Rule 19 – Page 19 – Turtle Talk

I. Whether, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), courts may adjudicate and compromise legal rights in land to which the United States holds title without the United States’ participation in the litigation.

II. Whether, in light of this Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, No. 10-382 (June 13, 2011), the Ninth Circuit properly held, as a matter of law, that litigation compromising the United States’ title in land can proceed in the United States’ absence as long as an Indian tribe is a party to the litigation.

Here are the lower court materials.

Pyramid Lake Opposition to Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. Motion to Re-open Water Case

June 15, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Pyramid Lake Motion.

In honor of Navajo’s Rule 19 motion posted yesterday….

Navajo Nation Moves to Intervene in Environmental Suit to Protect Navajo Mine Interests

June 14, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in Center for Biological Diversity v. Pizarchik (D. Colo.):

Amended_Motion_to_Intervene_CBDv.U.S.&BHP

Ex.A_Dismiss

Ex.B_Shelly

Ex.C_Cicchetti

Ninth Circuit Dismisses Bishop Community Land Claim against City of Los Angeles under Rule 19

March 14, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community v. City of Los Angeles.

An excerpt:

Plaintiff Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, California, an Indian tribe formallyrecognized by the United States, filed this action againstDefendant City of Los Angeles for an order restoring Plaintiffto possession of land that the City took long ago in a deal withthe United States. The district court dismissed the actionunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) because itruled that, under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States was a required party that Plaintiffcould not join. The district court certified the appealability ofits order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Upon Plaintiff’s timelyrequest, we agreed to hear this interlocutory appeal, and we now affirm.

And the briefs:

Paiute-Shoshone Brief

Los Angeles Brief

Paiute-Shoshone Reply

Katherine Florey on Rule 19 after Pimentel

March 9, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Katherine Florey has published “Making Sovereigns Indispensable: Pimentel and the Evolution of Rule 19” in the UCLA Law Review.

Here is the abstract:

Though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 might appear to be one of the more esoteric of the Federal Rules, it is actually an exceptionally powerful device: It permits defendants to obtain dismissal of cases over which the court has valid jurisdiction, even when no other forum exists in which the action can be brought. This Article argues that, while Rule 19 was originally intended to facilitate the consolidation of litigation by requiring joinder of absent parties, it has evolved in an important subset of cases to serve a nearly opposite purpose. That is, in many cases in which a party may be affected by the litigation but cannot be joined because it is a sovereign possessing immunity from suit, courts have developed a near-categorical rule that the entire case may be dismissed—even if that means that the plaintiff is permanently denied a remedy. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court recently appeared to endorse this approach, holding that Philippine human rights victims’ claims to their former regime’s assets could not be litigated because two Philippine governmental entities could not be joined in the case.

In such situations, this Article argues, Rule 19 functions almost as an abstention doctrine, permitting courts to avoid decisions in cases that may raise sensitive intergovernmental or foreign-relations issues. This use of the rule is problematic for several reasons. It is not authorized by (or even discussed in) Rule 19’s text, and it appears at odds with the original purpose of Rule 19: to promote consolidated litigation of disputes, not to dispose of them entirely. Further, it permits the interests of the plaintiff—and the public interest in resolution of disputes—to be systematically slighted. Thus, although there may be situations in which an absent party’s sovereign immunity should be taken into account, courts have gone too far in their solicitude for absent sovereigns. This Article explores how this phenomenon has evolved and suggests ways in which courts’ analysis of Rule 19 factors should be modified to take account of the rule’s fundamental purposes