Federal Court Denies Rule 11 Sanctions Motion against Native American Arts by Party Whose Arguments Were Borderline Frivolous

Here are the materials in Native American Arts v. Peter Stone Co. (N.D. Ill.):

367-motion-for-sanctions

370-opposition

371-reply

373-dct-order

An excerpt:

In that briefing, the defendant’s primary position was that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from establishing standing. Its secondary position was that plaintiff did not qualify as an Indian arts and crafts organization under the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (“IACA”), 25 U.S.C. § 305 IACA. Both arguments were rejected as non-starters. Native Am. Arts, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74187, 2015 WL 3561439, at *5-7. An intemperate opponent might have called them frivolous, but the mere fact that a position is a loser does not make it frivolous.

Another:

As for this time, however, it’s worth noting that the defendant was unable to mount a challenge to plaintiff’s standing until six years into this litigation; that tends to further undermine defendant’s position that this was an obvious flaw in the plaintiff’s suit and one that plaintiff should have readily conceded and should have dropped its suit early on. Indeed, if it were such a frivolous suit it would seem that defendant could have put together a successful motion for summary judgment based on the standing issue some time ago, thereby avoiding many of the costs and expenses of which it now complains.

 

WaPo: “In Dakota Access pipeline controversy, Obama’s ties to tribes played pivotal role”

Here.

Financial Blog: “Trump advisors aim to privatize oil-rich Indian reservations”

Here.

Photographer Matika Wilbur at King County Library in Auburn, WA

kimg0360

kimg0356

Army Corps Denies Easement at Standing Rock Pipeline Crossing

NYTs

Press release from NCAI here

NYTs (Timothy Egan): “Fake Cowboys and Real Indians”

Here.

Bundys = fake cowboys 

Standing Rock protest = real Indians

Update in Suit against Pipeline Company in Kiowa Country

Here are the materials in Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners (W.D. Okla.):

14-davilla-motion-to-dismiss-counterclaim

25-emp-response-to-14

28-davilla-reply-in-support-of-14

31-emp-motion-on-damages-and-rules-of-decision

32-davilla-motion-for-summary-j-on-liability

36-emp-response-to-32

37-davilla-response-to-31

38-davilla-reply-in-support-of-32

39-emp-reply-in-support-of-31

51-dct-order-on-31

Prior post here.

Peggy Fontenot Challenge to Oklahoma Art Sales Act

Here is the complaint in Fontenot v. Pruitt (W.D. Okla.):

1 Complaint

NYTs: “Even as Trudeau Reaches Out to First Nations, Mercury Rises”

Here, by Stephen Marche.

Alex Pearl: “Redskins: The Property Right to Racism”

M. Alexander Pearl has published “Redskins: The Property Right to Racism” in the Cardozo Law Review.

The abstract:

Everyone has an opinion, from President Obama to Matthew McConaughey, about the Washington football team name. This Article comprehensively analyzes the legal and social issues surrounding the mascot controversy. I focus my inquiry on the interaction of trademark law and Indian law. I offer three primary contributions in this Article. First, the current mainstream conception of harm caused by the team name is subjective, and I argue that the harm caused by the team name and logo is objective, testable, and demonstrable. Psychological research shows that these images harm Native people. Second, the remedies offered by the Lanham Act are wholly inadequate. Under section 2(a) of the Act, “disparaging” trademarks are subject to cancellation of federal registration benefits. This does little to economically affect the value of the trademark, thereby having no bearing on changing the name. Finally, I suggest a legislative solution that applies real economic pressure to change the team name. Utilizing the tool of express federal preemption, I suggest an approach that directly undermines the economic value of the trademark by precluding trademark infringement suits against unlicensed users of the trademark. This creates real pressure to change the name. Ultimately, this issue directly confronts the doctrinal inquiry into the extent of property rights in intellectual property forms.