Author: Kate E. Fort

Alaska Supreme Court on Active Efforts [ICWA]

Kate Fort

Here.

I very nearly made an inadvertent broken record pun here, but seriously, I do talk about making a clean record a lot. OCS didn’t even manage to document state law requirements in this case. And in the continuing theme of this afternoon’s ICWA cases–the requirements of ICWA stand regardless of whether the agency finds the parents cooperative or not.

Like the superior court, we are underwhelmed by the quality of OCS’s testimony. We agree with the court’s observation that OCS “made a rather lackadaisical effort” and “put on a skeletal case about [its] required active efforts.” The superior court was rightly concerned to doubt OCS’s demonstration of active efforts. We acknowledge that the superior court concluded that OCS met its burden due in large part to “the consideration the Court is to give to the parents’ demonstration of an unwillingness to change or participate in rehabilitative efforts.” While this principle remains valid, the parents’ lack of effort does not excuse OCS’s failure to make and demonstrate its efforts. Even considering the parents’ lack of participation, there is simply insufficient evidence in the record to show that OCS made active efforts. It was legal error for the superior court to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family.

***
A related but distinct problem is OCS’s failure to document its active efforts in detail in the record. While documentation is related to OCS’s duty to make active efforts, documenting those efforts is a separate responsibility. The act of documentation is not itself an “active effort”; rather, it is a mechanism for OCS and the court to ensure that active efforts have been made. Documentation is required by ICWA and is critical to compliance with ICWA’s purpose and key protections. The CINA statute also requires OCS to document its provision of family reunification support services. But such documentation is woefully missing here.

Montana Supreme Court on Reason to Know [ICWA]

Kate Fort

Here.

And a long excerpt:

Contrary to the Department’s assertion and the apparent corresponding view of the District Court, the “reason to know” standard does not necessarily require an evidentiary showing, and certainly not by the parents, that a child or parent may be eligible for tribal membership. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.107-08. Nor does ICWA require that an assertion of potential tribal eligibility be certain. Gerardo, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 802; Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 511. See also 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.107(a), (c), -108(a). Any more stringent construction as suggested by the State would defeat ICWA’s manifest purpose and command. Certainly, a “reason to know” is a low standard, but not an unlimited one. In re Jeremiah G., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 207-08 (Cal. App. 2009); In re Z.H., 740 N.W.2d 648, 653-54 (Iowa App. 2007). A “reason to know” requires something more than a bare, vague, or equivocal assertion of possible Indian ancestry without reference to any identified Indian ancestors with a reasonably suspected tribal connection. See Jeremiah G., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 207-08; Z.H., 740 N.W.2d at 653-54. Pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(1), Mother’s asserted belief that she may be eligible for enrollment in the Crow Tribe was minimally sufficient to constitute a reason to know that the children were Indian children under the circumstances of this case.

¶22 We are further troubled by the Department’s apparent view that it has no affirmative duty to make further inquiry or provide tribal notice and inquiry when parents are not cooperative. Lack of parental cooperation is immaterial, is not a basis for equitable waiver or estoppel, and does not otherwise relieve state agencies and courts of the duty to comply with ICWA requirements. Kahlen 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512. ICWA vests Indian children and related Indian tribes with a federal right, independent of but on par with the right of Indian and related Indian tribes with a federal right, independent of but on par with the right of Indian parents, to specified tribal notice and eligibility determinations regardless of the conduct or disregard of the parents. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 49-53, 109 S. Ct. at 1609-11; Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The practical difficulty or inability of a state agency to identify the correct tribe or substantiate an assertion of requisite Indian ancestry does not relieve the agency of its duty to comply with ICWA requirements. See Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512.

Briefing Completed in Brackeen v. Bernhardt (frmly Zinke) in the Fifth Circuit [ICWA Case]

Kate Fort

Oral arguments are March 13.

Principal Briefs on the Tribal Defendant/Intervenor and Federal Side (Pro-ICWA)

Appellant Tribes Brief

Appellant Federal Parties

Navajo Nation Motion to Intervene and Proposed Brief

Amicus Briefs, Pro-ICWA

Congressional Amicus Brief

Constitutional Law Profs Brief

Casey Family Programs and Thirty Child Welfare Organizations Amicus Brief

21 State Attorneys General Amicus Brief

Indian Law Scholars Amicus Brief

325 Tribal Governments and 57 Tribal Organizations Amicus Brief

Prof. Ablavsky Amicus Brief

UKB Amicus Brief

Native American Women’s Amicus Brief

Principal Briefs on the State and Individual Plaintiff side (Anti-ICWA)

AppelleeStateBrief

IndividualPlaintiffBrief

Amicus Briefs (Anti-ICWA)

ChristianAllianceAmicus

ProjectonFairRepresentationAmicus

Goldwater Cato AAAA Amicus

OhioAmicusBrief

Reply Briefs by Tribal Intervenors and Federal Government

Appellant Tribes’ Reply Brief

Federal Reply Brief

Intervenor Navajo Nation Reply Brief

 

Comments Needed for Kansas ICWA Pro Hac Vice Rule Exception

Kate Fort

The Kansas Supreme Court is seeking comments on an amendment for to the pro hac vice rule to exempt out of state ICWA attorneys from fees and associating with local counsel. Deadline for comments is March 15, 2019. Rule is here.

