ICWA Defense Project Press Release on ICWA Final Rule

Here.

The Initial Observations post has been updated through out the day today with additional information from some of the first 300 pages, including the fact the Department plans to issue updated Guidelines in the next 180 days.

Ninth Circuit Rejects NEPA Challenge to NIGC Authority

Here is the opinion in Jamul Action Committee v. Chaudhuri.

The court’s syllabus:

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus under the Administrative Procedure Act of a group of tribal members and organizations, alleging that the National Indian Gaming Commission violated the National Environmental Policy Act when it approved the Jamul Indian Village’s gaming ordinance for a casino in Jamul, California, without first conducting a NEPA environmental review. The district court held that the Gaming Commission’s approval of the 2013 gaming ordinance was not “major federal action” within the meaning of NEPA requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement. Affirming on different grounds than the district court, the panel held that even if the GamingCommission’s approval of the gaming ordinance was a major federal action within the meaning of NEPA, the GamingCommission was not required to prepare an environmental impact statement because there was an irreconcilable statutory conflict between NEPA and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, pursuant to San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 648 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that an agency need not adhere to NEPA “where doing so ‘would create an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict’ with the substantive statute at issue”).

Briefs here.

 

SCOTUS Holds Puerto Rico Does Not Possess Separate Sovereign Authority to Prosecute; Indian Law Bullet Dodged

Here is the opinion in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle.

P.R. had tried to analogize itself to Indian nations, but that effort failed:

For similar reasons, Indian tribes also count as separate sovereigns under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Originally, this Court has noted, “the tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities,” possessing (among other capacities) the “inherent power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.” Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 322–323. After the formation of the United States, the tribes became “domestic dependent nations,” subject to plenary control by Congress—so hardly “sovereign” in one common sense. United States v. Lara, 541 U. S. 193, 204 (2004) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831)); see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56 (1978) (“Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the [tribes’] powers of local self-government”). But unless and until Congress withdraws a tribal power—including the power to prosecute—the Indian community retains that authority in its earliest form. See Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 323. The “ultimate source” of a tribe’s “power to punish tribal offenders” thus lies in its “primeval” or, at any rate, “pre-existing” sovereignty: A tribal prosecution, like a State’s, is “attributable in no way to any delegation . . . of federal authority.” Id., at 320, 322, 328; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at 56. And that alone is what matters for the double jeopardy inquiry. 

Slip. op. at 9-10. So now we can say tribal sovereignty is “primeval”: whether we should is another question.

The dissent, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Sotomayor, argues that tribal sovereignty actually does derive from Congress, by virtue of Congress not divesting it completely:

But as the Court today recognizes, this prelapsarian independence must be read in light of congressional action—or, as it were, inaction. That is because—whatever a tribe’s history— Congress maintains “plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the [tribes’] powers of local self-government,” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56 (1978), and thus the tribes remain sovereign for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause only “until” Congress chooses to withdraw that power, ante, at 10. In this sense, Congress’ pattern of inaction (i.e., its choice to refrain from withdrawing dual sovereignty) amounts to an implicit decision to grant such sovereignty to the tribes. Is not Congress then, in this way, the “source” of the Indian tribes’ criminal enforcement power?

Dissent at 5. No no no!!!!

Fortunately, the Court rejects this formulation, calling it “deeply disturbing”:

This Court’s reasoning could not have been plainer: The States (all of them) are separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes not (as the dissent claims) because they exercise authority over criminal law, but instead because that power derives from a source independent of the Federal Government. See Heath, 474 U. S., at 89. So too for the tribes, see supra, at 9–10; and, indeed, here the dissent’s contrary reasoning is deeply disturbing. According to the dissent, Congress is in fact “the ‘source’ of the Indian tribes’ criminal enforcement power” because it has elected not to disturb the exercise of that authority. Post, at 5. But beginning with Chief Justice Marshall and continuing for nearly two centuries, this Court has held firm and fast to the view that Congress’s power over Indian affairs does nothing to gainsay the profound importance of the tribes’ pre-existing sovereignty. See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559–561 (1832); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, 384 (1896); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip op., at 4–5). And once again, we have stated in no uncertain terms that the tribes are separate sovereigns precisely because of that inherent authority.

