Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community on Schedule in Supreme Court Conference Today

See SCOTUSblog. And docket. We should know Monday.

Here are the briefs:

Michigan v Bay Mills Cert Petition w Appendices

Bay Mills Cert Opp

Michigan Cert Stage Reply

United States Invitation Brief

Michigan Supplemental Brief

OSG Recommends Denial of Michigan’s Cert Petition in Vanderbilt Casino Dispute

Here is the brief:

12-515 Michigan v Bay Mills

SG Recommends Denial of Cert Petition in Corboy v. Louie

From SCOTUSBlog (brief here and embedded in the post):

Corboy v. Louie is a challenge to a Hawaii tax exemption that is available only to those who meet the state’s definition of “native Hawaiians.”  The Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground that the petitioners (who are not native Hawaiians) lacked standing.  The federal government agreed with the respondents that certiorari is not warranted, for several reasons.  First, it regarded the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision as resting on an adequate and independent state ground.  Second, and in any event, it alleged that the petitioners would not have standing under Article III.  Third, and finally, the Court does not need to review the petitioners’ equal protection claim, which is not properly presented and could be affected by recent legal and political developments in Hawaii.

Petition stage briefs are here.

OSG Recommends Denial of Certiorari in Osage Nation v. Irby

No one will read this ’til Tuesday, but here goes….

Here is the brief:

10-537 Osage Nation v Irby

US Files Invitation Brief Opposing Cert in Brown v. Rincon Band (IGRA Revenue Sharing Case)

Here is the brief:

Brown v Rincon Band No 10-330

OSG Invitation Brief in Thunderhorse v. Pierce

From SCOTUS blog:

Yesterday the Acting Solicitor General filed an invitation brief in Iron Thunderhorse v. Pierce (09-1353), recommending that the Court deny certiorari or, in the alternative, grant certiorari and summarily reverse and remand the Fifth Circuit’s ruling for application of the correct legal standard.  At issue in the case is whether the court of appeals misinterpreted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act to require only a minimal showing that a prison grooming rule which concededly imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is the “least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.”  The Acting Solicitor General’s brief is available here.

An excerpt, where the OSG argues that the Fifth Circuit made a gross error:

But petitioner in this case raised arguments and evidence not addressed in Diaz or Longoria: that other prison systems (including the federal Bureau of Prisons)permit long hair, and that TDCJ enforces its grooming policy in an inconsistent manner. Id. at 10a n.3. Thecourts below, however, never required respondents to explain why the alternative, less restrictive practices utilized in other prison systems would not work in the Polunsky unit. Nor did they require prison administrators to explain why the previous inconsistent application of the grooming policy to petitioner and to others (including Texas’’s female inmate population) did not indicatethat a less restrictive alternative was appropriate. See ibid. Although respondent acknowledges (Br. in Opp. 14-15 (citing Odneal, supra)) that the Fifth Circuit requires prison officials to justify application of a challenged policy under the facts of a particular case, respondent notably does not even attempt to justify the court of appeals’’ refusal to hold officials to that standard in this case.

The petition stage materials are here.