Here is the complaint in National Council for Adoption v. Jewell (E.D. Va.):
Oops. Kate posted this forever ago.
Eastern District of Virginia
Complaint in National Council for Adoption v. Jewell–Litigation Challenging the 2015 ICWA Guidelines
Here.
Plaintiffs argue the 2015 Guidelines violate the APA, due process of birth parents and children, equal protection of birth parents and children, the 10th amendment, and manage a quick sideswipe at ICWA itself on page 38 (exceeds Congress’s authority under the Indian Commerce Clause).
Fake Indian Habeas Challenge to State Conviction Fails
Here is the opinion in Metaphyzic El-Ectroraagnetic Supreme-El v. Director, Dept. of Corrections (E.D. Va.):
An excerpt:
Additionally, in Claims 8 and 9, Supreme–El argues that the Virginia courts violated “Article 39 of Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” because “Moorish nationals operate through a fee simple absolute estate lien,” (§ 2254 Pet. 11–D), and violated the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” because “officers hindered Petitioner in his official duties” and “deprived the Petitioner of his nationality,” through an arbitrary arrest and detention (id. at 11–E). Supreme–El fails to demonstrate that the “Rights of Indigenous Peoples” and “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” entitle him to federal habeas relief. See Bey v. Ohio, No. 1:11–CV–01048, 2011 WL 4007719, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 9, 2011)(explaining that the “ ‘Universal Declaration of Humans Rights’ “ … and “ ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1994’ … are not recognized by United States courts as legally binding”).
Washington Football Team Argues Lanham Act/TTAB Decision Violates First and Fifth Amendments
Here is the opening brief in Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse (E.D. Va.):
53 DCT Order on Briefing Schedule
56 Pro-Football Motion for Summary J on Constitutional Claims
According to the briefing schedules, briefs are going to be flying fast and furious. We’ll try to keep up.
Prior materials on the federal government intervention here, and the now-denied motion to dismiss here.
Western Sky-Related Debt Collector Successfully Compels Arbitration in Virginia Case
Here are the materials in Hayes v. Delbert Services Corp. (E.D. Va.):
An excerpt:
This matter cornes before the Court on the defendant’s motion [2] to dismiss the amended complaint or, alternatively, to compel arbitration. (Dk. No. 30.) The plaintiffs, borrowers from internet payday lender Western Sky Financial, LLC, brought this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Delbert Services Corporation, a third-party debt collecter. The plaintiffs allege Delbert violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) in the course of its collection efforts. Delbert moves to dismiss based on the Loan Agreements’ forum-selection clause or on the basis of the tribal exhaustion doctrine. Alternatively, Delbert moves to compel arbitration.
The forum-selection clause does not reach third-party debt collectors such as Delbert, and the doctrine of tribal exhaustion does not apply under the facts of this case. The language of the arbitration agreement, however, covers disputes with third-party debt collectors.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel arbitration under the terms of the Loan Agreement and DISMISSES the claim without prejudice.
US Intervenes in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football Inc. (Washington Football Team Trademark)
Here are the new materials in Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse (E.D. Va.):
Prior materials here.
Federal Court Denies Motion to Dismiss Washington Football Team’s Suit against the Blackhorse Plaintiffs
Here are the materials in Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse (E.D. Va.):
Blackhorse Plaintiffs Move to Dismiss Washington Football Team’s Suit
Here is the motion to dismiss in Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse (E.D. Va.):
An excerpt:
In June 2014, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), a component of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), decided that the USPTO acted contrary to federal trademark law when it issued six trademark registrations to Plaintiff Pro-Football, Inc. (“PFI”), the owner of the Washington NFL team. The TTAB concluded that the marks were not eligible for registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1502(a) because they contain matter that “may disparage” Native Americans.1 Accordingly, the TTAB scheduled the registrations for cancellation by the Director of the USPTO. The TTAB acted after five Native American individuals, the defendants in this action (“Blackhorse Defendants”), petitioned it to cancel the registrations.
PFI could have appealed to the Federal Circuit, where the USPTO could have defended the TTAB decision, but PFI declined to do so. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a). Instead, PFI filed this civil action against the Blackhorse Defendants, under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4).
PFI’s dispute, however, is with the USPTO, not with the Blackhorse Defendants. PFI alleges that the TTAB — not the Blackhorse Defendants — acted unlawfully by scheduling its registrations for cancellation. Likewise, PFI seeks relief only against the USPTO — a declaratory judgment to prevent the Director of the USPTO from carrying out the cancellations. PFI alleges no conduct on the part of the Blackhorse Defendants other than filing a petition with the TTAB. It does not allege that they acted unlawfully or tortiously. Nor does PFI allege that the Blackhorse Defendants claim any interest in PFI’s trademarks or in similar trademarks. This lawsuit will not affect the legal rights or obligations of the Blackhorse Defendants in any way. As a result, the Complaint should be dismissed for the following two reasons:
• The Blackhorse Defendants are not “parties in interest” who may be sued under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4); and
• This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is no “Case or Controversy” under Article III of the Constitution as between PFI and the Blackhorse Defendants.
The complaint is here.
Washington Football Team’s Complaint
Here is the complaint in Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse (E.D. Va.):
Fort Sill Apache Industries Loses In Its Claims of Conversion/Fraud in Government Contracting Dispute
Here is the federal court’s order in Fort Sill Apache Industries v. Mott (E.D. Va.):
DCT Order Granting Defendants Motion
An excerpt:
In this civil action, which has been fully tried to the bench, plaintiff Fort Sill Apache Industries (“FSAI”) seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages from defendant Deborah Evans Mott (“Mott”) based on claims of Conversion (Count I), Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count II), Deceit by False Representation (Count III), Deceit by Nondisclosure and Concealment (Count IV), Actual Fraud (Count V), and Constructive Fraud (Count VI). During the bench trial, defendant orally moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c), on the ground that all of plaintiff’s tort claims against Mott in her individual capacity are actually contractual disputes with Mott’s employer, Team Systems International, Inc. (“TSI”), over the amounts billed for services performed pursuant to several contracts between the two corporate entities. Citing well-established Virginia case law, Mott argues that all of FSAI’s claims against her fail and that judgment should be entered in her favor. FSAI contends in response that Mott personally took on fiduciary duties and other responsibilities for which she is individually liable by acting as FSAI’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) and by virtue of her level of access to one of FSAI’s bank accounts, including the use of a debit card linked to that account. FSAI also orally moved for inferences adverse to defendant because of alleged spoliation of evidence. The Court took both motions under advisement and in the weeks following the bench trial, the parties fully briefed these motions. This Memorandum Opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the decision to grant defendant’s motion and deny plaintiff’s motion as moot.
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