Tenth Circuit

Briefs here.

(Split) Tenth Circuit Rules against Pojoaque Pueblo in Gaming Dispute with State of New Mexico

July 18, 2017July 18, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Pueblo of Pojoaque v. State of New Mexico.

An excerpt:

Plaintiffs-Appellants Pueblo of Pojoaque and its governor, Joseph M. Talachy, (collectively “the Pueblo”) appeal from the district court’s dismissal of its claim for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the State of New Mexico’s alleged unlawful interference with Class III gaming operations on the Pueblo’s lands. Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (D.N.M. 2016). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

From the dissent:

This appeal turns on what constitutes regulation of tribal gaming.
The majority answers narrowly, stating that New Mexico is regulating Indian gaming only when the regulation is directly applied to Indian gaming on tribal land. In my view, this approach is unsupportable and unrealistic. Under the allegations in the Pueblo’s complaint, New Mexico is trying—with considerable success—to disrupt the Pueblo’s gaming operations by targeting the Pueblo’s vendors. This disruption is not
softened by the state’s strategy of targeting vendors.

Briefs here.

Tenth Circuit Orders Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies over Trespass Claim Involving Nonmember Police Officers

July 11, 2017July 12, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe.

An excerpt:

We conclude that the district court erred in excusing the officers from exhaustion of tribal remedies with respect to the Tribe’s trespass claim, which alleges that the officers asserted superior authority over tribal lands and barred a tribal official from accessing the scene of the Murray shooting. Although we do not decide today whether the Tribal Court possesses jurisdiction over that claim, exhaustion is required unless tribal court jurisdiction is “automatically foreclosed.” Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985). The officers have not made this showing for the trespass claim because that claim at least arguably implicates the Tribe’s core sovereign rights to exclude and to self-govern. We further conclude that this claim is not barred by Hicks, which excused exhaustion based on a state’s overriding interest in investigating off-reservation offenses. Such an interest is not at play in this case. Murray was not suspected of committing any off-reservation violation, and the officers were not cross-deputized to enforce state law on the Reservation. However, we agree with the district court that the remaining Tribal Court claims are not subject to tribal jurisdiction and thus exhaustion was unnecessary.

Briefs:

Opening Brief

Utah Municipalities Answer Brief

Answer Brief

Reply Brief

Lower court materials in Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe (D. Utah):

23 Motion to Dismiss

32 Motion for Preliminary Injunction

33 Utah Municipalities Response to 23

34 State Response to 23

36 Norton Response to 23

37 Reply in Support of 23

38 Opposition to 32

39 Tribal Court Response to 32

40 Reply in Support of 32

57 DCT Order

State Utility Petitions 10th Circuit for Rehearing En Banc

July 10, 2017Sarah M Donnelly

Download(PDF): Petition for Rehearing En Banc

Link: Previous post in the matter of Public Service Company of N.M. v. Barboan et al

Tenth Circuit Holds NIGC Indian Lands Opinion Letters Not Final Agency Action

June 27, 2017June 28, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in State of Kansas v. Zinke.

An excerpt:

The question in this case is whether a legal opinion letter issued by the Acting General Counsel of the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) regarding the eligibility of Indian lands for gaming constitutes “final agency action” subject to judicial review. In response to a request from the Quapaw Tribe, the NIGC Acting General Counsel issued a legal opinion letter stating that the Tribe’s Kansas trust land was eligible for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). The State of Kansas and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Cherokee, Kansas, filed suit, arguing that the letter was arbitrary, capricious, and erroneous as a matter of law. The district court concluded that the letter did not constitute reviewable final agency action under IGRA or the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. IGRA’s text, statutory scheme, legislative history, and attendant regulations demonstrate congressional intent to preclude judicial review of legal opinion letters. Further, the Acting General Counsel’s letter does not constitute final agency action under the APA because it has not determined any rights or obligations or produced legal consequences. In short, the letter merely expresses an advisory, non-binding opinion, without any legal effect on the status quo ante.