The plaintiffs, who are seeking federal recognition under Hardwick v. United States, will seek individual relief under that case instead.
Here are the materials:
Northern District of California
Denial of Motion to Intervene in Now-Closed Wilton Miwok Rancheria v. Salazar
Here are those materials:
Tribal Member Effort to Remove Cigarette Tax Case to Federal Court Remanded to State Court
Here are the materials in People v. Huber (N.D. Cal.):
Huber Opposition to Remand Motion
Should’ve read this, first: Kaighn Smith, Jr., Federal Courts, State Power, and Indian Tribes: Confronting the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 35 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (2005) (email me if you want a copy).
ICWA-Related Federal Civil Rights Claim Dismissed
Here is the opinion in Belinda K. v. County of Alameda (N.D. Cal.):
Belinda K v County of Alameda.
Here is an excerpt:
Plaintiff’s Count Sixteen is a § 1983 claim based on her allegation that her ICWA right to competent counsel in the Superior Court dependency proceedings was violated. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants “conspired and agreed that appointed attorneys would not as a custom and practice produce any written pleadings for the defense of their clients, nor would they be paid for their time to consult with their appointed clients.” Compl. ¶ 212. Plaintiff alleges that appointed counsel appeared in court but provided no “substantive actual effort, no investigation of the facts or the law nor vigorous defense or responsive pleadings” on behalf of appointed clients. Compl. ¶ 214. Plaintiff is asserting a direct claim for violation of ICWA (on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and on a number of other bases as well) in the related action, J.H. v. Baldovinos, pending before this Court. In Count Sixteen’s § 1983 claim, Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable for money damages and attorney’s fees based on this alleged violation. These remedies are not available to Plaintiff in her direct ICWA claim.
Federal Court Dismisses ICRA Habeas Action for Robinson Rancheria Disenrollees/Evictees
Here are the materials in Quitiquit v. Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians (N.D. Cal.):
DCT Order Dismissing Quitiquit Complaint
Cloverdale Rancheria Leadership Dispute Dismissed by Federal Court
Here is the opinion in Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians of Cal. v. Salazar (N.D. Cal.):
ICRA Habeas Petition in Robinson Rancheria Disenrollment Cases
Here is the petition in Quitquit v. Robinson Rancheria Citizen Business Council (N.D. Cal.):
An excerpt:
Petitioners Luwana Quitiquit, Robert Quitiquit, Karen Ramos, Inez Sands, and Reuben Want (Petitioners) are Native Americans currently residing on the tribal lands of the Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians in Nice (Lake County), California. They reside in homes they contracted to purchase through a federally-funded, low-income Indian housing program when they were enrolled members of the Robinson Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians tribe. In late 2008, the officers of the Robinson Rancheria Tribal Business Council (Respondents) passed a Resolution to disenroll Petitioners and extinguish all their rights as tribal members. Subsequently, Respondents established a Tribal Court with jurisdiction to hear only eviction cases brought by Respondents. Respondents retained an attorney to evict Petitioners using the newly-established Tribal Court. These evictions culminated in the issuance of a Judgment by the Tribal Court that, when executed, will effectuate the immediate expulsion of Petitioners from their homes on the reservation and from tribal land under threat of arrest and criminal trespass, effectively banishing them.
Karuk Motion for Summary Judgment against USFS in Sacred Sites Case
Here is that pleading:
Karuk Motion for Summary Judgment
The case is captioned Karuk Tribe v. Kelley (N.D. Cal.).
Habeas Petition Challenging Peremptory Striking of Native Jurors Dismissed
Here is the order in Munoz v. McDonald (N.D. Cal.): Munoz v McDonald.
An excerpt:
Appellant, who is Native American, argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude three of the five Native American prospective jurors on the panel and no Native Americans were seated on the jury. In addition to the three jurors excused by peremptory challenge, the court excused for hardship reasons prospective juror R.B., the tribal chairperson for the Elem Indian Colony. After the jury was sworn, but before opening statements, the court excused for cause an alternate juror described by defense counsel as “the only Native American juror that we have” after it came to light that the juror had failed to disclose information about his prior arrests and convictions. Appellant does not challenge the court’s decision as to either of those two jurors.] We disagree.
Turtle Talk 
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