Title VII – Page 3 – Turtle Talk

Remarkably, Plaintiff demands that the Court ignore this clear and dispositive analysis, and hold that the Tribe is not actually a federally recognized tribe. Plaintiff acknowledges that to do so, this Court would have to find not only that its own previous opinion, Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, No. 2:12–cv–411–SPC–38UAM, 2013 WL 3350567, at *1 (M.D.Fla.2013), was incorrect, but also that the Eleventh Circuit has erred on multiple occasions too, see Mastro, 578 F.App’x 801; Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 692 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir.2012). To support this sizeable request, Plaintiff provides the Court with numerous pages of historical context and argument, explaining how the Tribe, to this date, has failed to achieve federal recognition as an Indian tribe. But this argument is completely without merit. This Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Florida Supreme Court “rotely” accept that the Tribe is federally recognized because it is. Unsurprisingly, this has not changed in 2015. A simple search in the Federal Register reveals as much. To be sure, the United States Bureau of Indian Affair’s most recent list of “Indian entities … acknowledged to have the immunities and privileges available to federally recognized Indian tribes” includes the Seminole Tribe of Florida. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 80 FR 1942–02 (2015) (emphasis added).

Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Pro Se Employment Claims against Mohegan Sun Casino

April 8, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Tremblay v. Mohegan Sun Casino:

Tremblay Brief

Mohegan Brief

CA2 Summary Order

Ninth Circuit Files Amended Opinion in EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co.

November 19, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here. The amendment appears minor:

At Slip Op. 22, 768 F.3d at 974, the sentence beginning with <The Indian preference exemption> and ending with <does not extend to Indians.> is deleted and replaced with:

The Indian preference exemption contained in Section 703(i) is therefore necessary to clarify that Title VII’s prohibition against racial or national origin discrimination does not extend to preferential hiring of Indians living on or near reservations.

Panel materials here.

Second Circuit Brief in IFP, Pro Se Employment Discrimination Complaint against Mohegan Sun Casino

November 17, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the tribe’s brief in Tremblay v. Mohegan Sun Casino:

Mohegan Brief

From the brief:

On May 20, 2014, the Court granted the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The full text of the decision is as follows:

ORDER granting [27] Motion to Dismiss; denying [28] Motion Not to Dismiss. Plaintiff brings this action against her former employer, the Mohegan Sun Casino, alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The motion is granted. The Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, which operates the defendant Casino through the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority (“MTGA”), is a federally recognized Indian tribe. “As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe *4 has waived its immunity.” Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). Neither has occurred here. The Mohegan Tribe has not waived its immunity from suit in this Court, and the statutes under which plaintiff brings this action do not abrogate the Tribe’s immunity. Title VII is expressly inapplicable to Indian tribes, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1), and nothing in the ADEA revokes tribal sovereign immunity from private lawsuits. Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Authority, 268 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, plaintiff cannot bring claims of employment discrimination against an Indian tribe under Title VII or the ADEA. The Mohegan Tribe has enacted legislation establishing a tribal court system as well as legislation waiving the sovereign immunity of the Tribe and the Gaming Authority for discrimination claims by employees against the MTGA, but only in the Mohegan Gaming Disputes Court. Thus, plaintiff’s only remedy is to proceed in that Court. Accordingly, because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 27] is granted and plaintiff’s motion not to dismiss [ECF No. 28] is denied. The Clerk is directed to close the case. So ordered. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 05/20/2014. (Bialek, T.)

Ninth Circuit Affirms Title VII Exemption for Tribal Preference in Employment`

September 26, 2014September 26, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co.:

EEOC Opinion – 09-26-2014

The syllabus:

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with respect to its claim that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited the tribal hiring preference contained in Peabody Western Coal Co. leases with the Navajo Nation.

The panel held that the Navajo hiring preference in the leases was a political classification, rather than a classification based on national origin, and therefore did not violate Title VII. The panel concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to defendants Peabody Western Coal Company and Navajo Nation, and third-party defendant Secretary of the Interior. The panel also held that the EEOC waived on appeal its record-keeping claim. Finally, the panel held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the EEOC’s eleventh-hour motion to supplement the record with a declaration and documents about Peabody’s hiring practices in 1999.

Briefs here. Oral argument audio here.

Eleventh Circuit Rules in Favor of Seminole Tribe in Title VII Matter

August 21, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the unpublished opinion in Mastro v. Seminole Tribe:

Mastro v Seminole

Briefs here.

New Scholarship on Employment Preferences and Statutory Exemptions for Alaska Native Corporations

June 20, 2014June 26, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Gregory S. Fisher & Erin “Faith” Rose have published “Selling Ice in Alaska: Employment Preferences and Statutory Exemptions for Alaska Native Corporations 40 Years After ANCSA” in the Alaska Law Review.

Here is the abstract:

In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in order to settle land disputes between Alaska Natives and the federal government. ANCSA established Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs), which were tasked with managing settlement funds to provide for the health, education, and economic welfare of Alaska Natives. To enable the ANCs to promote the interests of their shareholders, Congress exempted ANCs from certain employment restrictions contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, but did not exempt ANCs from other worker-protective legislation. In subsequent decades, courts reviewing the preferential practices of ANCs have often construed these statutory exemptions narrowly, thus exposing ANCs to liability under various anti-discrimination statutes. This Article argues that Congress never intended to subject ANCs to these pieces of worker-protective legislation, despite court holdings to the contrary. The Article proposes two possible solutions to this discrepancy: (1) congressional amendment of ANCSA to clarify and further limit the extent of ANC liability; and (2) judicial adoption of a two-part test which would consider employment policies giving preference to Alaska Native shareholders in light of Congress’s intent to protect such preferences.