Slip. op. at 11 n. 5. Whew!

Associate Attorney Opening with Earthjustice in Seattle

Link to job announcement here.

“The Northwest Office opened in 1987 to enable Earthjustice to take a more active role in preserving the unique natural resources and environment of the Pacific Northwest. Since that time, the Northwest office has undertaken campaigns to protect old growth forests, promote salmon recovery, improve water quality, protect Puget Sound and the communities that depend on it, stop coal-fired power plants, protect farmworkers and their families from pesticides, and respond to climate change, among other things.”

Tribal Courts in the 21st Century Program at ABA Annual Meeting

Download details here.

The meeting is Friday, August 5, 2016, in San Francisco.

 

Initial Observations on the ICWA Regulations

Today’s additions to this post have been added in red text.

The Rule is organized in much the same way as the Guidelines. They do not mirror each other, however. These are just highlights of the actual rule, not the 300+ pages addressing all of the comments, which look to be incredibly useful.

The Department anticipates issuing updated Guidelines in the next six months, before the final rule goes into effect. p.10, “Overview of Final Rule”

The Rule does not use the phrase “existing Indian family”, but pp 90-94 of the text explain that the Rule overrules the application of the EIF through other means:

The final rule no longer uses the nomenclature of the exception, and instead focuses on the substance, rather than the label, of the exception. Thus, the final rule imposes a mandatory prohibition on consideration of certain listed factors, because they are not relevant to the inquiry of whether the statute applies. If a child-custody proceeding concerns a child who meets the statutory definition of “Indian child,” then the court may not determine that ICW A does not apply to the case based on factors such as the participation of the parents or the Indian child in Tribal cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship between the Indian child and his or her Indian parents, whether the parent ever had custody of the child, or the Indian child’s blood quantum.  

Rule at 93.

Highlights:

The definitions of continued custody, custody, and domicile are extensive and helpful, includes tribal custom and tribal law, makes clear that any custody at any time in the past counts as “continued custody” and makes the child’s domicile dependent on the custodial parent, not just mother. 23.2.

The active efforts definition is marginally different than the one in the Guidelines. It does not specifically state they are more or different than ASFA’s reasonable efforts, but it does say they must be “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely”. The list of elements under what active efforts “may include, for example” are also slightly different, and combine some of the Guideline elements (4 in the regs is 9&5 in the Guidelines; 7 is 10&14). 23.2.

The Department’s reasoning regarding ASFA is as follows, though is contrary to how state courts have been comparing the two at the appellate level, and not entirely helpful:

Unlike the proposed rule, the final rule does not define “active efforts” in comparison to “reasonable efforts.” After considering public comments on this issue, the Department concluded that referencing “reasonable efforts” would not promote clarity or consistency, as the term “reasonable efforts” is not in ICW A and arises from different laws (e.g., the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as modified by the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), see 42 U.S.C. 670, et seq., as well as State laws). Such reference is unnecessary because the definition in the final rule focuses on what actions are necessary to constitute active efforts.

Rule at 50.

“When Does ICWA Apply?” addresses the issue of “continued custody” thrown into doubt by Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. It also specifically states a child’s blood quantum may not be considered by the state court. 23.103(c).

State laws that provide higher protections to the rights of the parent control over the regulations. 23.106.

State courts must ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know the child is an Indian child. 23.107(a).

A parental request for confidentiality in a voluntary proceeding does not relieve the court, agency, or other party from any duty of compliance with ICWA, including the obligation to verify whether the child is an Indian child. 23.107(d).

Only tribes can determine if a child is an Indian child under the law, that is a final determination that cannot be substituted by the state, and the state can use tribal enrollment documentation (for example) to make the judicial determination a child is an Indian child. 23.108.

A court must determine domicile of the child in any voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding. 23.110(a).

If a parent or Indian custodian appears in court without an attorney, the court must inform them of their rights under the law, including the right to appointed counsel, the right to request transfer to tribal court, the right to object to transfer, the right to request additional time, and the right to intervene in the child custody proceedings. 23.111(g).

