Here.
Eighth Circuit Vacates Sentence in United States v. Spotted Horse
Here.
Here.
Above the Law has additional commentary here.
Here is the opinion in United States v. Seminole.
An excerpt:
We are far from solving the crisis of domestic violence, as “[t]his country witnesses more than a million acts of domestic violence, and hundreds of deaths from domestic violence, each year.” United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1408 (2014). It is a crime that is “notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at trial.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832–33 (2006). Wyatt’s “spouse as victim” holding dictates that the district court correctly compelled the testimony of Limberhand.
Three Indians were struck from the jury during voir dire in United States v. Harding, including one who was struck because he was struck in a prior case. And that’s okay under federal law, apparently:
The prosecutor gave these reasons for the strikes: He said that Lacroix worked with Harding at Dakota Paneling, where Lacroix was a supervisor, and that Lacroix knew Harding. He stated that Cottier was a registered nurse and was a member of a venire in the recent case of United States v. High Wolf. In response to questions from the court, the prosecutor clarified that Cottier had been excused from service in High Wolf, and that the prosecutor was drawing on Cottier’s responses during voir dire in the past.
The General Accounting Office has published a report, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: Information on Cases in Indian Country or that Involved Native Americans.
Here is the opinion in United States v. Magnan.
Here:
An excerpt:
A tribal law enforcement officer conducted a welfare check on Cooley, who had pulled over on a public highway where it crosses the Crow Reservation. It appeared to the officer that he was dealing with a non-Indian person. Soon thereafter, the encounter raised suspicion that Cooley was impaired and trafficking drugs and guns. He was detained and transferred to state custody. The district court suppressed the evidence from the stop based on a new Fourth Amendment test it derived from a tribal roadblock case. The district court held that the detention of Cooley and search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment because, at the time the tribal officer realized Cooley was a non-Indian, it was not obvious that a state or federal crime had occurred. This new obviousness standard, the court held, is “notably higher” than probable cause.
Here:
Questions presented:
1. Whether the Acts of Congress, authorizing the President to set apart and reserve any reservoir site or other lands necessary to conserve and protect the water supply for the Indians or for general agricultural development, diminished the Uintah and Ouray Reservation.
2. Whether as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), the term “Indian Country” includes the National Forest land, and the right of way running through the National Forest lands where the alleged criminal conduct occurred, for purpose of federal criminal jurisdiction.
Lower court materials here.
Here is the unpublished memorandum in Roberts v. Elliott (In re Roberts Litigation).
An excerpt:
The Supreme Court has not addressed the interaction between Oliphant’s rejection of inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and a non-Indian’s ability to waive the question of personal jurisdiction before the tribal court in criminal matters. The extent to which a non-Indian may consent to tribal jurisdiction is not settled law. Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127, 1136–40 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (discussing non-tribal member consent to jurisdiction in civil suits).
Briefs:
Here are the materials in Cheykaychi v. Geisen (D.N.M.):
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