In addition to its stunning internal flaws, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta exemplifies Indian law’s broader flaws as a jurisprudence. Castro-Huerta holds that states have concurrent criminal jurisdiction with federal and tribal governments over crimes by non-Indians against Indians on reservation lands. Justice Gorsuch deftly addresses many of the glaring internal flaws in Kavanaugh’s majority opinion, but not all. He does not dissect the hollow assertion that reservations are part of the surrounding state both geographically and politically. This cannot go unaddressed, particularly given its weak analysis, misguided use of precedent, and broader consequences.
Castro-Huerta’s holding affects the precise kind of “jurisdictional overlap” at the root of the slow erosion of tribal sovereignty over time, as first explained in a prior article. The Founders believed two governments generally cannot co-exist, i.e. overlap. They had a firm idea of what happens when jurisdictional overlap occurs: one government slowly subsumes the other over time until nothing meaningful is left, here labeled “competitive sovereign erosion.” The Founding Fathers believed this proposition so much and feared it so deeply that it played a central role in how the Constitution was written, specifically the categorical division of authority between the federal and state governments. Tribal sovereignty will continue to be vulnerable to competitive sovereign erosion until a solution is reached that results in either a respect for tribal borders, or a qualitative division of governmental authority between tribal governments, the federal government, and the states. Anything less will continue the long-term war of sovereign attrition historically experienced by tribes.
Analyzing Indian law as a competitive sovereign erosion problem of the sort contemplated by the Framers and discussing it in terms of United States federalism has additional jurisprudential and advocacy advantages. Doing so disconnects Indian law from the tortured logic exemplified by Castro used to reach anti-Indian results, and reconnects it to the intuitively fair, commonly accepted, and historically effective answers used when White cultures have had the same kinds of problems. From an advocacy perspective, competitive erosion adopts a conceptual framework and lexicon that resonates with conservatives commonly opposed to tribal sovereignty. Using competitive erosion can present tribal sovereignty in a way that persuadable conservatives can embrace.
Tribes wanting to maintain their separate existence need to overturn the assertion that reservations are part of the state, oppose practices that give the appearance of being part of state government, and push congress for legislation that will eliminate jurisdictional overlap between tribes, states, and the federal government.
Thousands of Indigenous women and girls have gone missing or have been found murdered across the United States and Canada; these disappearances and killings are so frequent and widespread that they have become known as the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women Crisis (MMIW Crisis). Indigenous communities in both countries often lack the jurisdiction to prosecute violent crimes committed by non-Indigenous offenders against Indigenous victims on Indigenous land. Extractive industries—businesses that establish natural resource extraction projects—aggravate the problem by establishing temporary housing for large numbers of non-Indigenous, primarily male workers on or around Indigenous land (“man camps”). Violent crimes against Indigenous communities around extractive industry projects have in- creased with the establishment of man camps while the current legal systems leave Indigenous communities vulnerable against this clear threat. Both the United States and Canada have endorsed international declarations of Indigenous rights, agreeing to protect Indigenous communities from violence, yet the MMIW Crisis in both countries con- tinues. This Note first argues that both the United States and Canada can best further their commitments to international Indigenous rights while also combatting the MMIW Crisis by allowing Indigenous communities to exercise full criminal jurisdiction over non-Indigenous assailants of Indigenous victims on Indigenous lands. This Note then argues that, until full criminal jurisdiction over non-Indigenous offenders is realized, the United States and Canada can help further Indigenous international rights by providing extractive industries with financial incentives to address their role in enabling the MMIW Crisis.
Oklahoma v. Castro‑Huerta is an unprecedented attack on the autonomy of Native American nations in the United States. The Supreme Court held that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over a crime committed by a non‑Indian perpetrator against an Indian victim within the Cherokee Reservation’s boundaries. The decision posits that states presumptively have jurisdiction, concurrent with the federal government, over crimes by non‑Indians against Indians in Indian country. But this proposition is at war with a bedrock principle of Indian law, namely, that reservations are essentially “free from state jurisdiction and control,” a policy that “is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.” That principle has stood the test of time, with the high court itself guarding tribes’ autonomy and sovereignty in celebrated Indian law cases dating to the nation’s founding.
