Here are the materials in EXC, Inc. v. Jensen (D. Ariz.):
DCT Order Granting EXC Motion for Summary J
Tribal court materials are here.
Here are the materials in EXC, Inc. v. Jensen (D. Ariz.):
DCT Order Granting EXC Motion for Summary J
Tribal court materials are here.
Here are the materials in Harvey v. United States:
Paul Spruhan (Navajo DOJ) has posted his chapter, “The Meaning of Due Process in the Navajo Nation.” This is a chapter from “The Indian Civil Rights Act at Forty.”
Here is the abstract:
The article is a contribution to the Indian Civil Rights Act at Forty, and describes the Navajo Nation’s approach to the concept of due process under the Indian Civil Rights Act and the Navajo Bill of Rights. It traces the evolution of the Navajo Supreme Court’s views on due process from direct application of federal definitions to the development of a unique Navajo doctrine informed by federal constitutional doctrine, but ultimately reflecting Navajo values of fairness. Based on the discussion of the development of Navajo due process, the article suggests the Navajo Nation’s approach in synthesizing federal doctrine with tribal values can be a model for other tribes grappling with developing modern court systems that emphasize jurisprudential sovereignty through the development and application of unique tribal law.
Here:
Victor Bowman v. Delores Greyeyes. Opinion. Bowman files a petition asking the Court to reconsider its Dec. 14, 2011 summary denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus. Reconsideration petitions for special actions may not be filed without leave of the Court. The Court treats the petition as a motion for leave but states that, in future, petitions for leave must first be filed pursuant to N.R.C.A.P. Rule 19(d), and must contain sufficient detail for the Court to rule on the request. In this case, the Court denies the motion as Bowman offers no new argument. (January 24, 2012).
Here:
Navajo Nation v. RJN Construction Management, Inc., et al, No. SC-CV-13-11. Opinion. In this appeal filed by RJN, the Home for Women and Children, and Robert Nelson, the Supreme Court affirms the lower court’s permanent order enjoining appellants from blocking access to the worksite and otherwise interfering with the Navajo Nation’s legal obligation to build a shelter facility pursuant to a business site lease issued to the Home by the Navajo Nation. The Court stated that a business site leaseholder’s possessory right on tribal trust land is strictly limited by the specific purposes for which the lease has been approved for the holder. The Court further stated that while the lower court was wrong in excluding contract-based justifications from RJN on the basis of sovereign immunity, the justifications were only relevant insofar as they bear on the consideration of the injunction itself as an equitable remedy. In this case, the Court found harmless error. (January 17, 2012).
Here they are (website):
Bitsie v. Greyeyes, Opinion. The Court grants habeas relief to a defendant who was verbally charged with an additional crime at his pre-trial conference, arrested, then denied bail at his arraignment later the same day. While Navajo law allows bail to be heard at arraignment, the law requires specific findings on enumerated grounds by clear and convincing evidence. No such findings were part of the record in this case. Additionally, the Court stated that where the underlying charge does not specify incarceraton as a possible sentence, courts shall consider alternatives to detention as a first option. (December 29, 2011).
In the Matter of Quiet Title to Livestock Grazing Permit No. 8-487 Formerly Held by Martha Francis, Opinion. In this appeal of the Kayenta Family Court’s dismissal of a quiet title action regarding a grazing permit due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court reverses, stating that Navajo Nation Council resolution CO-59-03 did not establish the Office of Hearings and Appeals as the exclusive forum for resolving disputes concerning grazing permits and did not divest the family courts of their authority to hear and decide such matters as part of probate and quiet title actions. The Court stated that upon remand, the family court must look into whether the decedent perfected a transfer of the permit during her lifetime or effected an oral will. Additionally, the Court addressed the 5-year statutory probate filing deadline and stated in a footnote that a late filing does not mean that a decedent’s estate may never be legally distributed. A decedent’s family may still seek distribution of the decedent’s estate through intestate administration after the statute of limitations has passed. (December 29, 2011).
Here.
The court’s syllabus:
In this attempted filing of a pleading contesting an order of the Office of Hearings and Appeals without a filing fee due to indigency, the Court dismisses on the basis of improper filing. The Court repeats that the fee is jurisdictional and may be waived only where required under the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights. The Court provides a summary of circumstances in which the waiver is available, and cautions filers that their pleadings must conform to content requirements in appellate court rules.
The Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation came to Yale to hear a case on Monday evening. Photo by Jennifer Cheung.
News coverage here.
Here are the materials in EXC, Inc. v. Jensen (D. Ariz.). This is a federal appeal to a Navajo Nation Supreme Court decision affirming jurisdiction over the nonmember company (we posted those materials here).
DCT Order in EXC (denying motion to dismiss)
Navajo Court Defendants Concurrence in Motion to Dismiss
Here is the Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenfelt & Buffington v. Johnson. From the court’s syllabus:
In this appeal of a Navajo Nation Labor Commission’s finding that termination of an employee was not for just cause because each of numerous violations were not substantial, and additionally progressive discipline was not imposed even though k’e measures through meetings were held with the employee for more than eight months, the Court reverses, discusses k’e measures, and sets the standard for substantial misconduct in cases of repeated minor violations.
And from the opinion itself:
When Appellant made its concerns about Appellee’s violations known to Appellee over the course of eight months through personal meetings and emails without imposing punishments, Appellant undertook a course of action in keeping with the Diné Fundamental Law, which emphasizes personal accountability through talking out, self-knowledge and self-correction. The Court notes that the situation presented to us also shows how little respect is accorded k’é measures by an employee when the employer undertakes such measures without also imposing punishments or threats of punishments. The employment workplace is where the people on the Navajo Nation now spend the larger share of our days in earning a living. This case illustrates that the societal change from family self-sufficiency (working independently to provide for one’s family) to wage earning (working for someone else) appears to have changed the perspective of some regarding the basic tenet of our culture that an individual voluntarily corrects errant conduct out of respect for others.
Unfortunately, self-accountability has not been smoothly translated to the modern workplace of employers, employees, paychecks and disciplinary sanctions. Appellee’s actions show a belief, apparently relying on an interpretation of how employment laws have evolved in our sister jurisdictions, that workplace violations require no corrective actions by an employee unless the employer has made a threat of future sanctions. While this state of workplace relationships may be acceptable in bilagaana jurisdictions, it is not the Diné way, nor will our laws support such a purely adversarial interpretation of employer-employee responsibilities to each other in the workplace when disputes occur.
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