Major Crimes Act – Page 5

Federal Court Holds State Highway on Sandia Pueblo is Indian Country

June 6, 2017June 6, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in United States v. Antonio (D.N.M.):

An excerpt:

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, filed April 10, 2017 (Doc. 62)(“Motion”). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on April 11, 2017, and a hearing on April 12, 2017. The primary issue is whether the Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the Indian Pueblo Land Act Amendments of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-133, 119 Stat. 2573 (Dec. 20, 2005), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 Note, because the automobile collision giving rise to Plaintiff United States of America’s criminal prosecution against Defendant Jeffrey Antonio, which occurred on private land, nonetheless occurred within the exterior boundaries of the 1748 Spanish land grant to the Sandia Pueblo, which Congress confirmed in the Act of December 22, 1858, 11 Stat. 374, 374 (1859). The Court concludes: (i) the automobile collision giving rise to this criminal cause of action occurred within the exterior boundaries of the 1748 Spanish land grant; and, consequently, (ii) under 25 U.S.C. § 331 Note, the Court has jurisdiction over this matter. Accordingly, the Court denies Antonio’s Motion.

Eighth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Child Abuse Conviction

February 2, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in United States v. White Plume.

Justice Dept. Cements Position on Concurrent Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in “Optional” P.L. 280 States

January 19, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

oaag-80488-v1-optional_pl_280_memo_to_u_s__attorneys

An excerpt:

For decades, conflicting judicial decisions and Department of Justice statements have led to uncertainty about whether the United States has concurrent jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 over Indian-country crimes that fall within an “optional P.L. 280” State’s jurisdiction under Section 7 of Public Law No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953). The Acting Solicitor General, after reviewing prior positions of the Department and the underlying legal materials, has now concluded that the litigating position of the United States is that the United States does have this concurrent criminal jurisdiction. Your Offices therefore can bring prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153, in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(2), notwithstanding any contrary view about optional P.L. 280 jurisdiction that the United States or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) may have previously expressed.

Eighth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Conviction; Judge Bright Dissents on Race Discrepancy in Sentencing Issue

August 15, 2016August 15, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in United States v. Lasley.

Briefs:

Lasley Brief

US Brief

An excerpt from Judge Bright’s dissent:

I write to protest the sentencing disparity in this case and the heavy disparity in sentences for other similarly-situated individuals based purely on their race and residence. Appellant-defendant Gordon Lasley (Lasley), an Indian and twenty-six-years old at the time of sentencing, will spend the rest of his life in prison for a conviction of two counts of second-degree murder, but a sentence imposed as though the conviction was for two counts of first-degree murder. This result comes about because our precedent: (1) purports to allow the imposition of the federal sentencing regime to cases under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 without consideration of sentences imposed and actual time served for similar state-law crimes; and (2) authorizes federal district courts to find a defendant committed a greater offense for the purpose of sentencing when a jury expressly convicts a defendant of the lesser-included offense. The consequence of both precedents is a high probability Lasley will serve a longer sentence than a white citizen because Lasley is an Indian who committed a crime in Indian Country. This disparity resting on Lasley’s status as an Indian is unjust, unfair, and improper for the reasons set forth herein. Thus, Lasley’s sentence should be reversed and remanded.

Ninth Circuit Reverses Major Crimes Act Conviction on Indian Status Grounds

August 2, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in United States v. Alvirez.

The court’s syllabus:

The panel reversed a conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury on an Indian reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(6), and remanded.

The panel held that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that a Certificate of Indian Blood offered into evidence by the government in order to establish Indian status, an essential element of § 1153, was a self-authenticating document under Fed. R. Evid. 902(1). The panel held that this error was not harmless.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude references to polygraph evidence, where the defendant, who elected not to present his multiple-interrogation defense as a legal strategy, was not denied the opportunity to present his defense.

The panel held that the district court cannot show plain error in the district court’s application of enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 for infliction of permanent or life-threatening injury.

The panel held that double jeopardy does not bar retrial after reversal in this case because the erroneously-admitted Certificate of Indian Blood was nevertheless sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

Briefs here.

Ninth Circuit Reverses Major Crimes Act Conviction for Crime Arising on Navajo

August 1, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in United States v. Benally.

An excerpt:

Joe Arviso Benally appeals a jury conviction for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112 and 1153 and for using a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In a separate unpublished memorandum disposition, we address Benally’s challenge to the trial proceedings and sentence. In this opinion, we address whether involuntary manslaughter can be considered a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). We hold that involuntary manslaughter is not a “crime of violence” and reverse the § 924(c) count of conviction.

Federal Court Rejects Challenge to Major Crimes Act Conviction, Defendant Argued Justice Thomas’ View of Indian Law

July 25, 2016July 25, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in United States v. Bearcomesout (D. Mont.):

An excerpt:

Citing decades of “schizophrenic” case law, Bearcomesout argues that the law has evolved such that the Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s concept of self-governance and sovereignty has disappeared. As a result, Bearcomesout argues that the Tribe is “subject to the external whim of the United States” which inherently extinguishes the tribe’s sovereignty. Because the Tribe is not sovereign, Bearcomesout argues that her prosecution in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court was in essence a federal prosecution, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The obvious disagreement about the state of tribal sovereignty among Supreme Court justices contained in various dissents and concurrences over the years unquestionably creates uncertainty and doubt about whether the term “independent sovereign” still appropriately applies to Indian tribes. Nevertheless, as recently as June of this year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule from Wheeler and its progeny that tribal sovereignty continues to exist, at least as it relates to Double Jeopardy….

US Cert Opposition Brief in Zepeda

March 23, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

US Cert Opp Brief

An excerpt:

Petitioner contends (Pet. 11-22) that the Ninth Circuit’s definition of an “Indian” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1153 violates equal protection. Petitioner further asserts (Pet. 22-23) that the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with a decision from the Utah Supreme Court. Those claims lack merit. The court of appeals’ decision – which follows this Court’s precedent – is fully consistent with the Constitution, and no conflict exists on the question presented. Moreover, this case would be a poor vehicle to consider the meaning of “Indian” in Section 1153 because petitioner qualifies under any conceivable definition, including the one he proposes. Further review is not warranted.

Cert petition is here.

Zepeda v. United States Cert Petition

November 24, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

Zepeda Cert Petition

Questions presented:

The Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, makes it a federal crime for an “Indian” to commit any one of thirteen enumerated acts in “Indian country.” In this case, the en banc Ninth Circuit held that an element of the offense in prosecutions under this statute is proof that the defendant has “Indian blood,” whether or not that blood tie is to a federally recognized tribe. The question presented is: