ICWA

NCJFCJ Disproportionality Report of Children in Foster Care for FY 2012

Kate Fort

Page 9 of the report has Native American Disproportionality Rates by State. 21 states have overrepresentation of Native kids in care, including Michigan (1.3, and 1.9 in entries to care), Wisconsin (4.1), Minnesota (13.9)and Iowa (4.5). Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota have worse numbers than 10 years ago (page 3).

Report Disproportionality Rates for Children of Color in Foster Care for Fiscal Year 2012 (pdf). Website here.

As a side note, anytime anyone would like to talk about what they think is happening in Illinois/Chicago (no disproportionality shown, almost no ICWA cases pop up on appeal, but with a large urban Native population), we are all ears.

 

Michigan Court of Appeals Opinion on MIFPA and ICWA Notice

Kate Fort1 Comment

The Michigan COA interpreted In re Morris to require a conditional reversal when the parent asserted that his grandmothers were Native and:

It is unclear from the record exactly how or why the caseworker came to the conclusion, reflected in the case service plans, that the minor child is not an Indian child for purposes of 25 USC 1912(a); some elaboration would have been appropriate given the father’s assertion. There is no indication that an inquiry or investigation was made specifically with respect to the father’s claim made at the preliminary hearing, nor an explanation in regard to why the father’s claim was being discounted, assuming it was evaluated or pondered in the first place, such that the ICWA notice requirement was not triggered. Of special concern to us is that the initial case service plan, in its summarization of the trial court’s preliminary hearing order, made no mention of the court’s command that the caseworker “make necessary inquiry and/or notification as to possible Native American Indian heritage.” Furthermore, there is no clear confirmation by the court itself that its initial concerns of whether the child is an Indian child were alleviated. Moreover, the father’s assertion concerning the Native American heritage of the minor child’s paternal great-grandparents fits within the parameters of the examples given by the Morris Court, quoted above, that would trigger the need to serve notice. Morris, 491 Mich at 108 n 18. Finally, petitioner itself concedes that conditional reversal is necessary in order to determine whether the minor child is an Indian child under the law.

Opinion here.

Utah Appeals Court Denies Transfer to Tribal Court

Kate Fort

Granted, it’s a strange and short decision about voluntary relinquishment. But we post it as another example of what state courts do when a tribe allows a case to go forward in state court and then moves to transfer at a later date.

After monitoring the case for approximately one year, the Tribe filed a motion to transfer the case to its tribal court. In response to the motion, the juvenile court found that good cause existed not to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court due primarily to the fact that the case was in an advanced stage of litigation and all relevant witnesses resided in Utah.

Opinion here.

Nebraska Court of Appeals: Active Efforts Required When Children Under State Jurisdiction are In Parental Home

Kate Fort

Opinion here.

Case law in this state has clearly established that the active efforts standard in this section requires more than the reason- able efforts standard that applies in cases not involving ICWA. See, In re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008); In re Interest of Ramon N., 18 Neb. App. 574, 789 N.W.2d 272 (2010). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(6) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
The question presented to us in this case is whether ICWA’s active efforts standard applies when the State, through DHHS, has legal custody of the children, but the children are placed in the parental home. Nebraska appellate courts have not spe- cifically addressed this question. David argues that case law from other jurisdictions should lead this court to conclude that ICWA’s protections are applicable at all stages of a juvenile court proceeding.

***

In reaching the conclusion that active efforts should be pro- vided during periods that placement of the children is with the parent or parents, we recognize that the active efforts required may certainly be different from those required during a period of removal from the home. As discussed by the Nebraska Supreme Court in In re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008), the active efforts standard requires a case-by-case analysis. See, e.g., In re Interest of Louis S. et al., supra (where further rehabilitative efforts would be futile, requirement of active efforts is satisfied); T.F. v. State, Dept. of H & S Services, 26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001); People ex rel. D.G., 679 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 2004); In re Cari B., 327 Ill. App. 3d 743, 763 N.E.2d 917, 261 Ill. Dec. 668 (2002) (degree of active efforts required to prevent Indian familial breakup reduced by parent’s incarceration).

Comments on the BIA Guidelines from AAIA, NICWA, NARF, NCAI, and Indian Law Professors

Kate Fort1 Comment

The comments are in response to the Dear Tribal Leader letter we posted about here.

Here from AAIA, NICWA, NARF, NCAI

Here from Indian law professors.

Here from Craig Dorsay.

Kate Fort’s ICWA Blog Post on Concurring Opinions

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here.

Kate discusses Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, the South Dakota class action alleging massive due process violations involving Indian children. Well worth the read.

News Article on Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik

Kate Fort

Here.

While written court orders are obviously important, court transcripts reflect far more what it is like to be a parent in a fast and confusing hearing about your children. Also makes for a strong argument for these to be public hearings rather than confidential ones. It’s far from a complete solution, but sunshine usually helps more than it hurts.

Federal Court Finds No Jurisdiction for Itself in Tribal Guardianship Proceeding

Kate Fort2 Comments

Here.

Section 1914 does not confer jurisdiction upon this court because the guardianship action at issue here was not decided under State law. Rather, Plaintiff is challenging an Indian tribal court’s decision to place an Indian child in foster care. Plaintiff does not allege that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to make a custody determination or otherwise violated his due process or equal protection rights; rather, he merely alleges that its decision violated the Indian Child Welfare Act. However, the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, gives Indian tribes jurisdiction to determine custody of Indian children. See DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 1989). The Indian Child Welfare Act does not confer jurisdiction upon this court to review the propriety of the tribal court’s guardianship decision in this case.

Federal Judge Orders South Dakota Judges to Comply with Subpoenas in ICWA Class Action

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the newest materials in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik (D.S.D.):

We posted the motion to compel and the order to show case here.

87-1 Plaintiffs Exhibits

88 Judge Davis Response

89 Non-Party State Judges Response

90 Plaintiffs Reply

95 DCT Order Granting Motion to Compel

Prior posts here (denial of motions to dismiss), and complaint here.

Nebraska COA ICWA Matter — Trial Court Reversed where State Agency Failed to Allege ICWA

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the unpublished opinion in In re Avery S.:

In re Avery S

An excerpt:

Therefore, we conclude that at the time the State filed its petition and motion for  temporary custody in this case, it was aware that Katherine’s other children were  members of the Tribe or at least that ICWA was applicable to their case. Accordingly, the State knew or should have known that ICWA applied in the case involving Avery and Izabel. Thus, based on the facts of this case, the State was required to set forth allegations under ICWA in the petition and motion for temporary custody. Based on the State’s failure to do so, the juvenile court erred in entering an order detaining the children and should have dismissed the petition.