Here is the order: DCT Order Approving Settlement.

Of note, the court addressed Michigan AG Cox’s objection relating to Nevada v. Hicks, in which the AG argued that the establishment of a “Tribal Enclave” violated Hicks:

The Attorney General next objects to any limitations on the ability of state police officers to enter the “Tribal Enclave” for law enforcement purposes. The Tribal Enclave is a small parcel within the Isabella Reservation, which includes land owned by the Tribe and viewed by the Tribe as essential to its sovereignty. State police can enter the Tribal Enclave only if they are responding to an emergency call, in “fresh pursuit” of a suspect, or with authorization from the Tribal Police. The Attorney General contends that the restrictions are inconsistent with Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 150 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2001). In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a tribal court’s jurisdiction is limited with respect to non-Indian actors, even as to events that took place within Indian country and on land owned by a tribe. Id.at 358-60. Accordingly, a tribal member cannot sue a state game warden in tribal court for executing a search warrant within Indian country where the game warden was seeking evidence of a crime that occurred outside Indian country.

The procedures described in the law enforcement agreement are consistent with Hicks and the interests of the public. The agreement does not limit the authority of the state police to enforce state law within the Tribal Enclave. Rather, it simply requires that the state police officers follow certain procedures before entering the Tribal Enclave. The state police will still be able to execute state-issued search warrants within the Tribal Enclave after obtaining authorization from the Tribal Police. In the event of an emergency, however, pre-authorization is not required. The agreement is a compromise that enables the Tribe to retain a higher degree of sovereignty within the Tribal Enclave without sacrificing public safety. Accordingly, the Attorney General’s second objection is also reasonably addressed by the settling parties.