Miami Tribe BDA Immunity in Alabama Illegal Bingo Debacle Questioned

Here are the materials so far in Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park (M.D. Ala.) relating to the motion to dismiss the tribal defendant:

Miami Tribe BDA Motion to Dismiss

Bussey Response

DCT Order Denying Motions to Dismiss

An excerpt:

Plaintiffs contend that, without the benefit of discovery, they cannot ascertain whether the Tribe “waived sovereign immunity by contract or other agreement” (Doc. # 96, at 3) because they are not in the possession of any contracts (Doc. # 96, at 6). The court takes no position on whether, as Plaintiffs assert, discovery “most likely” will prove a contractual waiver of sovereign immunity as to Plaintiffs’ claim against the Tribe. (Doc. # 96, at 6.) It is noted, though, that the existence of such a contract is neither admitted nor denied by the Tribe. All of this is why, without discovery, it would be inappropriate at this time to determine the issue of sovereign immunity on a factual Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Accordingly, the Tribe’s motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity is due to be denied at this time.

Tribal Immunity, Tribal Court Jurisdiction, and Separation of Powers

There are two active cases out there involving Florida tribes that raise interesting questions relating to tribal courts and tribal immunity in federal and state courts. The two cases, Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. (which is currently pending before the Supreme Court — an invitation brief from the OSG may be forthcoming soon), and last week’s district court decision in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (see today’s post here).

It is our understanding that both tribes have unusual government structures (unusual by federal and state standards, and to most but not all tribes) in which the tribal legislature serves as the appellate court of final resort for the tribal judiciary. This is less common, we think, than it once was in Indian country, but a goodly number of tribes retain this structure. Many tribes in Michigan, by contrast, have very clear constitutional boundaries between the tribal political branches and the tribal courts, and the Harvard Project strongly recommends an independent judiciary as part of its prescription for solid economic growth in Indian country.

Tribes can and should establish whatever governmental structure they believe fits best for their communities, but there may be consequences to the tribal council-as-appellate court structure for tribes that have large commercial operations. Miccosukee, for example, is trying to enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court, and their tribal court judgment creditor is vehemently arguing that tribal jurisdiction is not viable because the tribal appellate court — the tribal council — is an interested party in the underlying suit. [That case likely will turn on whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim, however.] But if the Miccosukee Tribe or other tribes try to enforce tribal court judgments in state or federal courts, it could be very difficult to persuade a foreign court to enforce a judgment ultimately controlled by the tribal council.

Such bad government structure “facts” almost made terrible law in the Contour Spa case, where the district court gave a great deal of credence to the Tenth Circuit’s maligned Dry Creek Lodge exception (this exception allows federal courts to review tribal government action under the Indian Civil Rights Act under certain circumstances, such as the lack of a tribal court forum). Other than the actual Dry Creek Lodge case (which was “bad facts make bad law” exemplified), no other court has adopted it. And outside of the Tenth Circuit, few (if any) courts have even invoked it to see if it was worth adopting. But last week, in large part because the tribal legislature sits as the tribal court at Seminole (according to the opinion), the district court invoked Dry Creek Lodge and applied the facts of the Contour Spa contract breach claim to it. While the court did not, in the end, apply the “exception,” likely because the non-tribal party didn’t attempt to resolve the dispute in “tribal court,” the mere fact that it was willing to take the Dry Creek Lodge exception seriously is worth contemplating.

Two commercially successful tribes with no independent tribal judiciary. While nothing disastrous has occurred yet, there are commercial costs associated with this government structure. Maybe for these tribes, those costs are worth paying. But they should be taken seriously.

Federal Court Remands Contract Breach Claim against Seminole Tribe to State Court

Here are the materials in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (S.D. Fla.):

DCT Order Remanding Case to Fla. Cir. Ct.

Seminole Tribe Motion to Dismiss

Cypress Motion to Dismiss

Contour Spa Response to Cypress Motion

Contour Spa Response to Tribe Motion

Tribe Reply

Cypress Reply

Of note, the court here appeared to assume that the so-called “Dry Creek lodge exception” could apply here, but found that the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements (one of which was essentially exhaustion of tribal forums). This is a potentially troubling development (that is, the spread of Dry Creek Lodge to areas outside of the Tenth Circuit).

Nebraska SCT Holds Tribal Officials with “Apparent Authority” (Not Actual Authority) May Waive Tribal Immunity

Here is today’s opinion in StoreVisions v. Omaha Tribe (as first reported in Indianz).

