Brief in Support of Petitioner here.
U.S. cert petition previously posted here.
uncounseled tribal court convictions
United States v. Bryant Cert Petition — Federal Habitual Offender Statute and Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions
Here is the petition:
Question presented:
Section 117(a) of Title 18, United States Code, makes it a federal crime for any person to “commit[] a domestic assault within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or Indian country” if the person “has a final conviction on at least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings for” enumerated domestic-violence offenses. 18 U.S.C. 117(a).
Sharply Divided Ninth Circuit Denies En Banc Review in United States v. Bryant
Here are the materials:
CA9 Order Denying En Banc Petition + Opinions
Panel materials and commentary are here.
Federal Defender Positioning United States v. Drapeau to Force Circuit Split over Use of Prior Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Federal Sentencing Enhancement
Here are the briefs in United States v. Drapeau:
An excerpt:
Santana Drapeau was convicted of two counts of domestic assault by an habitual offender. In support of those charges the United States offered evidence of Drapeau’s three prior domestic abuse convictions in Crow Creek Tribal Court. In each instance Drapeau entered a no contest plea; in two of the three he did so without a lawyer. Over Drapeau’s objection under Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404, the District Court admitted testimony about the underlying facts giving rise to those convictions. The District Court admitted that evidence based on a flawed understanding of whether the court or the jury decided what was a qualifying predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 117.
The District Court denied Drapeau’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the use of no contest pleas obtained without counsel as qualifying predicate offenses. Drapeau acknowledges that this issue is controlled by United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), but presents it here in order to preserve it for review by this Court en banc and through petition for writ of certiorari.
We’ve commented on this issue extensively here and here. Right now, there is no circuit split as both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have allowed use of the tribal court convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 117, a habitual offender statute. The cases are Cavanaugh and Shavanaux. There’s a Ninth Circuit case from the 1980s — United States v. Ant (882_F.2d_1389) — that is in disagreement with these cases but in a different context (confessions).
Ah, there is a clean split that I forgot about! United States v. Bryant in the CA9.
A case worthy of watching.
I wrote a short paper about these issues more generally a while back: Sovereign Comity
Split Ninth Circuit Panel Dismisses Uncounseled ICRA Habeas Claim for Failure to Exhaust Tribal Remedies
Here are the materials in Alvarez v. Tracy:
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition brought pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (ICRA), and 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which Fortino Alvarez challenged convictions and sentences imposed by the Gila River Indian Community tribal court.
The panel declined to exercise jurisdiction over Alvarez’s claims and affirmed the denial of the habeas petition because Alvarez failed to exhaust his claims by bringing them first to the tribal courts, and did not demonstrate that unavailability or futility of direct appeal excuses the exhaustion requirement or that the Community’s appeals process did not comply with the ICRA.Although the Community failed to raise Alvarez’s lack of direct appeal in its motion to dismiss, the panel considered the defense under Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012), and Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987), and concluded that the strong comity and judicial efficiency interests at stake warrant federal abstention.
Dissenting, Judge Kozinski wrote that the majority does not live up to its solemn responsibility to appear impartial, when it forgives the Community, which was represented by counsel, for failing to raise an exhaustion defense in district court or on appeal, but holds Alvarez to his single oversight of failing, while unrepresented before the Community court, to raise his jury trial and confrontation claims by way of a direct appeal. On the merits, Judge Kozinski would find that the Community violated Alvarez’s right to a jury trial under ICRA by failing to inform him that he needed to request a jury, a structural error fatally undermining the conviction.
Judge Kozinski added:
I have read the opinion many times and disagree with pretty much everything in it, including the numerals and punctuation. I explain why in the pages that follow, but first I pose a more basic question: How can a court committed to justice, as our court surely is, reach a result in which the litigant who can afford a lawyer is forgiven its multiple defaults while the poor, uneducated, un-counseled petitioner has his feet held to the fire? I attribute no ill will or improper motive to my excellent colleagues. They are fair, honorable and dedicated jurists who are doing what they earnestly believe is right. But we see the world very differently.
Ninth Circuit Reaffirms that Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions Resulting in Jail Time May Not Be Used to Enhance Federal Sentences
Here is the opinion in United States v. Bryant.
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment charging the defendant, an Indian, with two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).Applying United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989), the panel held that, subject to the narrow exception recognized in case law for statutes that serve merely as enforcement mechanisms for civil disabilities, tribal court convictions may be used in subsequent prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right. Because the defendant’s tribal court domestic abuse convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment had they been obtained in federal or state court, the panel concluded that it is constitutionally impermissible to use them to establish an element of the offense in a subsequent prosecution under § 117(a), which is an ordinary recidivist statute and not a criminal enforcement scheme for a civil disability.
Concurring, Judge Watford wrote separately to highlight
why Ant warrants reexamination.
Judge Watford correctly notes that a circuit split on this issue has arisen with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits:
It’s perhaps unsurprising that our decision in this case conflicts with decisions from two of our sister circuits. Faced with almost identical scenarios—prior, uncounseled tribal court convictions that would have violated the Sixth Amendment in state or federal court and that were used as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 117—the Eighth and Tenth Circuits pointedly disagreed with us. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 595, 604 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995–98 (10th Cir. 2011). As our colleagues on the Eighth Circuit noted, “Supreme Court authority in this area is unclear; reasonable decisionmakers may differ in their conclusions as to whether the Sixth Amendment precludes a federal court’s subsequent use of convictions that are valid because and only because they arose in a court where the Sixth Amendment did not apply.” Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605. Given this circuit split and the lack of clarity in this area of Sixth Amendment law, the Supreme Court’s intervention seems warranted.
