Oneida Indian Nation and State of New York Agreement on Wide Range of Issues

Here. Another article here.

Details from the Syracuse.com article:

In a deal announced today, the Oneidas will give 25 percent of their gaming machine revenues to the state in exchange for exclusive rights to run casinos in a 10-county area of Central New York. Gov. Andrew Cuomo said that could mean $50 million a year for the state.

— Oneida and Madison counties agree to drop all legal action against the Oneidas over land and tax issues. The state will drop any support of those actions.

— No casinos would be built in the 10-county Central New York region, which includes Onondaga County. Vernon Downs, which opened in 2006, could continue to operate.

— The Oneidas, which have been granted 13,000 acres of tax-exempt trust land by the federal government, agree to cap their total trust land to 25,000 acres.

— Oneida County will get $2.5 million a year and Madison County will get $3.5 million from the state’s share of the Oneidas’ payments.

— The Oneidas will charge — and keep — the same sales taxes New York state charges. The Oneidas must use that money for the same kinds of services New York does.

— The nation will waive its sovereign immunity for the agreement, allowing New York to take the tribe to federal court in any disputes.

NPR’s Coverage of the South Dakota Summit on Indian Children

Here.

Federal officials met with South Dakota’s nine Sioux tribes on Wednesday for a historic summit in Rapid City. A year in the making, it was an effort to address long standing concerns over the high number of Native American children the state places in white foster homes. State officials, however, didn’t show up for the meeting.

Michigan House Republicans Introduce Retaliatory Bill Against MDCR

Representatives Bob Genetski and Dan Lauers introduced a bill yesterday that would cut the Michigan Department of Civil Rights budget and use the money to pay schools that are “forced” to change their mascot.

Coverage from the Freep and Michigan Radio.

The legislation, introduced by state Reps. Bob Genetski, R-Saugatuck, and Dan Lauwers, R-Brockway Township, would create a $3-million Mascot Reimbursement Fund. The fund would cover the expenses of schools that have to change mascots. The money to create the fund would come from the budget of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR).

ICT’s Baby Veronica Series, Part II

Another article in this excellent series.

Here.

“The birth mother knew I was Cherokee, she knew I was a tribal member, she knew my birth date and she knew how to spell my name,” said Brown matter-of-factly. “Look, we’ve known each other since we were 16. We were engaged. She absolutely knew all of my vital information. And she gave [the attorney and the tribe] the wrong information [hoping to keep the adoption secret].”

Behn v. Moulton Contracting, Supreme Court of Canada Says Blockades Are An Abuse of Process

Decision here.

Coverage here.

The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that individual members of an Aboriginal group can’t use blockades or other “self-help” remedies when claiming a government breached its duty to consult, and in fact doing so amounted to “an abuse of process.”

In Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., the SCC dismissed an appeal from individual band members of the Fort Nelson First Nation and endorsed the position taken by two lower B.C. courts.

Among the issues addressed by the SCC was whether it amounts to an abuse of process for Aboriginal individuals — in this case all with the last name Behn — to challenge the validity of government issued authorizations as a defence to a legal claim when they failed to take legal action to challenge the government’s authorization.

From one of our senior Canadian correspondents.

 

ICT’s Baby Veronica Coverage: The Brown Family Perspective

Here.

This much is clear: If one did not know that this small family was at the center of one of the most important Indian law cases in the last 30 years, the Browns would seem like any other family at 6 o’clock in America. Two tired parents, a three-year-old with endless energy, dinner on the stove, dogs yapping, geese squawking and a house in the middle of remodeling. In military-speak, they are squared away.

 

Onondaga Nation v. New York Petition for Cert

Here:

Onondaga Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals’ ruling that equitable considerations bar the Onondaga Nation’s claim for a declaratory judgment for violations of the Trade and Intercourse Act, three federal treaties, and the United States Constitution contravenes the fundamental right to a remedy, international legal norms, principles of federal equity and this Court’s decisions in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 266 (1985) and City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005).