An excerpt:

As noted, this separate waiver was signed in the presence offive of the seven members of the tribal council and lends even more weight to an appearance that the signatories to the document—the chairman and vice chairman—were vested with theauthority to waive the tribe’s sovereign immunity.

The court refused to take judicial notice of tribal laws for some reason, and gave great weight to the mere presence of tribal council members in finding a waiver. Fairly remarkable decision.

Tenth Circuit Briefing in Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distributors

Here (reply brief not due yet):

Somerlott Brief

Cherokee Nation Distr Brief

Lower court materials here.

Briefing in City of Temecula v. Pechanga Band Gaming Dispute

Here are the materials:

Pechanga Motion to Dismiss

Temecula Opposition

Pechanga Reply

The complaint is here.

News coverage from Pechanga.net.

Ninth Circuit Dismisses Bishop Community Land Claim against City of Los Angeles under Rule 19

Here is the opinion in Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community v. City of Los Angeles.

An excerpt:

Plaintiff Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, California, an Indian tribe formallyrecognized by the United States, filed this action againstDefendant City of Los Angeles for an order restoring Plaintiffto possession of land that the City took long ago in a deal withthe United States. The district court dismissed the actionunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) because itruled that, under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States was a required party that Plaintiffcould not join. The district court certified the appealability ofits order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Upon Plaintiff’s timelyrequest, we agreed to hear this interlocutory appeal, and we now affirm.

And the briefs:

Paiute-Shoshone Brief

Los Angeles Brief

Paiute-Shoshone Reply

Oklahoma Supreme Court Affirms Miami Tribe’s Immunity in Seneca Telephone Suit

Here is the opinion in Seneca Telephone v. Miami Tribe.

An excerpt:

In the present matter the Tribe was not engaged in any telecommunication activity. The Tribe was engaged in excavation work for another tribe on land held in fee as well as in trust by the United States Government. The United States Congress has not unequivocally waived sovereign immunity for the activities involved in the instant matter. The Tribe has not waived its sovereign immunity at any level in the present case and all issues herein presented are fully satisfied by our finding of immunity and, therefore, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated and the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss.

Lower court materials here.

Katherine Florey on Rule 19 after Pimentel

Katherine Florey has published “Making Sovereigns Indispensable: Pimentel and the Evolution of Rule 19” in the UCLA Law Review.

Here is the abstract:

Though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 might appear to be one of the more esoteric of the Federal Rules, it is actually an exceptionally powerful device: It permits defendants to obtain dismissal of cases over which the court has valid jurisdiction, even when no other forum exists in which the action can be brought.  This Article argues that, while Rule 19 was originally intended to facilitate the consolidation of litigation by requiring joinder of absent parties, it has evolved in an important subset of cases to serve a nearly opposite purpose.  That is, in many cases in which a party may be affected by the litigation but cannot be joined because it is a sovereign possessing immunity from suit, courts have developed a near-categorical rule that the entire case may be dismissed—even if that means that the plaintiff is permanently denied a remedy.  Further, the U.S. Supreme Court recently appeared to endorse this approach, holding that Philippine human rights victims’ claims to their former regime’s assets could not be litigated because two Philippine governmental entities could not be joined in the case.

In such situations, this Article argues, Rule 19 functions almost as an abstention doctrine, permitting courts to avoid decisions in cases that may raise sensitive intergovernmental or foreign-relations issues.  This use of the rule is problematic for several reasons.  It is not authorized by (or even discussed in) Rule 19’s text, and it appears at odds with the original purpose of Rule 19: to promote consolidated litigation of disputes, not to dispose of them entirely.  Further, it permits the interests of the plaintiff—and the public interest in resolution of disputes—to be systematically slighted.  Thus, although there may be situations in which an absent party’s sovereign immunity should be taken into account, courts have gone too far in their solicitude for absent sovereigns.  This Article explores how this phenomenon has evolved and suggests ways in which courts’ analysis of Rule 19 factors should be modified to take account of the rule’s fundamental purposes

Federal Court Dismisses Police Brutality Complaint against Walker River Tribal Police

Here are the materials in Lantry v. Walker River Tribal Police (D. Nev.):

Walker River Motion to Dismiss

Lantry Response

Walker River Reply

DCT Order Dismissing Lantry Complaint