Castro‑Huerta drastically extends the reach of state authority into Indian country, and it does so by imposing a dubious, revisionist retelling of the history of U.S.‑tribal relations. The false narrative forged by the majority reflects an extremist “states’‑rights” ideology aggressively projected onto the field of Indian law, threatening to “wip[e] away centuries of tradition and practice” by uprooting a core historical principle protective of Indigenous rights. The decision provoked an immediate U.S. governmental response, with a House subcommittee holding hearings and the Justice and Interior Departments conducting listening sessions in September 2022 to begin assessing the case’s dire implications. Scholarly criticism already is underway as well and likely will proliferate and intensify. With so much at stake for the preservation of tribal sovereignty and the future of federal Indian law, unmasking and deconstructing the decision will remain a pressing project for years to come.
This Article contributes to the project by examining the long line of historical Supreme Court precedents addressing state authority in Indian country to discern and explain their true significance. In addition, the Article casts light on a few important issues in Castro‑Huerta from a unique source: the papers of individual Justices archived at the Library of Congress and various universities across the country. A point of departure is Justice Neil Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in the case, a searing critique that delves incisively into many of the relevant precedents, exposing numerous flaws and fallacies in the majority’s analysis and laying the groundwork for additional commentary and criticism. Anchored in that foundation of principled critical assessment, this Article endeavors to help fill in some of the serious gaps and omissions in the majority’s treatment of state authority in Indian country while periodically referencing the “Indian Law Justice Files” to further illuminate the case’s alarming distortions of history and precedent.
United States (“U.S.”) courts have long failed to recognize the value of oral traditional evidence (“OTE”) in the law. Yet, for Indigenous peoples, OTE forms the basis of many of their claims to place, property, and political power. In Canada, courts must examine Indigenous OTE on “equal footing” with other forms of admissible evidence. While legal scholars have suggested applying Canadian precedent to U.S. law regarding OTE, scholarship has generally failed to critically examine the underlying ethos of settler courts as a barrier to OTE admission and usefulness. This essay uses the work of political philosopher, James Tully, to examine OTE not just as evidence, but as an exercise of Indigenous self-determination. By recognizing the inherent political nature of OTE, U.S. courts may expand on Canadian law to build a “just relationship” with Indigenous peoples.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA) devised a land entitlement system markedly different from the Indian reservation system that prevailed in the Lower 48 states. It directed the creation of twelve, for-profit Alaska Native regional corporations and over 200 private, for-profit Alaska Native village corporations, which would receive the bulk of Native land in the state. This corporate model left nearly all tribes in Alaska without a land base. As such, there is very little Indian Country land in the state over which tribes can exercise territorial-based sovereignty. Yet, the Supreme Court has long recognized the power of tribes to exercise membership-based jurisdiction. This Comment analyzes a range of state and federal court decisions addressing the authority of tribes and argues that Alaska tribes, through membership-based jurisdiction, can exercise various sovereign powers, like the exclusion of nonmembers. Importantly, this membership-based jurisdiction does not depend on lands over which tribes can exercise jurisdiction. Therefore, the exclusionary orders imposed by several Alaska Native tribes during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 were valid exercises of the tribes’ sovereign powers.
What if every gendered legal issue was not burdened by over 200 years of patriarchal and racist precedent? How would feminists craft legal practices and structures in a way that would be grounded by a clear understanding of the harms of oppression and subjugation? These questions are not just rhetorical; this essay argues that a fresh perspective is possible in the context of an Indigenous feminist jurisprudence. Indigenous feminist legal theory (IFLT) is in its nascent stages as a contemporary academic discipline and praxis. It has largely been elucidated by legal scholars in Canada, including Emily Snyder, Val Napoleon, and John Borrows. Snyder explains that IFLT lies at the intersection of feminist legal theory, Indigenous feminist theory, and Indigenous legal theory.
The Supreme Court, some commentators argue, is at its most undemocratic since the Lochner Era in the 1930s. They point to the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which departs from public opinion on abortion and longstanding constitutional precedence. Dobbs, however, is not an outlier. The Supreme Court made a similar move in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. The majority opinion questioned almost 200 years of constitutional interpretation and several decades of congressional policy to enable state governments to exercise criminal authority over non-Indians in Indian Country. This article compares the majority opinion in Castro-Huerta to congressional policy to explore the democratic and constitutional difficulties that can arise when the Supreme Court refuses to defer to Congress—the democratically elected and constitutionally appointed institution for making federal Indian policy. It reveals how the Court’s undemocratic turn extends beyond cases involving individual rights.
Turtle Talk 
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