23.113 Emergency removals (or the Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming section) addresses all the requirements of emergency removal including length of time (30 days), how to terminate an emergency proceeding (initiate a proceeding subject to the provisions of ICWA, transfer to the tribe, or send the kid home), and the standard of “imminent physical damage or harm to the child”.

The regs direct state courts what they cannot consider “good cause” not to transfer a case to tribal court, but do not specify what is good cause not to transfer. States cannot consider advanced stage, prior proceedings where there was no petition to transfer, whether transfer will affect placement, cultural connections, and socioeconomic conditions. 23.118(c).

There is no standard of evidence for active efforts (states are still split on this), but similar to the Guidelines, the evidence must show a causal relationship between the particular conditions in the home and the likelihood of serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Evidence with no causal relationship of poverty, isolation, single parenthood, custodian age, crowded or inadequate housing, substance abuse, or nonconforming social behavior does not on its own constitute evidence that continued custody is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 23.121

Who can be a qualified expert witness is fairly vague, but the regulation specifically excludes the social worker regularly assigned to the Indian child from being the QEW. 23.122(c)

The state court must determine if a child is an Indian child in voluntary proceedings, and that determination may mean contacting the child’s tribe to verify. 23.124(b)

Consent to a voluntary adoption largely mirrors the law, but also includes that when a parent request confidentiality, the execution of consent must still be before a court of competent jurisdiction, but not in open court. 23.125(d).

Good cause to not follow the placement preferences must be made on the record, the party seeking to deviate bears the burden of proving good cause by clear and convincing evidence, and may not be based “solely on ordinary bonding or attachment that flowed from time spent in a non-preferred placement that was made in violation of ICWA.” 23.132

The regs do give good cause reasons to depart from the preferences. They include the request of one or both parents if they attest they have reviewed the placement preferences that comply with the order of preference, the request of the child, the presence of a sibling attachment, the extraordinary physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child, and the unavailability of a suitable placement after the court finds a diligent search was conducted. 23.132(c).

Courts should allow participation by telephone, videoconferencing, or other methods. 23.133.

If there are certain changes in an adopted Indian child’s status (the voluntary termination by the adoptive parent, or the final decree of adoption was set aside or vacated), the biological parent, prior Indian custodian, and tribe must be noticed. 23.139. Of course, the child remains an Indian child regardless of the adoption, so ICWA should apply to these situations anyway.

The state must maintain certain records of every voluntary or involuntary foster care, preadoptive, and adoptive placement of an Indian child, including the petition or complaint, all substantive orders, the complete record of the placement determination. That record must be made available within 14 days of a request by the child’s Tribe or the Secretary. 23.141.

 

Solicitor’s Opinion on the New ICWA Regulation

US DOI Solicitor Opinion on the implementation of ICWA through legislative rule:

Congress understood that these issues went beyond reservations and significantly impacted Indian children who lived off reservations as well. Congress noted that there were approximately 35,000 Indian children in foster care, adoptive homes, or institutions whose families did not “live on or near reservations”52 and yet who were subject to the same problematic State child custody proceedings. In the AIPRC Final Report, which was included as part of the Senate Report on ICWA, the Commission recommended that any final legislation address the fact that because “[m]any Indian families move back and forth from a reservation dwelling to border communities or even to distant communities, depending on employment and educational opportunities,” problems could arise when Tribal and State courts offered competing child custody determinations, and that legislation therefore had to address situations where “an Indian child is not domiciled on a reservation and [is] subject to the jurisdiction of non-Indian authorities. ”  Congress accordingly fashioned ICWA to address the removal of Indian children, as defined in the statute, regardless of where their families were located.

Navajo Nation Office of Legal Counsel Seeking Interns

Details are available here: Legal Internship opening

If interested, contact Karis Begay: knbegaye@navajo-nsn.gov

 

Final Indian Child Welfare Act Regulations

Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings Federal Rule Here. The rule itself starts on page 321.

The new regulations are not binding for 180 days (6 months), and will be located at 25 CFR 23. As the document appears to be about 300 pages long, we’ll have more analysis of it in a later post.

Press release here

Q&A here.