 

Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Issues Four Year Sentence in DV Case

Here

Russell McKinley Wolfe, 35, was convicted on Nov. 16, 2012, in the Cherokee Court for Domestic Violence Assault on a Female, Violation of a Domestic Violence Protective Order, Driving While Impaired, and Injuring Public Property. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. The sentence, issued by the Honorable Kirk G. Saunooke, Cherokee Court Judge, was one of the longest sentences ever issued by the Cherokee Court and comes after the enactment of the Tribal Law and Order Act which authorized criminal sentences of greater than one year in tribal courts.

Since the sentence was handed down in Wolfe’s case, the Office of the Tribal Prosecutor, in conjunction with the Cherokee Court and Cherokee Police Department, worked together with the Federal Bureau of Prisons to authorize Wolfe’s sentence to be served in a Federal Detention Facility with the Bureau of Prisons.

Second Read-Through of Baby Veronica Transcript

By Matthew Fletcher and Kate Fort

This second read-through incorporates a broader analysis of how the argument went on the merits.

Best Interests of the Child

While it’s true oral argument advocates exaggerate their arguments in order to make a point, Lisa Blatt’s arguments in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl today were particularly onerous. From claiming that this case “involves accretion and conscripting other people’s children to grow the tribal population based solely on biological link” (p. 19, lines 16-18) to her comment about the white adoptive parents being at “the back of the bus” (page 62 line 20), she pushed so much anti-tribal and racial animus claims it is hard to keep up. Beyond that, her claim that there was no best interest determination was just plain wrong—as Charles Rothfeld pointed out immediately — the first line out of his mouth:

It is simply false to say that this child’s custody was transferred without a best interest determination, as is apparent from any reading of the lower court decisions in this case. (page 30, lines 20-23)

The Justices did seem to get the distinction between a best interests determination and determining the unfitness of a parent. They also seemed to understand that the father in this case is a fit parent, ready, willing, and able to parent his child. They appeared to recognize that allowing a best interests of the child standard to be used against a fit parent would create rights for a child far beyond what has been acknowledged so far by the Court: (pages 36-37, lines 20-25, 1-3):

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But I think Justice Breyer is quite wrong because a standard that says results in serious emotional or physical damage to the child is far from a best interest standard.
JUSTICE SCALIA: It sure is. And do you know of any State that — that applies best interest of the child standard to termination of parental rights as opposed to adoption?
MR. ROTHFELD: Absolutely not.

Interpretation of Sections 1912(d) and (f)

Perhaps because of its commitment to preserving the OSG’s reputation for objectivity, the federal government was of little help to tribal interests. The SG’s admittedly confusing position of claiming 1912(d) applies (what we know as active efforts, what Blatt characterized as an “exhaustion obligation” (page 8, line 11) and what Justice Kagan called the “curing provision” (page 58, line 14)), but 1912(f) does not (the heightened standard for termination of parental rights), the government may have done more harm than good. In fact, the interpretation about how ICWA is a balancing statute between two sovereigns, the state and the tribe may not be all that persuasive to the Court. This line of argument may be the deciding factor for the case. In a vast majority of cases, a child would not be in the custody of her parents when there is a termination of parental rights hearing. In an abuse and neglect case (which this is not), the child would have been removed, and the court would make the determination about “continued custody” while the child was in foster or family care — not, generally, while the child was in the actual physical custody of the parent. To interpret 1912(f) otherwise eliminates the provision for virtually all parents under ICWA.

Another question is if Justice Scalia believes everything  he was saying in oral argument. He is “quite sure” (page 42, line 13) he is right on how tribal membership is determined and ended up shutting down Chief Justice Roberts concern about random groups of people calling themselves tribes and getting the protection of ICWA. Scalia also talked about the legislative policy of the law, argued with the government about the separation of sections 1912 (d) and (f), and stated an “Indian family” is a father, a mother, and a kid, with no additional requirements.

Assorted Weirdness — Chief Justice Roberts Edition

The Chief had to go there — he asks counsel for the Birth Father about blood quantum on pages 38-29, lines 25-25, 1-6:

If — if you had a tribe, is there at all a threshold before you can call, under the statute, a child an “Indian child”? 3/256ths? And what if the tribe — what if you had a tribe with a zero percent blood requirement; they’re open for, you know, people who want to apply, who think culturally they’re a Cherokee or — or any number of fundamentally accepted conversions.

