Here.
St. Anne’s Residential School survivors are before the Ontario Superior Court today in a bid to get the federal government to release documents the former students say would help corroborate their claims of abuse.
The documents they want are from a five-year Ontario Provincial Police investigation in the 1990s, as well as files from the subsequent trials that resulted in several convictions against school staff and supervisors.
Minnesota Supreme Court decision here.
The Director argues that Michael’s e-mail questioning the tribal court’s impartiality violated Rule 8.4(d). Michael counters that her accusation regarding the tribal court’s impartiality was well founded and, therefore, was not a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Similar to the misconduct in Getty, the conclusion that Michael’s conduct constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(d) rests on the manner in which she raised her concerns about the tribal court’s alleged unfairness. Even if Michael could establish that her concerns were well founded, Michael’s flippant rhetorical question at the end of the e-mail that she addressed to the presiding tribal court judge and sent to opposing counsel was unprofessional and disrespectful. Michael’s conduct demonstrates a failure to “show . . . restraint and . . . respect for the judicial system even while disagreeing strongly with it or its decisions.” In re Getty, 401 N.W.2d at 671; cf. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645-47 (1985)
Here are the materials in George v. Superior Court (E.D. Wash.):
39 DCt Order Dismissing Claims
An excerpt:
Here, the three elements for abstention are met. The underlying Superior Court proceedings are ongoing and it is generally recognized that family relations are a traditional area of state concern. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979); H.C. ex rel. Gordon, 203 F.3d at 613. The Superior Court had apparent concurrent personal jurisdiction over the parties with the Tribal Court and has jurisdiction to determine the legal affect of the Tribal Court proceedings, its own jurisdiction, and to consider deferring to the Tribal Court if it finds it appropriate. See Wash. Rev.Code 37.12.010; Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., 83 Wash.App. 763, 767, 924 P.2d 372 (1996); Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Superior Court of Okanogan County, 945 F.2d 1138, 1140, n. 4 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that Pub.L. 280 did not divest Tribal Courts of concurrent jurisdiction over child custody matters). The children were residing off-reservation in Spokane County for at least six months consecutive prior to when the custody petitions were filed, and it appears the children may have been domiciled on Yakama Nation land for at least a day when Plaintiff’s custody petition was filed in Tribal Court. Finally, both parties availed themselves of the child custody proceedings held in the respective courts. Defendant participated in the Tribal Court proceedings, and Plaintiff participated in the Superior Court proceedings. Thus, Plaintiff has an adequate forum in which to assert her federal claims. At this point, extraordinary circumstances do not exist that would require the Court to refrain from abstaining in this matter.
Release here.
The advisory committee will convene four public hearings across the country beginning in Bismarck, N.D., Dec. 9, focusing on violence in children’s homes, schools and communities in Indian country. Associate Attorney General Tony West will join the task force at the first hearing in Bismarck. The other hearings will be held in Phoenix, Ariz., Fort Lauderdale, Fla. and Anchorage, Alaska early in 2014.
Here.
These revelations are sure to disturb any reader, but the point of Jacobs’s important article is not to expose adoption proponents as disingenuous or malevolent. It is to place an ongoing phenomenon—Indian children’s disproportionately high rate of separation from their families—in proper historical context. (P. 154.) “It is no coincidence,” Jacobs writes, “that the IAP arose during the era in which the federal government promoted termination [of tribal nations’ special status] and relocation policies for American Indians.” (P. 152.) Adoptions enabled the federal government to terminate its responsibilities, child by child, by shifting them to “the ultimate ‘private’ sector.” (P.154.) By extension, Jacobs argues, adoptive families also advanced the government’s long-term “effort[] to eliminate Indianness.” (P. 154.) This, Jacobs demonstrates, was the backdrop for the ICWA. When tribal leaders and advocacy organizations convinced Congress to enact the new law, it was a small victory in a long war. And when plaintiffs invoke the ICWA today, they raise a hard-won shield.
We agree that Margaret Jacobs “Remembering the ‘Forgotten Child’: The American Indian Child Welfare Crisis of the 1960s and 1970s” 37 American Indian Quarterly 136 (2013) is an excellent and important article.
Finding the tribe, not the state, has exclusive jurisdiction over child welfare issues arising on tribal land. Also interesting is the state courts’ continued resistance to recognizing tribal-state agreements surrounding ICWA (pp 9-12) (see, eg, In re R.S. (Minn. 2011)).
For purposes of the ICWA, Ellen’s domicile was that of her
parents. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 48, 104 L. Ed. 2d 29, 46 (1989). At the time DSS filed
the juvenile petition on 8 November 2011, respondents were
domiciled in Cherokee, North Carolina, within the Tribe’s Qualla
Boundary land trust.4 Therefore, this case is governed by 25
U.S.C. § 1911, which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the tribal court, “except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in
the State by existing Federal law.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
Here. (pdf)
Includes summary of the case and legal analysis, including the impact of state statutes and tribal/state agreements.
Tulsa World coverage here.
Ending a custody battle that stretched across two states and dragged on for nearly four years, Dusten Brown will drop all litigation in the “Baby Veronica” case, he announced Thursday.
“I cannot bear to continue it any longer,” Brown said, holding back tears. “I love her too much to continue.”
From the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Here.
In addition to Veronica’s interests, the Cherokee Nation has been a party to all of the proceedings in the courts of South Carolina, in the United States Supreme Court, and in the courts of this State. As such, the Cherokee Nation has a direct and substantial interest in seeing that Veronica’s rights as an Indian child and member of the Cherokee Nation are fully protected, including the right to the special best interests determination under the law of the case. It would be virtually impossible for any court to make this special best interests determination without hearing from the Cherokee Nation.
Reif, V.C.J.
Everything in the life of Baby Girl has changed since 2011, and therefore, I cannot join the majority’s decision to dissolve the temporary stay and to deny original jurisdiction.1 Although this is a complicated case, we should accept our legal responsibility to follow established law in making a determination having such a profound impact on the life of this child.
Gurich, J.
H/T Constitutional Law Prof Blog
Today’s Tulsa World coverage here (including a discussion of the contempt charges in South Carolina).
Turtle Talk 
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