Here.
Yes Magazine: “In Negotiations With Feds, Can Standing Rock Change U.S.-Tribe Relationships?”
Here.
Here.
Finally some rational thinking about TNToT. Here.
This is the fourth full commentary on “The New Trail of Tears” (TNToT), written by Naomi Schaefer Riley (NSR or the author). The announcement post is here.
In line with the earlier chapters, NSR sets sights on specific reservations and tribes, in this chapter targeting Pine Ridge and the Rosebud, and yet more attacks directed at Seneca (a repeat player from Chapter 2).
Attacks on Pine Ridge and Rosebud Indian People and Nations
This chapter delivers the lowest blows on Indian people in TNToT. This is classic blaming the victim, but with undertones of race-baiting. In the TNToT narrative, Indian people struggle and poor because of their own character flaws. TNToT, as usual, offers no tribal or reservation history whatsoever on either the Oglala Sioux Tribe or the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. That naturally would complicate NSR’s harshly judgmental conclusions.
Here’s a bit of history, mostly from my reading of United States v. Sioux Tribe. The history is way, way more complicated. But I am trying more than NSR, who is actively ignoring or hiding the history.
The two reservations now known as Pine Ridge and the Rosebud are far smaller than the original Great Sioux Reservation, which covered all of the Dakotas and parts of other states. My sense is that the Black Hills were the keystone of the entire original reservation. It’s where there were resources in the winter and a gathering place for lots of tribes. The Rosebud and Pine Ridge cannot be considered in isolation without reference to the Black Hills. My guess would be that most of the federally recognized “Sioux”
tribes would rather live in and near the Black Hills than where they are in South Dakota, for example, if they had to choose. The US initially obliged itself in treaty language to protect that territory for the benefit of Indian people, but stupidly placed people like George Custer in charge of that mission, who promptly betrayed the tribes (and later died for it, one could say — remember that victory NSR called “Pyrrhic” on page 3?).
Of course, once the US started on the path toward greatly diminishing Indian land holdings, the Black Hills was the main target. As far as I understand, there is no treaty consenting to the taking of the Black Hills by the US. There are statutes that confiscate the territory, ostensibly negotiated with tribal interests, but these are truly confiscation acts. Ultimately, the Supreme Court (and even Congress, which authorized the suit — it didn’t have to do so) held in 1980 that the taking of the Black Hills was compensable (over the objections of the Executive branch). The United States’ argued that the rancid meat the government provided on occasion to starving Indians in the winter was “just compensation.” [It’s maddening and tiresome that NSR advocates for property rights in Indian country — recall the “magic force” quote on page 15 — but simply will not acknowledge the property rights of Indians and tribes.] Still, the tribes refused the money in order to keep alive the claim to the actual land. Five years ago, the trust fund was at $1.3 Billion and likely far more now. This is far greater context, though ultimately just a snippet, of the history of the Rosebud and Pine Ridge Reservations. TNToT wants nothing of that. Continue reading
Here is the complaint in Daugomah v. Roberts (W.D. Okla.):
Here is the opinion in In re Michael V.
An excerpt:
Kristina C., the mother of five-year-old Alissa M. and two-year-old K.C., appeals the juvenile court‟s September 29, 2105 order terminating her parental rights and identifying adoption as the permanent plan for her two daughters. Kristina contends the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We agree the Department failed to adequately investigate Kristina‟s claim of Indian ancestry, remand the matter to allow the Department and the juvenile court to fully comply with ICWA and related California law and otherwise conditionally affirm the order.
California Court of Appeals, 2nd District (17 reported and unreported notice appeals so far in 2016), continues to state what the Department’s role is in ICWA notice and inquiry:
The Department’s brief in this court reflects its misunderstanding of its duty to meet ICWA’s requirements. The Department attempts to defend its investigation by asserting, “Mother’s paternal aunt, who was present at the detention hearing, also never spoke up to indicate mother’s paternal family believed mother might have Indian heritage.” It was not the paternal great-aunt’s obligation to speak up; it was the Department’s obligation to inquire, an affirmative and continuing duty imposed by both ICWA and California law. (See In re Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 10–11.)
Here are the materials in Goodeagle v. United States (Fed. Cl.):
An excerpt:
This case involves many significant claims against the United States for breaches of fiduciary duty, among other things. Both parties assert that multiple claims can be resolved through summary judgment. The Quapaw Tribe relies heavily on the claim that an accounting document known as the Quapaw Analysis is binding upon the Government, and thus asserts that its claims grounded on this document should be granted through summary judgment. The Government disputes the binding authority of the Quapaw Analysis entirely and asserts multiple defects in the Quapaw Tribe’s claims that bar it from recovery. As explained below, the Court finds that the Quapaw Analysis is binding as to its factual findings only, but not as to the valuation, extrapolation, and calculation models it contains to calculate damages. In addition, the Court finds no merit in any of the arguments for summary judgment presented by the Government. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment regarding the Quapaw Analysis is GRANTED IN PART, but in all other respects, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are DENIED.
Prior postings here.
Here are the materials in State of New York v. United Parcel Service (S.D. N.Y.):
An excerpt:
The fundamental reason why plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment and defendant is not is that when UPS was transporting unstamped cigarettes (how many is “TBD”), it was transporting contraband. Pre-amendment § 471 confirms that stamps were required, that taxability was presumed, and that the burden of proving otherwise was on UPS. UPS has not carried this burden. UPS is not entitled to rely on the judicially imposed injunctions or stays of enforcement obtained by Indian tribes, nor is it entitled to rely upon forbearance. It is also of no moment that there were difficulties in determining when tax was required to be paid or not, and it is also of no moment that the State had stood down on collection from reservation retailers altogether. At the end of the day, the situation — which may have advantaged reservation retailers — placed UPS in a precarious position; without its own statutory exemption or legal assurance, and in the absence of information as to ultimately taxability of the cigarettes they were shipping, transporting shipments was a risky business indeed. But this was a business risk. UPS could choose to undertake such risk or not. One thing has [38] always been clear: UPS has never had exemption from the CCTA.
This is a continuation of Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Hildreth, recently decided by the Eleventh Circuit.
Here are the materials in Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Moore (S.D. Ala.):
An excerpt:
After due and proper consideration of all issues raised, and a de novo determination of those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) and dated August 10, 2016 is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court with the following exceptions. The Court does not adopt the recommendation to deny the Plaintiff’s Motion to strike Defendant Moore’s affirmative defenses numbered 4 and 5, but rather grants the motion to strike defenses 4 and 5 for the reasons set forth in Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. 79). The report and recommendation is adopted in all other respects.
Here are the materials so far Paradigm Energy Partners LLC v. Fox (D.N.D.):
8-mha-nation-motion-to-dismiss
UPDATE (2/17/2017):
Here is “Young man blamed for 3 arson deaths in Alaska village gets traditional justice: Banishment,” from the Anchorage Dispatch News.
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