tenth Circuit Affirms Sentence in Major Crimes Act Conviction

Here is the unpublished opinion in United States v. Jim, a case arising on the Navajo Reservation.

U.S. v. White Mountain–Jurisdictional Defense to Federal Prosecution Based on 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty

Here are the materials (no decision from the Eighth Circuit yet):

White Mountain Opening Brief

USA Appellee Brief

White Mountain Reply Brief

U.S. v. Maggi — Ninth Circuit Further Refines Who is an “Indian” under the Major Crimes Act

Here are the materials:

CA9 Opinion

Maggi Opening Brief

Government Brief in US v Maggi

Maggi Reply Brief

Mann Opening Brief

Government Brief in US v Mann

Mann Reply Brief

An excerpt:

Gordon Mann and Shane Maggi appeal from unrelated convictions on the same basis, namely that they are not “Indians” for purposes of prosecution under the Major Crimes Act. Because there is no evidence that Mann has any blood from a federally recognized Indian tribe, his conviction must be vacated. Maggi’s documented blood from a federally recognized tribe is scant-1/64. However, we do not decide the novel question whether Maggi’s Indian blood degree is adequate; rather, because Maggi lacks sufficient government or tribal recognition as an Indian, his conviction must also be vacated. In light of this disposition, we need not consider Maggi’s additional challenges to the sufficiency of the indictment and the reasonableness of the sentence.

The real question here is whether the government thinks this is the right vehicle to test the Ninth Circuit on the means by which it defines “Indian” under the Major Crimes Act. I’d say definitely not Mann (with no Indian blood from a federally recognized tribe), but maybe Maggi (still only 1/64 blood from a federally recognized tribe). I bet they wait for another case (assuming they want one at all).

Briones v. U.S. Cert Petition

This involves crimes committed on and around the Gila River Indian Community, prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act. Here is the petition: Briones v US Cert Petition.

It looks like a pair of interesting questions. There may be a decent shot for review if the petition’s representations are correct.

Questions presented:

1. Whether the District Court and the Circuit Court erred in admitting the out-of-court statements of Arlo Eschief to the jury by the prosecution through testimony of a law enforcement agent constituting hearsay testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause?

2. Whether the District Court had the jurisdiction under the General Crimes Act 18 U.S.C. § 1152 and the Major Crimes Act 18 U.S.C. § 1153, to apply federal statutes of crimes on Indian land not expressly authorized by Federal statute?

Eighth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Murder Conviction

Here is the opinion in United States Azure (or Wind)–US v. Wind

Ninth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Conviction

Here is the opinion in United States v. Other Medicine (opinion here).

Eighth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Conviction

The case is United States v. Littlewind (opinion here).

Challenge to Major Crimes Act Rejected

Here are the opinions in United States v. Prentiss (D. Minn.):

Prentiss Magistrate Report

Prentiss DCT Order Adopting R&R

Equal Protection Challenge to Major Crimes Act Fails

Here is the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion in United States v. Lyons.

An excerpt:

Lyons contends that the mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) unconstitutionally violates his right to equal protection. This contention fails because § 2241(c) does not discriminate against Native Americans, either on its face or as applied. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). Any disproportionate impact § 2241 has on Native Americans simply reflects the different treatment of criminals under the Major Crimes Act who commit crimes in a federal enclave. See United States v. Lemay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645, 648-49 (1977) (holding that federal legislation, although relating to Indian tribes, is not based upon impermissible racial classifications; and that it is of no consequence that the federal scheme differs from a state criminal code.)