I urge readers to check out two papers by Kati Kovacs at Rutgers Law School. She formerly worked in DOJ ENRD. She just published Eagles, Indian Tribes, and the Free Exercise of Religion is available online, http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2863&context=llr, and has a forthcoming piece on Hobby Lobby and the Eagle Act, entitled Hobby Lobby and the Zero-Sum Game, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484613.
Scholarship
Three Remanded for ICWA Notice Deficiency Cases out of California
Cases from the Second District, the Fourth District and the First District.
From the Second District:
Before the next scheduled hearing on January 31, 2013, DCFS submitted the following documents to the court: signed return receipts for the entities noticed; a letter from the Bureau of Indian Affairs acknowledging receipt of the ICWA notice but indicating it does not determine tribal eligibility; a letter from the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma declining to intervene in the case because there was no evidence T.M. was a descendant of anyone on the Keetoowah Roll based on the information supplied; a letter from the Cherokee Boys Club, Inc., on behalf of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, declining to intervene in the case because T.M. was neither registered nor eligible to register as a member of the tribe based on the information supplied; and a letter from the Cherokee Nation seeking further information. The Cherokee Nation letter asked DCFS to “verify correct spelling of maternal great great grandmother Lual Made [D.], also need her date of birth. Relationship of Eleonora [H.] to the above named child. [¶] We need dates of birth for everyone involved, their relationship to the child or children in question, and maiden names of all females listed. It is impossible to validate or invalidate this claim without more complete information.” (Boldface and capitalization removed.)
At the January 31, 2013 hearing, which was presided over by a different hearing officer than Commissioner Lewis, the court stated the tribes were properly noticed and it had received letters back from the tribes indicating T.M. was not an Indian child. The court found the ICWA did not apply. The court did not acknowledge the Cherokee Nation’s request for further information.
Just spit balling here, but maybe the reason Cherokee Nation puts part of its response in BOLDFACE CAPITALIZATION is to help a state court out, so it doesn’t find ICWA doesn’t apply when it might.
Alternative Reports A and B to the UN CERD Regarding Violation of Indigenous Children’s Right to Culture
Speaking of ICWA placement preferences, Here are the reports submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination by the National Native American Boarding School Healing Coalition, the International Indian Treaty Council, and the National Indian Child Welfare Association:
Alternative Report A: Indigenous Children and the Legacy and Current Impacts of the Boarding School Policies in the United States and the Lack of Redress, Restitution and Restoration by the United States to Address these Impacts or to Acknowledge Responsibility for Them
Alternative Report B: The Continued Removal of Indigenous Children from Their Families and Communities and its Impact on The Right to Culture
Update — a blurb from the authors:
During last week’s two-day dialogue with the United States, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination members asked questions of the US delegation relying on the information provided to it by the United States as well as reports submitted by non-governmental organizations and stakeholders. The National Indian Child Welfare Association submitted such a report voicing concerns over the problematic implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act. The report on “The Continued Removal of Indigenous Children from Their Families and Communities and its Impact on the Right to Culture (Alternative Report B)” was drafted in partnership with Suffolk Law’s Indigenous Peoples Rights Clinic, and can be viewed at hhere. During the session, Committee members asked the United States to comment on the over- representation of indigenous children in foster care and the bias in private adoptions. The Committee’s Concluding Observations report should be released next month.
ICWA Placement Preference Decision Out of California Involving Choctaw Tribe
Here.
This is a re-occurring and incredibly frustrating ICWA fact pattern–if the ICWA compliant placement is out of state, or far away from the parents, and the goal is reunification, it makes sense for the tribe and state to allow for a non-compliant ICWA placement near the parents. What happens, however, when reunification fails? As in this case, a court is often unwilling to remove the child from the home she has been in for anywhere from one to three years. Honest, actual, concurrent permanency planning could help with this, but while that is a best practice, it does not seem to be happening with any regularity at the state.
Concluding that the ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences do apply to this case, we then review the trial court’s order finding that the P.s failed to produce clear and convincing evidence of good cause to depart from those placement preferences. We determine that the court applied the correct burden of proof by requiring the P.s to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to deviate from section 1915’s placement preferences. However, the court erroneously required the P.s to prove a certainty that Alexandria would suffer harm if moved, and failed to consider Alexandria’s best interests or her bond with the P.s in determining good cause.
***
We recognize that a final decision regarding Alexandria’s adoptive placement will be further delayed as a result of our determination of the merits of this appeal. That delay is warranted by the need to insure that the correct legal standard is utilized in deciding whether good cause has been shown that it is in the best interest of Alexandria to depart from the ICWA’s placement preferences.
As also often happens, the parties start arguing about the very constitutionality of ICWA, making this case a “not as bad as it could have been” case–the court didn’t find ICWA is unconstitutional, nor does Adoptive Couple apply (as the de facto parents argued) to this fact pattern. And yet, the trial court decision placing the child with her extended family is still overturned based on the child’s best interest standard. Getting courts to acknowledge that the best interests of a child ought to include the child’s whole life, not just the one transition in front of the court at that moment, is both vital and seemingly impossible.