If nothing else, the case at least may generate support for en banc review. We posted materials on these two cases here (the Supreme Court denied cert). I wrote about this issue a few years ago in a paper titled “Sovereign Comity.“
Here are the briefs:
Federal Courts Dismiss Federal Habitual Domestic Violence Offender Indictments Due to Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions
Here are the materials in United States v. Kirkaldie (D. Mont.):
And in United States v. Stewart (D. Mont.):
20 Stewart Motion to Dismiss + Tribal Court Docs
Illinois Law Review Student Note on Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions and ICRA
The University of Illinois law Review has published “Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions: The Sixth Amendment, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Indian Civil Rights Act.”
Here is the abstract:
Tribal courts tasked with the prosecution of Native American defendants are not constrained by many Constitutional provisions, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Currently, the Indian Civil Rights Act only requires representation in tribal court prosecutions of indigent defendants that may lead to incarceration of more than one year. State and federal courts require the opportunity of representation for all defendants in criminal proceedings. This discrepancy between the rights afforded in tribal courts and in state and federal courts lead to unique legal issues for Native American defendants indicted in federal court after being convicted without counsel in a tribal court.
Native Americans prosecuted under federal re-peat-offender statues could be exposed to harsher penalties based on prior uncounseled tribal con-victions. Thus, even if a Native American lacked representation in tribal court, those convictions might be used as predicate offenses for the purposes of federal repeat-offender laws. Different approaches to this issue are presented from the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. This Note ad-dresses the reasoning of each Circuit and offers a Recommendation that balances tribal sovereignty concerns, Sixth Amendment ramifications, and justice implications for both victims and defendants in the tribal court system.
Evidence of Prior Navajo DUI Conviction Excluded from Federal Prosecution
Here are the materials in United States v. Bundy (D. N.M.):
US Motion to Introduce Evidence of Navajo Conviction
From the order:
As previously noted, Defendant has provided the Court with a copy of the transcript of her guilty plea proceeding. [Doc. 194-1] Since there is no indication in the transcript that Defendant was represented by counsel, the Court will not assume that Defendant was informed of her rights by counsel. Rule 12(c) of the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure required the judge, prior to accepting Defendant’s plea, to explain to Defendant that she had the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to have counsel at her own expense or appointed counsel if defendant cannot afford counsel, (3) to plead not guilty, (4) to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (5) to be released on bail unless certain findings are made, (6) to trial by jury, (7) to a speedy and public trial, (8) to call witnesses, and (9) to file a writ of habeas corpus. Instead of the detailed enumeration of her trial rights contemplated by the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure, the page-and-a-half transcript shows a cursory, rudimentary colloquy. Although Defendant was asked “Do you understand your rights as explained to you?” the transcript does not include any enumeration of those rights, nor does the record show that Defendant was told that she was giving up those rights by pleading guilty. Under the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure, the advisement of rights pursuant to Rule 12(c) is the sole procedure for advising a defendant of her rights. Further, Defendant’s counsel has represented to the Court that an examination of the tape of the proceedings before the tribal court for April 22, 2009 fails to show any explanation of rights to Defendant or any other person. [Doc. 194 at 3, n.1] It appears that this prerequisite to a valid guilty plea was entirely overlooked in Defendant’s case. The Court finds that Defendant was not advised of key rights guaranteed by ICRA–the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront her accusers and to compulsory process, the right to counsel at her own expense, and the right to trial before a jury of not less than six persons. Section 1302 (4) (6) and (10). The transcript also shows that there was no inquiry into the factual basis of Defendant’s plea. Defendant has made a compelling showing that her guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Under ICRA due process of law is itself a right. Section 1302(8). The Court concludes that Defendant’s guilty plea was obtained in violation of the due process provision of ICRA, and under Shavanaux is inadmissible as substantive evidence in a subsequent federal prosecution.
In a footnote, the court added:
Given the solicitude of the Navajo Supreme Court for the rights of accused tribemembers, e.g. Eriacho v. Ramah District Court, 6 Am. Tribal Law 624 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 2005); Navajo Nation v. Curley, 6 Am. Tribal Law 697 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 2005); Curley v. Navajo Nation, 4 Am. Tribal Law 622 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 2002), the Court has considerable doubt whether a prior conviction based on a demonstrably invalid guilty plea would be admissible in Navajo tribal court over the defendant’s objection.
Michigan Law Review Note on Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions
Christiana M. Martenson has published “Uncounseled Tribal Court Guilty Pleas in State and Federal Courts: Individual Rights Versus Tribal Self-Governance” (PDF) in the Michigan Law Review. Here is the abstract:
Indian tribes in the United States are separate sovereigns with inherent self-governing authority. As a result, the Bill of Rights does not directly bind the tribes, and criminal defendants in tribal courts do not enjoy the protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In United States v. Ant, a defendant—without the legal assistance that a state or federal court would have provided—pled guilty to criminal charges in tribal court. Subsequently, the defendant faced federal charges arising out of the same events that led to the tribal prosecution. The Ninth Circuit in Ant barred the federal prosecutor from using the defendant’s prior uncounseled tribal court guilty plea as evidence in the federal proceeding, explaining that doing so would violate the Sixth Amendment. This Note argues that Ant is no longer good law. First, Ant’s legal foundation is weak, especially in light of subsequent developments in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Second, Ant is poor policy because excluding tribal court guilty pleas from state and federal proceedings undermines tribal self-governance. Even though governments must protect the rights of individual criminal defendants, supporting tribal authority will ultimately lead to decreased violence on Indian land and increased consistency with federal legislation.
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