Materials in Chickasaw Nation Dispute with CVS

Here is the complaint in Chickasaw Nation v. Caremark CVS (E.D. Okla.):

2 Complaint

Most of the other pleadings are sealed.

Here are the materials in Caremark LLC v. Chickasaw Nation (D. Ariz.):

1 Petition to Compel Arbitration

13 Motion to Compel Arbitration

20 Response

26 Reply

28 DCt Order

And here are the briefs so far in Caremark LLC v. Chickasaw Nation (9th Cir.):

Opening Brief

Federal Court Allows Some Tobacco Business Claims in Dispute between Sac and Fox, Seneca, and Susanville Rancheria Companies

Here are the materials so far in Allegheny Capital Enterprises LLC v. Cox (W.D. N.Y.):

8 Amended Complaint

17-8 Motion to Dismiss

17-5 Arbitration Decision

21 Response

22 Reply

23 DCT Order

An excerpt:

This is a diversity action commenced by a corporate entity affiliated with the Sac and Fox of Oklahoma Tribe (doing business in the Seneca Nation in New York) and a partnership doing business in the Seneca Nation. They claim that Defendants, officers of affiliated corporations of the Susanville Indian Rancheria (a Native tribe in California, also referred to as “SIR”), made misrepresentations to Plaintiffs that led to Plaintiffs entering into the tobacco manufacturing and distribution contracts with one of the affiliated corporations. Defendants represented that they had the authority to waive tribal sovereign immunity for the affiliate corporation and that the affiliate in fact waived that immunity. After an alleged breach of these contracts, Plaintiffs lodged claims against one of the affiliate corporations, but the corporation successfully asserted that it did not waive its tribal sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs then commenced this action against the officers; they did not name the corporation as a Defendant.

Before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 17) the Amended Complaint on sovereign immunity, jurisdictional, and pleading grounds. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in part (dismissing claims against Defendants Stacy Dixon and Jolene Robles for lack of personal jurisdiction), denied in part (denying other grounds asserted). After resolution of this motion, Plaintiffs retain claims against Defendant Gretchen Cox.

Second Circuit Briefs in Seneca Nation of Indians v. State of New York [gaming dispute arbitration award]

Here:

Seneca Brief

New York Brief

Reply

Lower court materials here.

Federal Court Rejects Seneca Challenge to Arbitrators’ Decision

Here are the materials in Seneca Nation of Indians v. State of New York (W.D. N.Y.):

9-2-cross-petition.pdf

10-seneca-reply.pdf

12-ny-reply.pdf

14-dct-order.pdf

Prior post, including petition and arbitrators’ opinions, here.

Seneca Nation Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award Favoring State of New York on Revenue Sharing

Here are the materials in Seneca Nation of Indians v. State of New York (W.D. N.Y.):

1-1 Motion to Vacate

2-3 Final Award

2-4 Partial Final Award

2-5 Washburn Dissent

Tribal Appellate Court Affirms Immunity Defense in Comanche Gaming Dispute

Here is the opinion in CDST-Gaming v. Comanche Nation (Ct. Indian Appeals):

CDST Gaming v. Comanche Nation

Lower court decision here.

Related posts here, here, and here.

Fourth Circuit Briefs in Arbitration Case Arising from the Wreckage of Western Sky

Here are the briefs in Hayes v. Delbert Services Corp.:

Hayes Brief

Delbert Services Brief

Amicus Brief

Lower court materials here.

Federal Court Orders Arbitration in Western Sky/CashCall Payday Lending Dispute

Here are the materials in Kemph v. Reddam (N.D. Ill.):

51 CashCall Motion to Dismiss-Compel Arbitration

58-1 Plaintiffs’ Response

91 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Plaintiffs’ argument that the loan agreements are unconscionable because JAMS and AAA would never agree to preside over the arbitration is speculative and unconvincing. (See Resp. at 2—3, 13—14; Sur-Reply at 1—3.) Although the arbitration agreements provide that “the arbitrator will apply the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation,” (Agreement at 5), the arbitrator, once chosen, would have the authority to determine whether that choice-of-law provision is valid. See Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (holding that once the court determines the validity of the arbitration provision, the remainder of the contract is left for the arbitrator to decide); Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2330 (1995)(ruling that the arbitrator should decide choice-of-law in the first instance); CNA Reinsurance Co. v. Trustmark Ins. Co., No. 01 C 1652, 2001 WL 648948, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2001); see also Prostyakov v. Masco Corp., 513 F.3d 716, 725 (7th Cir. 2008)(upholding the arbitrator’s interpretation of the choice-of-law clause because it was not the court’s “place to determine whether [the arbitrator’s] interpretation was correct as a matter of law”). This is particularly true because, as discussed, the loan agreements explicitly provide that the arbitrator can decide “any issue concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of . . . the Arbitration agreement,” which includes [18]  the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause. (Agreement at 4.) Therefore, potential arbitrators need not refuse the dispute in order to comply with internal due process standards. Nor would they be required to violate Illinois public policy by applying tribal law if they chose to accept it. They could instead accept the dispute, find the choice-of-law provision is unenforceable, and determine what default law should apply.