Here are updated materials in United States v. Osage Wind LLC (N.D. Okla.):
229 Motion for Reconsideration
264 DCT Order Denying Reconsideration
Prior post here.
Here are updated materials in United States v. Osage Wind LLC (N.D. Okla.):
229 Motion for Reconsideration
264 DCT Order Denying Reconsideration
Prior post here.
Here are the materials in Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, New York:
Lower court materials here.
Here is the opinion in Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States.
An excerpt:
Accordingly, we affirm the United States Court of Federal Claims’ determination that the Nation’s breach of trust claims are not yet ripe for review, vacate its ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over those claims, and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice.
More:
A similar analysis applies here. The Nation alleges that in applying the doctrine of laches to bar its land claim, the district court improperly “took away the Nation’s legal right to sue for compensation for its stolen land.” The Court of Federal Claims, however, is without authority to adjudicate the Nation’s claim that it suffered a compensable taking at the hands of the district court. See Allustiarte, 256 F.3d at 1352; Joshua, 17 F.3d at 380. The court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions “of district courts and cannot entertain a taking[s] claim that requires the court to scrutinize the actions of another tribunal.” Innovair, 632 F.3d at 1344 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the government correctly notes, “[d]eciding whether the district court’s judgment resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the Nation’s property would require the Court of Federal Claims to review the judgment and pass on its correctness.” Just as the plaintiffs’ takings claim in Allustiarte was an improper collateral attack on the judgment of the bankruptcy courts, the Nation’s proposed judicial takings claim is an attempt to mount an improper collateral attack on the judgment of the district court.
Yesterday’s Supreme Court decision on the copyright of the Raging Bull screenplay involved both copyright law and laches. At issue was how long the screenwriter’s heir could wait to sue MGM for permission to renew the copyright. Copyright was originally sold to a company in 1976, and the heir waited until 2009 to sue for copyright infringement. She did communicate with MGM her displeasure during this time, but did not sue. The lower courts dismissed her claim on laches (as a refresher, laches is an affirmative defense used when the plaintiff waits an “unreasonable” amount of time to bring a claim and the defendant is injured by that delay).
In reversing the 9th Circuit, Justice Ginsburg cites to Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida 470 U.S. 226, 244, n.16 (1985) “(“[A]pplication of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be novel indeed.”).” It would be! But wait! That’s exactly what the Second Circuit did in Cayuga Indian Nation v. New York (relying on City of Sherrill v. OIN), as Justice Breyer points out in his dissent: “Lower courts have come to similar holdings in a wide array of circumstances—often approving not only of the availability of the laches defense, but of its application to the case at hand. E.g., Cayuga Indian Nation of N. Y. v. Pataki, 413 F. 3d 266, 274–277 (CA2 2005) (laches available in a “possessory land claim” in which the District Court awarded damages, whether “characterized as an action at law or in equity,” and dismissing the action due to laches);”. No one cited to City of Sherrill, perhaps because that case only “evokes” the doctrine of laches.
And in a majority footnote:
“13 Assuming Petrella had a winning case on the merits, the Court of Appeals’ ruling on laches would effectively give MGM a cost-free license to exploit Raging Bull throughout the long term of the copyright. The value to MGM of such a free, compulsory license could exceed by far MGM’s expenditures on the film.”
Because we wouldn’t want laches to be used to achieve THAT to result.
Here. Fletcher et al. papers to be discussed (“Tribal Disruption and Indian Claims“; “(Re)Solving the Tribal No-Forum Conundrum: Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community“; and “Tribal Disruption and Labor Relations“), and panel:
Plenary 1: Innovations in Law
In short, no dice. Here are the updated materials:
St. Regis Mohawk Motion for Clarification
Prior order here.
Here is the opinion in the case captioned Canadian St. Regis Band Mohawk Indians v. State of New York (N.D. N.Y.):
News coverage here.
Magistrate report and recommendation here.
Objections and responses here:
St. Regis Mohawk Opening Brief
Akwesasne Mohawk Opening Brief
Canadian St. Regis Mohawk Response
State and Municipal Defendants Response
Canadian St. Regis Mohawk Reply
NY Power Authority & State Surreply
As expected, Madison and Oneida Counties filed a cert petition over the Second Circuit’s affirmation of the Oneida reservation boundaries. Here:
11-12-12 Madison v. NY Oneida Cert Petition
Question presented:
Does the 300,000-acre ancient Oneida reservation in New York still exist, neither disestablished nor diminished, despite (1) the federal government’s actions taken in furtherance of disestablishment (including, but not limited to, the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek); (2) this Court’s holding in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197, 214 (2005) (“Sherrill”) that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York cannot exercise sovereignty over lands it purchases in the ancient reservation area; and (3) this Court’s finding in that case that land in the ancient reservation area has not been treated as an Indian reservation by the federal, state or local governments for nearly two centuries?
Lower court materials here.
You must be logged in to post a comment.