Here:
Lower court materials here.
Here is today’s opinion in Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distributors. Judge Gorsuch’s concurring opinion (starting at page 21) is a worthy read for tribal leaders and tribal counsel thinking about doing business outside of Indian country.
Briefs are here.
Excerpt here:
Tina Marie Somerlott appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her claims against CND, LLC (“CND”) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Somerlott brought federal employment discrimination claims against CND, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. After allowing discovery by both parties, the district court concluded CND was immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and, therefore, dismissed Somerlott’s complaint in its entirety. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
this court affirms.
Here are the materials in Harvey v. United States:
Here are the materials in Prairie Band Pottawatomi Nation v. Federal Highway Administration:
Kansas Dept. of Transportation Brief
Here are the lower court materials.
The plaintiff wanted the CIO to enjoin his state court prosecution for violation of anti-cockfighting statutes. Here are the materials in Turner v. McGee:
And the briefs after the CA10 appointed counsel for Turner:
And the Tenth Circuit’s opinion.
A related cockfighting case out of the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Langford, holding federal courts had no jurisdiction.
Here are the materials in Jech v. Dept. of Interior:
Here:
CA10 Order to File Supplemental Briefs
The Tenth Circuit panel requested supplemental briefing after oral argument to address this issue:
This court has previously acknowledged that “[t]ribal sovereign immunity is deemed to be coextensive with the sovereign immunity of the United States.” Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). Regarding the sovereign immunity of the United States, other circuits have held that where the United States is the sole shareholder of an entity incorporated under state law, the United States’ sovereign immunity does not extend to the entity. See Panama R. Co. v. Curran, 256 F. 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1919) (quoting Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904, 907–08 (1824)); Salas v. United States, 234 F. 842, 844–45 (2d Cir. 1916). The parties are therefore directed to submit supplemental briefs regarding the following issues:a) Does CND’s organization as a separate legal entity under Oklahoma’s Limited Liability Company Act preclude it from sharing in the Cherokee Nation’s sovereign immunity?
Lower court materials here.
Here is the unpublished opinion in Chavez v. Navajo Nation Tribal Courts.
An excerpt:
The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that Mr. Chavez’s lawsuit against the Tribal officials could not be maintained in federal court under §1983 because all of his challenges to the Tribal officials’ actions relied on Tribal law. See Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A § 1983 action is unavailable for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law, as opposed to state law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315 (1981) (observing that acting under color of state law is “a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action”). Turning to the Tribe, the court held–after noting that Mr. Chavez failed to even address the Navajo Nation’s sovereignty–that Congress had not authorized suit “against tribal entities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” R. at 631. See Nanomantube v. Kickapoo Tribe in Kan., 631 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n Indian tribe is not subject to suit in a federal or state court unless the tribe’s sovereign immunity has been either abrogated by Congress or waived by the tribe.”); E.F.W. v. St. Stephen’s Indian High Sch., 264 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that tribal sovereign immunity “is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction”).
Mr. Chavez appeals.
Briefs and lower court materials are here.
Here is yesterday’s opinion in Romero v. Goodrich.
Briefs are here.
An excerpt:
Ronald F. Romero, an enrolled member of the Pueblo of Nambé, through counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 to seek relief after a tribal court conviction. The district court dismissed Romero’s petition as moot after the Pueblo commuted Romero’s sentence to time served and released him from tribal custody. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
Here is the opinion in United States v. Diaz. And the briefs:
An excerpt:
Linda Diaz was convicted of knowingly leaving the scene of a car accident where she hit and killed a pedestrian. The accident occurred on the Pojoajue Pueblo Indian reservation. She was charged with committing a crime in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. On appeal, among other issues, Diaz contends the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the crime because the government failed to prove that the victim was not an Indian, a jurisdictional requirement under § 1152.
We conclude the government met its burden of proof. The testimony of the victim’s father provided enough evidence for a jury to conclude the victim was not an Indian for purposes of the statute. We also conclude the district court did not err in its rulings on various other evidentiary and trial issues.
You must be logged in to post a comment.