Here is the petition in Makah Indian Tribe v. Quileute Indian Tribe & Quinault Indian Tribe:
2018-05-21 makah cert petition and appendix
Question presented:
The question presented is whether the Ninth Circuit—in conflict with the decisions of this Court and other courts—properly held the Treaty of Olympia confers this expansive “fishing” right.
Lower court materials in United States v. Washington subproceeding 09-01 here.
From Justice Gorsuch’s opinion:
Like some courts before it, the Washington Supreme Court read Yakima as distinguishing in rem from in personam lawsuits and “establish[ing] the principle that . . . courts have subject matter jurisdiction over in rem proceedings in certain situations where claims of sovereign immunity are asserted.” 187 Wash. 2d, at 868, 389 P. 3d, at 574.
That was error. Yakima did not address the scope of tribal sovereign immunity. Instead, it involved only a much more prosaic question of statutory interpretation concerning the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887. See 24 Stat. 388.
***
We leave it to the Washington Supreme Court to address these arguments in the first instance. Although we have discretion to affirm on any ground supported by the law and the record that will not expand the relief granted below, Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U. S. 27, 30 (1984), in this case we think restraint is the best use of discretion. Determining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes is a grave question; the answer will affect all tribes, not just the one before us; and the alternative argument for affirmance did not emerge until late in this case. In fact, it appeared only when the United States filed an amicus brief in this case—after briefing on certiorari, after the Tribe filed its opening brief, and after the Tribe’s other amici had their say. This Court has often declined to take a “first view” of questions that make their appearance in this posture, and we think that course the wise one today. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).
Here:
Update (5-30-18):
supplemental brief for respondent in response to brief of us solicitor general
Here are the materials in Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den Inc.
Here is today’s order list.
Here is the petition in Bearscomesout v. United States:
Question presented:
Whether the “separate sovereign” concept actually exists any longer where Congress’s plenary power over Indian tribes and the general erosion of any real tribal sovereignty is amplified by the Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s Constitution in this case such that Petitioner’s prosecutions in both tribal and federal court violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Ninth Circuit’s unpublished opinion is here. We posted briefs in this case because the federal appellate defender characterized this case as a direct challenge to the applicability of the dual sovereign exception to double jeopardy as applied to Indian tribes.
SCOTUSBlog notes this case has been relisted, perhaps because a justice wants to write a dissent from denial of certiorari (Justice Thomas anyone?), but who knows?
Here is the petition:
Questions presented:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1491 grant the court of federal claims jurisdiction over an action to recover grant-in-aid funds unlawfully recouped by the United States or is the action one for specific relief which must be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702?
Does the court of federal claims have jurisdiction to enter a judgment on an illegal exaction claim when the United States had previously awarded money to a recipient under a grant-in-aid statute and then unlawfully recouped the funds?
Where a grant-in-aid statute mandates that the United States pay grant funds to a plaintiff, does the court of federal claims have jurisdiction to enter a money judgment for the failure to pay the grant funds even if there are conditions on the use of the grant funds after they are awarded?
Lower court materials here.
UPDATE:
Here is the petition in County of Amador v. Dept. of the Interior:
UPDATE: Cert Opp
Questions presented:
1. Whether Congress intended the phrase “under Federal jurisdiction,” as used in the 1934 Act, to encompass a tribe that, as of June 18, 1934, had no land held on its behalf by the federal government, either in trust or as allotments; was not a party to any treaty with the United States; did not receive services or benefits from the federal government; did not have members enrolled with the Indian Office; and which was not invited to organize under the IRA in 1934 by the Secretary like other recognized tribes in Amador County; but for whom the federal government had unsuccessfully attempted to purchase land pursuant to a generic appropriation authorizing the purchase of land for unspecified “landless Indians” in California?
2. Whether the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust for “members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” requires that the tribe have been “recognized” in 1934, in addition to being “under Federaljurisdiction” at that time, or whether such “recognition” can come decades after the statute’s enactment?
3. Whether the Secretary, having explicitly concluded that in enacting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Congress intended that Indian tribes “restored to Federal recognition” refers only to tribes that are “restored” pursuant to (a) congressional legislation, (b) a judgment or settlement agreement in a federal court case to which the United States is a party, or (c) “through the administrative Federal Acknowledgment Process under [25 C.F.R. § 83.8],” and having embodied that conclusion in a formal regulation, 25 C.F.R. § 292.10, can then act contrary to Congress’s intention by “grandfathering in” a preliminary (i.e., non-final) agency action treating Indians who do not meet the regulatory definition as “restored”?
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