Here are the materials in Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe v. City of Seattle (Wash. Ct. App.):

Here are the materials in Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe v. City of Seattle (Wash. Ct. App.):
We also conclude that when the Department has reason to believe that a child is an Indian child under ICWA and WICWA, the heightened removal standard in those statutes applies to ex parte pick-up order requests. Because the Department had reason to know A.W. is an Indian child–information not shared with the trial court–and the trial court appliced an incorrect legal standard in assessing the Department’s evidence at that stage of the proceeding, the trial court erred in not vacating the pick up order.
Here are the materials in Simmons v. State of Washington:
Here are the materials in Rabang v. Gilliland:
Here are the materials in Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Okanogan County (Wash. Ct. App.):
An excerpt:
This appeal concerns one of endless broken promises by American government authorities toward Native Americans. The breach of an agreement in this instance also encompasses a violation of a court order.
The Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation (Yakama Nation) agreed to dismiss a lawsuit against Okanogan County, and, in return, the county agreed to adopt, by December 31, 2018, a new comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance that hopefully addressed the concerns the Nation had about the county’s current plan and ordinance. The superior court signed an order of dismissal without prejudice of the lawsuit, which order incorporated the many promises of the parties. When Okanogan County failed to adopt a new plan and ordinance by December 31, 2018 and thereby violated the court order, the Yakama Nation moved to vacate the order of dismissal. The superior court denied the motion to vacate on the alternative grounds that it lacked authority to vacate an order of dismissal without prejudice and that the Nation had no sustainable cause of action against the county for breaching its promises or violating the court order. Because the order of dismissal without prejudice imposed numerous obligations on Okanogan County, some of which it has disobeyed, we rule that the motion to vacate should have been granted. We thus reverse the superior court.
Here are the materials in Davis v. King County (Wash. Ct. App.):
79696-6-8-I Appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration
79696-6-8-I Appellees’ Response to Motion for Reconsideration
Prior post here.
Here are the materials in Lacy v. Snohomish County (Wash. Ct. App.):
4-15-19 Appellant’s Opening Brief
5-17-19 Respondent Cross Appellant’s Brief
6-14-19 Appellant’s Reply Brief
Prior post here.
Here are the materials in Davis v. King County (Wash. Ct. App.):
9-27-19 Amended Appellees’ Joint Response Brief
09-09-19 Appellees’ Joint Response Brief
An excerpt:
“Before addressing each of the estate’s arguments, we acknowledge that Davis’s death is tragic and echo the trial court’s sentiment that the application of RCW 4.24.420 here is problematic because it precludes claims where law enforcement officers’ actions and training may have been unreasonable, given their knowledge that the individual they were confronting was suicidal and armed. RCW 4.24.420 prevents courts and juries from reaching the issue of whether law enforcement’s negligence resulted in the loss of life. The statute is clear and precludes our evaluation of these policy questions.”
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