Here is the SCT docket sheet.
And a news article on the issue, via Pechanga.
Supreme Court
Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s Amicus Brief in Montana v. Wyoming & North Dakota Supreme Court Case
Here: Northern Cheyenne Amicus Brief.
The other materials are here.
Sac and Fox Nation Cert Opposition Brief
Here: Sac and Fox Cert Opp.
Government’s Reply Brief in U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation in Support of Cert Petition
Native Wholesale Supply v. Oklahoma Cert Petition
Here: Native Wholesale Supply Cert Petition.
Here are the questions presented:
1. Whether a contract entered into by an Indian Tribe and fully performed outside the exterior boundaries of the state in which the Tribe’s reservation is located can constitutionally subject the out of state vendor to the personal jurisdiction of the state in which the Tribe’s reservation is located.
2. Whether a state can prohibit an Indian Tribe located within its boundaries from purchasing goods from Indians on a reservation outside the state.
Lower court materials here.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Kraus-Anderson Const. Cert Petition
Here: Miccosukee v Kraus-Anderson Cert Petition
Question presented:
This case presents an important question regarding the recognition and enforcement of Indian tribal court judgments in the federal courts. The question presented is whether an action to obtain recognition of a tribal court judgment presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, based on the common law and the federal character of Indian law, and whether the Eleventh Circuit was incorrect in its holding, which conflicts with other circuit court and Supreme Court precedents, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Miccosukee Tribal Court judgment in this case.
Lower court materials here.
Battle of Letters in Madison County v. Oneida
Three more letters from the parties have been filed with the SCt clerk’s office. Here they are:
Madison County Letter to Hon. Suter
Waxman Letter re Madison County v. Oneida, No. 10-72 – 12-2-10
Oneida Waives Immunity in Madison County v. OIN Suit Pending before the Supreme Court
To say the least, an interesting development.
Here is the letter referencing the OIN ordinance waiving immunity irrevocably: 2010_11_30 Letter to Clerk re Declaration and Ordinance.
Madison County’s opening merits brief is due today.
OSG Invitation Brief in Thunderhorse v. Pierce
From SCOTUS blog:
Yesterday the Acting Solicitor General filed an invitation brief in Iron Thunderhorse v. Pierce (09-1353), recommending that the Court deny certiorari or, in the alternative, grant certiorari and summarily reverse and remand the Fifth Circuit’s ruling for application of the correct legal standard. At issue in the case is whether the court of appeals misinterpreted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act to require only a minimal showing that a prison grooming rule which concededly imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is the “least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” The Acting Solicitor General’s brief is available here.
An excerpt, where the OSG argues that the Fifth Circuit made a gross error:
But petitioner in this case raised arguments and evidence not addressed in Diaz or Longoria: that other prison systems (including the federal Bureau of Prisons)permit long hair, and that TDCJ enforces its grooming policy in an inconsistent manner. Id. at 10a n.3. Thecourts below, however, never required respondents to explain why the alternative, less restrictive practices utilized in other prison systems would not work in the Polunsky unit. Nor did they require prison administrators to explain why the previous inconsistent application of the grooming policy to petitioner and to others (including Texas’s female inmate population) did not indicatethat a less restrictive alternative was appropriate. See ibid. Although respondent acknowledges (Br. in Opp. 14-15 (citing Odneal, supra)) that the Fifth Circuit requires prison officials to justify application of a challenged policy under the facts of a particular case, respondent notably does not even attempt to justify the court of appeals’ refusal to hold officials to that standard in this case.
The petition stage materials are here.
Commentary on the Schwarzeneggar v. Rincon Band Cert Petition
On December 10, 2010, the Supreme Court likely will decide whether to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the State of California failed to negotiate in good faith with the Rincon Band. This particular petition is very interesting on a number of levels, as it is really the first time a federal circuit has delved deep into the merits of a good faith claim under IGRA. Our guess is that the Court will not grant review, but it is a close question for reasons largely having to do with power politics (though we have been wrong before).
Here are the factors the Supreme Court uses to determine whether to grant cert.
(1) Circuit Splits. No split here, and perhaps there never will be. California may be the only state to have expressly waived its immunity to good faith suits under IGRA, and so the Ninth Circuit likely will be the only circuit to review this legal question for the foreseeable future. There aren’t even any splits in authority between state and/or federal courts for this reason. California in its cert petition resorted to asserting that the Department of Interior is generating splits in authority with itself by approving some compacts (Seminole Tribe) and disapproving others (Habemotolel Pomo) supposedly on revenue sharing grounds. Even assuming these two decisions cannot be reconciled (they plainly can be distinguished on the facts), we doubt there has been many (if any) cert grants based on a federal agency’s conflicting internal decisions. This factor weighs heavily in favor of letting the legal question percolate below. If there is a federal agency conflict, then let the parties appeal to the federal courts and see if any split in authority develops.
(2) Gross Error. Very unlikely that the Supreme Court would see a gross error here. This is a case of first impression, and so it would be very difficult for any court to make an obvious mistake like misapplying the correct precedents (since there aren’t any).
(3) Error Correction. This factor means that the Court will be disinclined to grant a case where the lower court merely got the facts wrong (from the point of view of the parties); in other words, cases labeled factbound. One could make a strong claim this case is factbound, given that the negotiations between governors and tribes are typically very heavily tribe-specific. A comparison between states is instructive. The 25 percent revenue sharing between Connecticut tribes and the state is entirely market-based, relating to the geography and gaming market available. The 10 percent sharing (generally) between Michigan tribes and the state also relates to the market of that region. The Rincon Band cert opposition brief does a good job of highlighting to the Court early that this particular negotiation involved only additional slot machines and the extension of the compact, not the compact from the ground up. The cert opp brief implies that this petition may even be virtually moot, in that the Colusa case expanded the pool of slot machines available to compacting tribes. In short, this is a very fact specific case.
(4) Importance. This is the key element in any cert petition — the most subjective factor in any decision made by the Court on a cert petition. And here is where Indian country is at its weakest.
Turtle Talk 
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