Here is the opinion:
Here are the materials so far in Allegheny Capital Enterprises LLC v. Cox (W.D. N.Y.):
This is a diversity action commenced by a corporate entity affiliated with the Sac and Fox of Oklahoma Tribe (doing business in the Seneca Nation in New York) and a partnership doing business in the Seneca Nation. They claim that Defendants, officers of affiliated corporations of the Susanville Indian Rancheria (a Native tribe in California, also referred to as “SIR”), made misrepresentations to Plaintiffs that led to Plaintiffs entering into the tobacco manufacturing and distribution contracts with one of the affiliated corporations. Defendants represented that they had the authority to waive tribal sovereign immunity for the affiliate corporation and that the affiliate in fact waived that immunity. After an alleged breach of these contracts, Plaintiffs lodged claims against one of the affiliate corporations, but the corporation successfully asserted that it did not waive its tribal sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs then commenced this action against the officers; they did not name the corporation as a Defendant.
Before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 17) the Amended Complaint on sovereign immunity, jurisdictional, and pleading grounds. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in part (dismissing claims against Defendants Stacy Dixon and Jolene Robles for lack of personal jurisdiction), denied in part (denying other grounds asserted). After resolution of this motion, Plaintiffs retain claims against Defendant Gretchen Cox.
Here are the materials in Kemph v. Reddam (N.D. Ill.):
Plaintiffs’ argument that the loan agreements are unconscionable because JAMS and AAA would never agree to preside over the arbitration is speculative and unconvincing. (See Resp. at 2—3, 13—14; Sur-Reply at 1—3.) Although the arbitration agreements provide that “the arbitrator will apply the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation,” (Agreement at 5), the arbitrator, once chosen, would have the authority to determine whether that choice-of-law provision is valid. See Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (holding that once the court determines the validity of the arbitration provision, the remainder of the contract is left for the arbitrator to decide); Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2330 (1995)(ruling that the arbitrator should decide choice-of-law in the first instance); CNA Reinsurance Co. v. Trustmark Ins. Co., No. 01 C 1652, 2001 WL 648948, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2001); see also Prostyakov v. Masco Corp., 513 F.3d 716, 725 (7th Cir. 2008)(upholding the arbitrator’s interpretation of the choice-of-law clause because it was not the court’s “place to determine whether [the arbitrator’s] interpretation was correct as a matter of law”). This is particularly true because, as discussed, the loan agreements explicitly provide that the arbitrator can decide “any issue concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of . . . the Arbitration agreement,” which includes  the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause. (Agreement at 4.) Therefore, potential arbitrators need not refuse the dispute in order to comply with internal due process standards. Nor would they be required to violate Illinois public policy by applying tribal law if they chose to accept it. They could instead accept the dispute, find the choice-of-law provision is unenforceable, and determine what default law should apply.
Here are the materials in Hayes v. Delbert Services Corp. (E.D. Va.):
This matter cornes before the Court on the defendant’s motion  to dismiss the amended complaint or, alternatively, to compel arbitration. (Dk. No. 30.) The plaintiffs, borrowers from internet payday lender Western Sky Financial, LLC, brought this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Delbert Services Corporation, a third-party debt collecter. The plaintiffs allege Delbert violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) in the course of its collection efforts. Delbert moves to dismiss based on the Loan Agreements’ forum-selection clause or on the basis of the tribal exhaustion doctrine. Alternatively, Delbert moves to compel arbitration.
The forum-selection clause does not reach third-party debt collectors such as Delbert, and the doctrine of tribal exhaustion does not apply under the facts of this case. The language of the arbitration agreement, however, covers disputes with third-party debt collectors.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel arbitration under the terms of the Loan Agreement and DISMISSES the claim without prejudice.