Kansas Supreme Court accepting public comment on Rule 116
TOPEKA—The Kansas Supreme Court is accepting public comment on amendments to Rule 116 regarding admission of out-of-state attorneys to make it easier for a tribe to exercise its rights to participate in Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings.

The Supreme Court will accept comment until 5 p.m. Monday, March 18, 2019. Comments are to be sent to rulenotice@kscourts.org with “Rule 116” in the subject line.

Amendments to Rule 116 are requested by the Kansas Judicial Council, on the recommendation of its Tribal-State Judicial Forum.

Among the amendments requested is new language that exempts an out-of-state attorney appearing in an Indian Child Welfare Act proceeding from paying a fee and from a duty to associate with local counsel. The out-of-state attorney would still need to file a motion for admission pro hac vice, accompanied by the attorney’s verified application.

Wisconsin Passes a Pro Hac Vice Rule Exception for ICWA Attorneys

Kate Fort

Order is here.

This is a great victory by the tribal attorneys who worked on this issue for the past number of years.

All of the ICWA pro hac vice rules are here.

Reason to Know [ICWA] Out of the Ohio Court of Appeals

Kate Fort

2019-ohio-178

In most states, this would most certainly be reason to know, and the agency would be required to do additional inquiry and notify a tribe. When we talk about inconsistent application of the law, this is definitely one of those areas.

With respect to Mother, the following exchange took place:

[MOTHER]: My dad is an Iroquois tribe, but I don’t know if he’s registered, but, I mean, his family is all native Americans and stuff. Yes, they are.

[COUNSEL]: But what we need to know is whether you yourself are registered with a tribe.

[MOTHER]: Oh, no.

[COUNSEL]: You’re not. Okay. That’s what we needed. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

[COUNSEL]: So ICWA does not apply then. THE COURT: Okay. You’re definitely not registered?

[MOTHER]: No, sir. (Jan. 16, 2018 tr. 5-6.) {¶23}

Thus neither L.D. nor S.D. are members of a tribe, and Mother, herself, is not a member of any tribe. Although Mother alleged that her father is an Iroquois, L.D. and S.D. are not his children; they are his grandchildren. As previously stated, the ICWA defines an “Indian child” as any minor child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or “is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. 1903(4) (Emphasis added.) A grandchild of a member of an Indian tribe falls outside the definition and therefore does not qualify as an “Indian child” under the act. Therefore, the ICWA is inapplicable, and the trial court was not required to comply with its mandates.

Published Permanency/Guardianship [ICWA] Case out of Nebraska Court of Appeals

Kate Fort

In re Mercedes L. et al

This is a very long decision, but the court’s discussion of appealability of the order is an interesting one.

Media Statements and News Articles on Fifth Circuit ICWA Case

ilpc

Quote from Intervening Tribes Statement:

We applaud the broad coalition of federal lawmakers, attorneys general from 21
states, and 30 child welfare organizations who have joined 325 Tribal governments and 57 Tribal organizations in filing numerous amicus briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to defend the Constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).

The past 96 hours have witnessed an unprecedented and overwhelming demonstration of support for ICWA and its constitutionality as a wave of amicus briefs were filed urging the Fifth Circuit to reverse the district court’s ruling in Brackeen v. Zinke, which erroneously deemed key provisions of ICWA as being
unconstitutional.

Passed more than 40 years ago by Congress, ICWA was designed to reverse decades of cultural insensitivity and political bias that had resulted in one-third of all Indian children being forcibly removed by the government from their families, their tribes and their cultural heritage.

ICWA ensures the best interests and wellbeing of Native American children are protected. ICWA preserves the stability and cohesion of Tribal families, Tribal communities and Tribal cultures. It maintains and reinforces the political and cultural connections between an Indian child and his or her tribe.

 

Statements here

Articles here (and some are behind paywalls)

Koi Nation v. U.S. Dept. of Interior [Restored Lands Exception]

Kate Fort

Complaint

Answer

Brief on Motion for Summary Judgment

Response to Motion for SJ

Reply

Memorandum Opinion

Unpublished Nebraska Court of Appeals Case on Active Efforts (ICWA).

Kate Fort

Here.

We rarely post unpublished ICWA cases because otherwise that’s all we would do. However, in this case involving an analysis of active efforts, the court found that:

Efforts made in this case included facilitating supervised visits, providing family support hours, drug testing, offering parenting classes to Nathaniel, placing Aviyanah in a NICWA-compliant foster home, and taking steps to enroll Aviyanah in the Rosebud Sioux tribe. Additionally, Nathaniel was provided transportation to visitations and during his job search.

Emphasis added.

This is not an active effort. This is the minimum requirement of 25 U.S.C. 1915 (placement preferences).