Here:
Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town Opening Brief
Case materials here.
Here are the materials in Public Service Company of New Mexico v. Barboan:
Transwestern Pipeline Company Amicus Brief
Prior posts here.
Here is the opinion in the consolidated appeal captioned Modoc Lassen Indian Housing Authority v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.
An excerpt from the lead opinion:
These consolidated appeals arise from a government agency’s decision to recapture, via administrative offset, funds that the agency allegedly overpaid to multiple grant recipients. The grant recipients brought suit in federal court, arguing in relevant part that the agency lacked authority to recapture the funds without first providing them with administrative hearings. The district court agreed and ordered the agency to repay the grant recipients. The agency now appeals that order.
If these underlying facts sound relatively straightforward, it’s because they are. But they nevertheless give rise to three legal questions that are decidedly less so: (1) did the agency recapture the funds pursuant to a statute or regulation that imposed a hearing requirement, thus rendering the recaptures illegal; (2) if the agency didn’t recapture the funds pursuant to such a statute or regulation, did it have authority to recapture the alleged overpayments at all; and (3) if not, must the agency reimburse the grant recipients for the amounts it illegally collected?
In answering the first of these three questions, the panel unanimously agrees that the agency didn’t recapture the funds pursuant to a statute or regulation that imposes a hearing requirement. Thus, we agree that the district court erred in ruling that the recipients were entitled to hearings before the agency could recapture the alleged overpayments.
But that’s where our unanimous agreement ends; the remaining questions divide the panel. Ultimately, two members of the panel agree that the agency lacked authority to recapture the funds via administrative offset. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the district court’s order that characterizes the recaptures as illegal. Nevertheless, two other members of the panel agree that if the agency no longer has the recaptured funds in its possession, then the district court lacked authority to order the agency to repay the recipients. Thus, we reverse that portion of the district court’s order and remand for further factual findings.
Briefs:
Here is the opinion in United States v. Magnan.
Here is the opinion in Pueblo of Pojoaque v. State of New Mexico.
An excerpt:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Pueblo of Pojoaque and its governor, Joseph M. Talachy, (collectively “the Pueblo”) appeal from the district court’s dismissal of its claim for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the State of New Mexico’s alleged unlawful interference with Class III gaming operations on the Pueblo’s lands. Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (D.N.M. 2016). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
From the dissent:
This appeal turns on what constitutes regulation of tribal gaming.
The majority answers narrowly, stating that New Mexico is regulating Indian gaming only when the regulation is directly applied to Indian gaming on tribal land. In my view, this approach is unsupportable and unrealistic. Under the allegations in the Pueblo’s complaint, New Mexico is trying—with considerable success—to disrupt the Pueblo’s gaming operations by targeting the Pueblo’s vendors. This disruption is not
softened by the state’s strategy of targeting vendors.
Briefs here.
Here is the opinion in Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe.
An excerpt:
We conclude that the district court erred in excusing the officers from exhaustion of tribal remedies with respect to the Tribe’s trespass claim, which alleges that the officers asserted superior authority over tribal lands and barred a tribal official from accessing the scene of the Murray shooting. Although we do not decide today whether the Tribal Court possesses jurisdiction over that claim, exhaustion is required unless tribal court jurisdiction is “automatically foreclosed.” Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985). The officers have not made this showing for the trespass claim because that claim at least arguably implicates the Tribe’s core sovereign rights to exclude and to self-govern. We further conclude that this claim is not barred by Hicks, which excused exhaustion based on a state’s overriding interest in investigating off-reservation offenses. Such an interest is not at play in this case. Murray was not suspected of committing any off-reservation violation, and the officers were not cross-deputized to enforce state law on the Reservation. However, we agree with the district court that the remaining Tribal Court claims are not subject to tribal jurisdiction and thus exhaustion was unnecessary.
Briefs:
Utah Municipalities Answer Brief
Lower court materials in Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe (D. Utah):
32 Motion for Preliminary Injunction
33 Utah Municipalities Response to 23
Here is the opinion in State of Kansas v. Zinke.
An excerpt:
The question in this case is whether a legal opinion letter issued by the Acting General Counsel of the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) regarding the eligibility of Indian lands for gaming constitutes “final agency action” subject to judicial review. In response to a request from the Quapaw Tribe, the NIGC Acting General Counsel issued a legal opinion letter stating that the Tribe’s Kansas trust land was eligible for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). The State of Kansas and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Cherokee, Kansas, filed suit, arguing that the letter was arbitrary, capricious, and erroneous as a matter of law. The district court concluded that the letter did not constitute reviewable final agency action under IGRA or the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. IGRA’s text, statutory scheme, legislative history, and attendant regulations demonstrate congressional intent to preclude judicial review of legal opinion letters. Further, the Acting General Counsel’s letter does not constitute final agency action under the APA because it has not determined any rights or obligations or produced legal consequences. In short, the letter merely expresses an advisory, non-binding opinion, without any legal effect on the status quo ante.
Briefs here.
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