It’s so easy to attack the Cherokee Nation on blood quantum. On one hand, everyone and their brother thinks they have a Cherokee princess in the ancestry. On the other hand, there’s sort of a Cherokee obsession about blood quantum when it comes to the Freedmen. The Cherokees do use a lineal descendancy membership rule. But you still have to prove blood quantum, using the 19th century rolls, and yes even 3/256ths will do the trick. But the Chief Justice’s obsession with fractions, as one our of esteemed and fearless commentators noted in an email to us just now, “very easily could have been applied to John Ross — our chief at time of removal. He was 1/8th Cherokee, which by the CJ’s logic is almost zero Cherokee. Almost zero Cherokee was enough to get your butt marched west. And his wife, probably not all Cherokee either, died in Little Rock along the way.

Assorted Weirdness — Adoptive Parents as Victim

Ms. Blatt’s final entreaty to the Court was that a ruling against her clients would”relegat[e] adoptive parents to the back of the bus….” (page 62, line 19-20). Naturally, since Chief Justice Roberts is an adoptive parent, she probably thinks she has a receptive audience. Why she felt she needed to do this baffles me. If it was wasn’t clear already from the Chief’s snarkily false comments about Indian identity, she has his vote. What’s this about?

We found this to be terrifically offensive.

Last we checked, it costs adoptive parents $27,500 to adopt a child (see here: In re TSW, page 127). The vast majority of American Indian families (and other people of color, frankly), who reside in the poorest socioeconomic categories in the United States when it comes to income, cannot afford to adopt a child. We fear Ms. Blatt is arguing for the power of white families to adopt; she is most certainly arguing for the power of wealthy families to adopt).  

The Possible Line-Up?

As Matthew said at Fed Bar, a decision in Adoptive Couple that rides on constitutional law (federal common law, or federal Indian law) likely will be more ideological than tribal interests can withstand (as in, they don’t have the votes). We think this one is going to be decided through an interpretation of the statute, as SCOTUSblog’s analysis of the oral argument seems to confirm.

Assuming Justice Scalia is not being facetious (but, seriously, how can one predict?), oral arguments made it sound like Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Scalia voting for father, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Thomas (he never votes for Indians) against, with Breyer and Ginsberg up in the air. As Justice Sotomayor stated, we can’t believe any of them “want to be that judge” (page 24, lines 9-10), the judge who takes the child away from her father after nearly two years.

SCOTUSblog Oral Argument Recap of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Here.

[Blatt’s]  line of argument fell flat with at least three Justices – Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor – who throughout the argument generally regarded the case as covered by the plain language, even if not the purpose, of ICWA.  Justice Elena Kagan’s vote was less certain, but she also seemed to at least be leaning that way:  she pressed both Blatt and Deputy Solicitor General Ed Kneedler, representing the federal government as an amicus, to explain why, if Father is a “parent” for purposes of ICWA, he wouldn’t also be able to rely on the protections of Sections 1912(d) and (f).  What, she asked Blatt, is the point of labeling Father as a “parent” if he doesn’t have any rights as such?  Returning to this topic again later, Justice Kagan suggested that the Adoptive Couple’s construction of the law would effectively create two classes of parents under the statute – those with the protections provided in subsections (d) and (f), and those without.  If Congress intended to do so, she queried, why didn’t it say so more explicitly?

At least three other Justices – the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer and Alito – seemed inclined to agree with Blatt and interpret ICWA more narrowly, particularly given what they clearly regarded as Baby Girl’s somewhat tenuous link to the Indian Tribe in question, the Cherokee Nation.  Thus, the Chief Justice expressed some astonishment that “one drop of blood” could “trigger[] all these rights” under ICWA; both he and Justice Alito also tried to test the limits of the position taken by Charles Rothfeld, representing the Father, by asking him about a scenario in which the Tribe would allow virtually anyone to join the Tribe, regardless of whether the would-be members had any actual Indian ancestry.  On this point, Justice Scalia chimed in to suggest that the hypothetical was a “null set” because there are federal criteria, including some blood relationship, that must be met for a Tribe to receive federal recognition.  Rothfeld countered that in this case Father has significant ties to the Cherokee Nation, but in any event this is an issue that Congress or the executive branch can address.