For the (depressing) record, here is Evelyn Blanchard writing the same thing in 1977 in The Destruction of American Indian Families, ed. Steven Unger (Association of American Indian Affairs 1977).
(Happy to post redacted briefs if we receive any)
DOJ Amicus Brief in SD ICWA Class Action Case
The United States came in strongly on the side of the tribes and tribal families for both the enforcement of ICWA and meaningful due process.
Here.
Thus, from the very start of an emergency removal, Section 1922 requires state courts, agencies, and officials to actively investigate and evaluate whether the emergency situation has ended. Given the statutory requirements for oversight and “immediate” action, this ongoing obligation cannot be deferred for weeks or months until the next scheduled hearing occurs.
***
The interest that parents have in the custody of their children is not to be lightly interfered with, even following an emergency situation. While an emergency proceeding such as the 48- hour hearing may not permanently deprive parents of their custody rights, even a temporary deprivation of physical custody requires a prompt and meaningful hearing.
Memorandum in support of leave to file amicus here.
Motion for Leave to File here.
Update — The court granted the motion the next day:
123 DCT Order Granting US Motion
Previous coverage here.
Forthcoming B.C. Law Review Note on the Impact of Congressional Exemptions for Alaska Natives
The Boston College Law Review will publish “An Era of Continued Neglect: Assessing the Impact of Congressional Exemptions for Alaska Natives,” now posted on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
This Note examines Congress’s recent efforts at reforming Native American criminal justice systems while exempting Alaska Natives. This Note argues that Congress and the State of Alaska should expand Alaska Native tribal sovereignty to allow Alaska Native tribes to prosecute crimes like domestic violence and sexual assault in order to more effectively promote safety and justice in rural Alaskan communities.
Two Additional Links of Interest Regarding the Nebraska ICWA Truancy Case
Nebraska Court of Appeals Overturns Lower Court Removing Child for Truancy Under ICWA
Opinion here (from June 24).
On February 26, 2013, the juvenile court ordered Mischa to be placed into foster care and the case plan was modified to allow for liberal visitation of Mischa with her family. In reaching this decision, the court noted the parents’ argument that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1505(5) (Reissue 2008) provides that foster care placement may not be ordered in the absence of a determination by clear and convincing evidence includ- ing testimony of qualified expert witnesses that continued custody by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional and physical damage to the child. The court found that serious emotional damage would result to Mischa as a result of insufficient education. The court found, however, that even in the absence of such proof, the statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case, stating that “Indian children are entitled to no less educational opportunity than other children and accordingly, as applied in this particular case, such statute is unconstitutional to the extent that it would deny Mischa educational opportunity even in the absence of serious emotional and physical damage . . . .” The order was silent on whether active efforts had been provided to prevent the breakup of this family. Deanna and Chris subsequently perfected their appeal to this court.
Unpublished California ICWA Opinion Reversing for Non-Compliance
A long and sad opinion here, but a few things of note:
-as usual, Jay Treaty arguments are brushed aside.
-the State’s assumption that a claim of tribal membership is vague doesn’t mean ICWA might apply. And families might involve many tribes, from geographically diverse areas.
-there is or was a dedicated ICWA court or docket in Los Angeles County.
-the foster parents were not interested in helping with reunification in the slightest.
Ann Tweedy on Tribal Laws & Same-Sex Marriage
Our own Ann Tweedy has posted her very interesting and relevant paper, “Tribal Laws & Same-Sex Marriage: Theory, Process, and Content,” on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
In 1996, Congress, in enacting the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), took the somewhat surprising step of explicitly including tribes within its purview. The legislative history is silent as to the decision to explicitly include tribes, and, at the time of DOMA’s passage, it does not appear that any tribe was seriously examining the issue. Since then, however, there have been many developments among tribes on this issue, including enactment of laws permitting same-sex marriage and enactment of prohibitions on same-sex marriage. Nonetheless, generally speaking, the issue does not seem to be a priority among tribes to the same extent it is a priority for states and the federal government.
In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down section 3 of the DOMA, which concerns the federal definition of marriage, as a violation of equal protection and due process. In doing so, it left the constitutionality of section 2, which pertains to tribes’ and states’ recognition of out-of-jurisdiction marriages, uncertain.
This article presents the post-DOMA developments in tribal law as to same-sex marriage, explaining the different tribal approaches to the issue, and then examines the processes by which tribal laws on same-sex marriage, particularly those explicitly permitting same-sex marriage, have been enacted. Finally, this article examines the possible effects that United States v. Windsor will likely have on tribal laws and suggests that tribal courts apply Windsor as persuasive authority under the Indian Civil Rights Act unless there is significant historical evidence as to a lack of openness to same-sex relationships or LGBT identities within that particular tribe. Finally, it discusses the reasons that laws on same-sex marriage may be less of a priority for tribes than for the other sovereigns in the United States. This article is the only comprehensive examination of tribal same-sex marriage laws since the issue gained serious momentum among tribes in 2011 and 2012, and it is the first to address the potential effects of Windsor on Indian tribes.
Turtle Talk 
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