Stephen Pevar against the Washington Football Team Nickname

Here, from the ACLU blog. An excerpt:

Think of a vile name that you were called by bullies at school based on your religion, your race, your country of origin, or some other characteristic. How did it make you feel? If I call you by the same name but tell you that my intention is to honor you by using it, will you feel honored just because I say so, or would you suggest that I find another way to show my appreciation?

“Redskin” is a vile name. It’s a name that people who hate American Indians often call them. Every dictionary defines “Redskins” as being offensive, derogatory and a racial epithet. Even with the best intentions, naming a sports team the New York Kikes, the Seattle Slant Eyes, the Atlanta Niggers, or the Washington Redskins will likely offend the very group you want to honor. And they’re the ones who should know if the name is an honor or not.

The ACLU is a champion of free speech. The issue here isn’t whether Dan Snyder, the owner of the Washington Redskins has a right to call his team anything he wants. He does. The issue is whether he should perpetuate racism.

Hopi Tribe Objection to Interior’s Intention to Enforce Stricter Air Quality Standards at Navajo without Hopi’s Input

Here:

Hopi Letter to Secretary of the Interior

An excerpt:

On September 4, 2013, the Hopi Tribe (“Tribe”) wrote to you expressing its serious concerns regarding the Department oflnterior’s (“DOl”) decision to join with the Salt River Project (“SRP”) and others to develop and endorse a proposed Altemative (“SRP- Altemative”) to the pending EPA rulemaking that would set stricter air quality standards and require the Best Available Retrofit Technology (“BART”) for the Navajo Generating Station (“NOS”), a coalfired power plant located on the Navajo Reservation in northeastern Arizona. In our letter, we also informed you that the Tribe would be hosting DOl attomey, Letty Belin, for a meeting (on September 5, 2013) that she had requested in order to discuss the proposed SRP-Altemative to the EPA rule, including the Tribe’s exclusion from  the process. As a result of the Tribe’s meeting with Ms. Belin, the Tribe now has greater  concerns regarding DOl’s explanations for its decision to exclude the Hopi Tribe from the  process and its support of the proposed SRPAlternative. Rather than satisfying the  concerns expressed by the Tribe, Ms. Belin’s explanation of the basis for DOl’s decisions  merely senred to underscore DOI’s disregard of the Tribe’s interests as a major  stakeholder in this matter and its violation of the trust responsibility it owes to the Hopi Tribe.

Federal Court Rejects Motions to Suppress Evidence in Red Lake Kidnapping Case

Here are the materials in United States v. Benais (D. Minn.):

70 MJ R&R re Smith

71 MJ R&R re Benais

75 DCT Order Adoting No. 70

76 DCT Order Adopting No. 71

Briefing Complete in Federal Motion to Dismiss Sand Creek Claims

Here are the briefs in Flute v. United States (D. Colo.):

US Motion to Dismiss

Flute Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

US Reply

The complaint is here.

Sen. Dorgan in USA Today: Time to Change Washington Football Team Nickname

Here.

Star-Tribune Coverage of White Earth Constitutional Referendum

Here.

JFK and Indian Country

Chris Stearns on JFK’s Legacy in Indian Country

JFK Receiving Indian Chiefs (March 5, 1963)

JFK Letter Rejecting Termination Policy

 

Written Testimony in SCIA Hearing on Carcieri

Here:

Assistant Secretary Assumes Jurisdiction over Appeals of Fee to Trust Acquisitions over 200 Acres

Here:

11 12 13-F2TDecisions IBIA-Washburn PDF0NJ

California COA Decides ICWA Placement Preferences Matter

Here is the opinion (Cal. App.):

In re Autumn K

An excerpt:

This appeal challenges an order terminating the parental rights of mother Patricia M. and father Bryan K. to their daughter Autumn K. and placing the child for adoption. Because Autumn was of Chickasaw descent and thus an Indian child, the dependency proceeding fell within the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. section 1901, et seq. (ICWA). As such, there were particular substantive requirements with which the juvenile court was obligated to comply when selecting a permanent plan for Autumn. Most significantly, absent good cause to deviate from this requirement, ICWA obligated the court to place Autumn with a member of her extended family, a member of her tribe, or another Indian family. (25 U.S.C. § 1915.) Here, there were two potentially viable, ICWA-compliant placements: maternal grandmother Teresa, who had custody of Autumn’s six siblings and had sought placement of Autumn from the outset of the dependency case, and maternal aunt Beatrice. Despite that, the court, relying on a conclusion by respondent Del Norte County Health and Social Services Department (Department) that Autumn could not be placed in her grandparents’ home, placed Autumn in a non-Indian home with a distant relative.

On appeal, the parents contend the juvenile court erred for a multitude of reasons. We agree with one argument that necessitates reversal: the Department erred in determining maternal grandfather José had a nonexemptible criminal conviction such that Autumn could not be placed with her grandparents. We conclude two different statutory provisions instructed that the conviction was in fact exemptible, and the Department was thus obligated to evaluate the request for an exemption on its merits. We therefore reverse.