As Indianz reported….
Here is the order: DCT Dismissal of Onondaga Land Claims
Northern District of New York
Update in St. Regis Mohawk Tax Case — TRO Granted
Update in Seneca v. Paterson Tax Case
As Indianz reported, the TRO has been extended to September 14, on which day there will be an evidentiary hearing (Pre-Hearing Order).
In addition to Cayuga, which intervened in the Seneca suit, and St. Regis Mohawk, Oneida (Oneida Nation complaint in NDNY) and Unkechauge (COMPLAINT – Unkechauge Indian Nation 08 27 10) have filed their own separate complaints alleging substantially the same claims as Seneca.
St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Paterson — Indian Taxation Complaint
Filed around the same time as the Seneca case, but in the Northern District of New York:
Western Mohegan Tribe Land Purchase Contract Breach (with Non-Intercourse Act Principles) Dismissed
Here are the materials in BGA v. Ulster County (N.D. N.Y.):
Ulster County Motion for Summary Judgment
Pending Summary Judgment Motions in St. Regis Mohawk Reservation Border Claim
Here are the materials in St. Regis Mohawk v. Paterson (N.D. N.Y.):
New York & Franklin County Motion to Dismiss
Upstate Citizens Claims re: Oneida Fee to Trust Fail (Mostly)
Here are the materials in Upstate Citizens for Equality v. Salazar (N.D. N.Y.), a companion to Central New York Fair Business Assn. v. Salazar (N.D. N.Y.):
DCT Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment
US Motion for Partial Dismissal
Plaintiff Response to Motion for Partial Dismissal
US Motion to Dismiss Supplemental Claim
Federal Court Dismisses Private Parties’ Challenge to Oneida Trust Land Aquisition
Here are the materials in Central New York Fair Business Assn. v. Salazar (N.D. N.Y.):
US Motion for Partial Dismissal of Complaint
CNYFBA Response to First Motion to Dismiss
US Motion for Partial Dismissal of Amended Complaint
CNYFBA Response to Second Motion to Dismiss
US Reply in Support of Partial Dismissal of Amended Complaint
Presumably, other claims on the merits remain (here is the complaint — CNYFBA Complaint, and the amended complaint — CNYFBA Amended Complaint).
Federal Court Dismisses Additional Challenges to Oneida Trust Acquisition
Here is Judge Kahn’s order in New York v. Salazar (New York v Salazar DCT Order), the companion case to Oneida County v. Salazar. Once again, Judge Kahn rejects the nondelegation doctrine challenge, as well as Tenth Amendment and IGRA-related challenges. Also, and perhaps a more interesting development, the court rejected the State’s arguments relating to whether OIN is eligble for a trust acquisition.
The first argument was that OIN rejected the Indian Reorganization Act in 1935:
The ROD indicates that the OIN voted to reject the IRA but does not address whether the vote satisfied the statutory requirement. See Siegfried Aff., Ex. A. at 33 (Dkt. No. 57, Attach. 3); OIN’s Statement of Facts ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 84, Attach 9). It is, therefore, an issue of fact whether the OIN validly voted to reject the IRA. However, it is unnecessary to decide whether the OIN rejected the IRA, as Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act (“ILCA”), 25 U.S.C. § 220214 (“Section 2202”) to amend or repeal any possible Section 478 trust land disability. See 25 U.S.C. § 2202.
The second relates to the Secretary of Interior’s position (first raised in the Carcieri litigation) that the Indian Land Consolidation Act amendments allow for a tribe potentially affected by Carcieri to be eligible for trust acquisitions:
A principle purpose of both the IRA and ILCA was to restore Indian economic life through expanding tribal land bases. The IRA was promulgated in 1934 as “[a]n Act to conserve and develop Indian lands and resources.” 48 Stat. 984 (1934). “The intent and purpose of the [IRA] was ‘to rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.’” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152-54 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934)); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974) (“The overriding purpose of the [IRA] was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and economically”). ILCA was subsequently enacted in 1983 to further effectuate this purpose by, inter alia, removing the Section 478 disability and expanding the reach of the IRA and Section 465, specifically. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-908, 7 (1982) (“Section 203 [25 U.S.C. § 2202] extends the provisions of section 5 of the Act of June 18, 1834 [i.e., the IRA] to all tribes.”).
Restricting the definition of “tribe” under Section 2201(1) to only include tribes for which the
United States already holds land in trust would vitiate the very purpose and intent of ILCA.
This is the first court to address this question, and they accepted the Secretary’s position. Very interesting.
Federal Court Dismisses Effort to Enforce Billion-Dollar Judgment Against Harrah’s
But not on Indian law grounds — because the case was settled orally in 2003.
An excerpt:
A balancing of the Winston factors tips decidedly in favor of the conclusion that a binding oral settlement agreement was reached on March 31, 2003 ending the litigation in this Court over the Tribal Court Judgment. “[T]o protect the parties appearing before it, to preserve the integrity of an action, to maintain its ability to render a final judgment and to ensure the administration of justice,” Haitian Ctrs., 817 F. Supp. at 337, the Court finds that the prior actions were finally dismissed by virtue of the oral settlement agreement entered on March 31, 2003. See Mone, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19445, 2001 WL 1518263, at *1 (finding that the action had been settled even though the formal stipulation was never submitted where defense counsel wrote the court confirming a conversation with the judge’s law clerk that the matter had been settled and stating that a formal stipulation would be drafted and forwarded to the court within three weeks); Van Ness, 129 A.D.2d at 932, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 571 (finding that an out-of-court oral agreement to settle as case was binding even though defendant never executed the general release and stipulation discontinuing the action forwarded by defendant counsel). Accordingly, because the subject matter of this action has been asserted in a prior action and settled by an oral agreement to end that matter with prejudice, Defendants’ motion must be granted and this action dismissed. The Court need not, and does not, reach the alternative arguments for dismissal.
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