Here.
The agreement calls for the Senecas to give about $340 million in back payments to the state and local governments, but they will not have to pay about $209 million that was also owed. The deal also allows the Senecas to retain its gambling exclusivity in western New York, stretching through Rochester and the western portion of the Finger Lakes. The settlement will not need legislative approval.
Here and here. Excellent articles.
From Part 3:
In 2010, after Brown had been served notice of termination and adoption, his original lawyer, Lesley Sasser, asked a Charleston, South Carolina–based family court attorney named Shannon Jones to join Brown’s legal team. Although Jones is an expert in interstate custody disputes under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, she did not expect to become involved in an adoption struggle over an Indian child from Oklahoma.
“Lesley came to my office one day and said, ‘I’ve got this case that’s coming up for trial, and it could be kind of complex,’ ” said Jones, laughing at the understatement. “She said it involved the Indian Child Welfare Act. Honestly, at first I didn’t even know what it was. I’d never heard of it.”
***
Judge Deborah Malphrus, who heard arguments in South Carolina’s Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, issued a verbal courtroom ruling in favor of Brown on November 25, 2011. Soon, according to multiple sources in South Carolina, she was “inappropriately contacted” by numerous parties who asked her outright to change her written ruling in favor of the Capobiancos. Far from listening to their requests, Malphrus subsequently issued a 25-page ruling that reiterated the family court findings and transferred custody to Brown.
Read more at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/06/04/fight-baby-veronica-part-3-149704
From the NY Times.
Nor was Justice Kennedy’s brief quotation from “Actual Innocence” especially punctilious. Here is how the justice rendered it, including his brackets and ellipses: “[P]rompt [DNA] testing … would speed up apprehension of criminals before they commit additional crimes, and prevent the grotesque detention of … innocent people.”
Those first three dots covered a lot of ground. They took the place of more than six sentences and suggested a different point than the one the authors were making. The original passage concerned evidence collected at crime scenes, not from people who might be connected to it.
“What we were saying had nothing to do with post-arrest testing of suspects,” said Jim Dwyer, a co-author of the book who is now a columnist for The New York Times. “We were arguing that all evidence should be tested, whether or not a suspect had been charged.”
Mr. Neufeld agreed. “The ‘prompt testing’ is referring to something completely different than the latter phrase,” he said. “Barry, Jim and I never endorsed arrestee databases.”
The omission of two words with the second set of dots is easier to understand. The authors had written that testing could prevent “the grotesque detention of thousands of innocent people.” Justice Kennedy apparently did not want to endorse the possibility that the criminal justice system had such widespread shortcomings. (The Innocence Project, which is affiliated with the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York, says that more than 300 prisoners have been exonerated using DNA.)
Opinion here.
The Seneca Nation of Indians administers its own healthcare system through a self-determination contract with the Indian Health Service under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. The Nation submitted a contract amendment to the Indian Health Service to adjust the number of persons to be serviced under the contract and, as a result, to increase the funding provided to the Nation for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. IHS did not respond to the proposal within the 90 days as required by statute, and the Nation contends that its proposed amendment automatically became part of its contract with IHS upon the lack of a timely response. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, of which IHS is a constituent part, disagrees. The parties have briefed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the matter is ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth below, the Nation’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.
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The Nation’s argument is forceful in its simplicity, in its support in the undisputed evidence, and in its grounding in the unambiguous terms of the Contract, the statute, and the regulations. “In the April 29 Proposal Letter, the Nation proposed in plain terms to amend the Nation’s FY 2010 Agreement to increase funding by $3,774,392, plus interest . . . [and i]n the same letter, the Nation . . . proposed an identical amendment to the Nation’s FY 2011 Agreement.” Pl. MSJ 9–10. “The IHS Nashville Office received the April 29 Proposal Letter . . . on May 2, 2011 . . . [but t]he ninety (90) day period expired before August 3, 2011, without any response during that time by the Secretary or any other officer of the Department to the Nation’s proposed amendments other than a May 4, 2011 e-mail acknowledging that ‘[w]e are in receipt of your [April 29 Proposal Letter] and have made assignments to provide you with a response as soon as possible.’” Id. at 10 (quoting E-mail Chain at 6). According to the Nation, its proposals thus automatically became part of the Contract under 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2) and 25 C.F.R. § 900.18
Abstract:
Rules and principles governing indigenous membership have a dual aspect. First, a group’s capacity to decide its own membership is an essential element of indigenous self-governance. Second, a person’s claim to membership is sometimes supported by human rights, especially the right to enjoy one’s culture in community with other members of a minority. Because of this duality, in some instances, the interests of a self-constituting group and the interests of a self-identifying individual are directly opposed. In this chapter I argue that international human rights norms, jurisprudence and methodologies have not generated principles that could assist states and tribes in the governance of indigenous membership disputes. While the structure and ideology of international human rights law is such that the interests of tribes (and tribal members) are almost always subordinated to the interests of aspirant members and the public, CANZUS states (the affluent western settler states of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States) have been able to augment domestic human rights law in order to provide normative space for tribal self-constitution. This, I argue, contributes to the development of a distinctive settler-state political theory which is premised on the cardinal importance of indigeneity and tribalism in settler-state constitutionalism, and on the enduring relevance of descent as a source of political and legal status in settler societies. I draw primarily on examples from the public and tribal law of membership in the CANZUS states and on the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee that oversees the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR). I take a closer look at the interplay of HRC jurisprudence and the domestic law of Canada, by examining the origins and aftermath of Lovelace v. Canada (HRC, 1981).
THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COOS, LOWER UMPQUA AND SIUSLAW INDIANS
Facilitator and Strategic Plan Drafting Services Related to
Comprehensive Planning Demonstration Program Grant
Proposals due June 14, 2013
Request for Proposals
The Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians (“Tribes”) are requesting proposals (“Tribal Court RFP”) to secure the services of a qualified consultant to perform facilitation and strategic planning services related to a federal Comprehensive Planning Demonstration Program grant to guide the Confederated Tribes’ justice system development to promote community wellness and safety.
A copy of the RFP may be obtained by contacting Diane Whitson, Tribal Court Clerk at (541) 888-1306 or by email at tribalct@ctclusi.org. Signed proposals will be received by the Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians until June 14, 2013, at 1245 Fulton Avenue, Coos Bay, Oregon 97420. Proposals received after June 14, 2013, will not be considered
Opinion here.
The Spirit Lake Tribe of Indians, by its Committee of Understanding and Respect, and Archie Fool Bear, individually and as representative of more than 1,004
members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe – collectively, “the Committee” – sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) for interfering with the University of North Dakota’s use of the Fighting Sioux name, logo, and imagery. The NCAA moved to dismiss. The district court1 treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it. The Committee appeals. This court affirms.
Previous coverage here.
Final vote was 16 for, 13 against.
Here. Published in The Indian Civil Rights Act at 40, eds. Kristen Carpenter, Matthew Fletcher, and Angela Riley.
Abstract:
I approach this discussion by noting that Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez raises two critical oppositional principles: the collective political right versus the individual rights norm. Individual rights are the keystone in the Constitution of the United States. However, tribal rights for collective political entities are also affirmed in the Constitution in the provisions that establish relationships with the tribal nations. This political, nation-to-nation relationship was explicitly acknowledged and reaffirmed in Morton vs. Mancari. The most important right that tribal people claim for themselves is that as sovereigns. We have to remember that tribes were first sovereigns within the United States. And, as the noted scholar Charles Wilkinson reminds us, the tribal sovereigns were pre-constitutional, post-constitutional, and, in the international law context of indigenous law, extra-constitutional.
Turtle Talk 
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