Supreme Court – Page 60

Cert Petition in Trust Accounting Claim for Sand Creek Descendants

June 27, 2016Sarah M Donnelly1 Comment

Download petition for a Writ of Certiorari here.

Questions presented:

Whether a treaty promise to pay reparations to a group of Native Americans in the form and amount that is “best adapted to the respected wants and conditions of” said group of Native Americans, and subsequent appropriation of funds by Congress to pay such reparations, create a fiduciary relationship between the United States and said group of Native Americans.

Whether the Administrative Procedures Act waives the United States’ immunity from suit for accounting claims regarding trust mismanagement that begun before the enactment of the Act.

Whether a set of Appropriations Acts by Congress that defer the accrual of trust mismanagement claims against the United States operates as a waiver of the United States’ immunity from suit.

Previous posts in re Flute v. U.S. here.

Impact of Dollar General Affirmance

June 23, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher3 Comments

Huge win for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians tribal court and most especially for the family of John Doe. The case must now return to the tribal court for a hearing on the merits. Presumably, DG will settle and we won’t hear any more about this case. One guesses, however, that if DG loses in a merits battle, it could AGAIN try the federal courts to see if they will hear another challenge to the tribe’s jurisdiction, perhaps more closely tied to something like punitive damages. Highly unlikely I would guess.

The battle waged at oral argument may be repeated again and again throughout Indian country. The constitutional issues are highly salient to the conservatives remaining on the Court. At least one thing we can thank DG for is making the best case for nonmembers on those constitutional issues.

The next Supreme Court Justice will decide whether tribes can assert civil jurisdiction over nonconsenting nonmembers. Meanwhile, tribal court plaintiffs will continue to cite to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in DG, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Water Wheel, Merrion, and related cases.

On a more speculative note, hopefully historians will figure out what was going on for the past six and a half months for all of this to end up in a 4-4 tie. One would have to guess that one or more Justices switched votes in the very recent past. Perhaps the Chief Justice assigned himself the majority after oral argument (he did write Plains Commerce and so has a track record), and struggled mightily to hold a majority for the past several months. Or perhaps Samantha Bee’s satire swayed someone at the last minute. 🙂

Dollar General Affirmed by an Equally Divided Court

June 23, 2016Kate Fort1 Comment

Here.

This means the Fifth Circuit decision upholding tribal jurisdiction stands.

Tunica-Biloxi Gaming Authority v. Zaunbrecher Cert Stage Briefs

June 22, 2016August 22, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here:

Tunica Cert Petn

Question presented:

It is well established that “Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,_ U.S._, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2030, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). “Among the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess – subject, again, to congressional action – is the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers …. That immunity, we have explained, is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and selfgovernance.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986).

In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., supra, this Court explained that the “baseline position … is tribal immunity; and [t]o abrogate [such] immunity, Congress must unequivocally express that purpose …. That rule of construction reflects an enduring principle of Indian law: Although Congress has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine Indian selfgovernment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 134 S.Ct. at 2031-32.

Cert Opp

Lower court materials here.

Commentaries on Bryant Decision

June 16, 2016June 17, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

SCOTUSBlog and Bloomberg (Noah Feldman) and the Atlantic (Garrett Epps)

SCOTUS Decides U.S. v. Bryant — Tribal Court Convictions May Be Used

June 13, 2016June 13, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in United States v. Bryant.

From the syllabus:

Because Bryant’s tribal-court convictions occurred in proceedings that complied with ICRA and were therefore valid when entered, use of those convictions as predicate offenses in a §117(a) prosecution does not violate the Constitution.

Background materials, briefs, etc. here.

SCOTUS Denies Cert in Seminole Tax, American Samoan Birthright Citizenship Cases

June 13, 2016June 13, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the order list today. The Court denied cert in Seminole Tribe v. Biegalski. The petition and lower court briefs are here.

The Court also denied cert in Tuaua v. United States, the American Samoan birthright citizenship case.

SCOTUS Holds Puerto Rico Does Not Possess Separate Sovereign Authority to Prosecute; Indian Law Bullet Dodged

June 9, 2016June 9, 2016Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle.

P.R. had tried to analogize itself to Indian nations, but that effort failed:

For similar reasons, Indian tribes also count as separate sovereigns under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Originally, this Court has noted, “the tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities,” possessing (among other capacities) the “inherent power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.” Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 322–323. After the formation of the United States, the tribes became “domestic dependent nations,” subject to plenary control by Congress—so hardly “sovereign” in one common sense. United States v. Lara, 541 U. S. 193, 204 (2004) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831)); see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56 (1978) (“Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the [tribes’] powers of local self-government”). But unless and until Congress withdraws a tribal power—including the power to prosecute—the Indian community retains that authority in its earliest form. See Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 323. The “ultimate source” of a tribe’s “power to punish tribal offenders” thus lies in its “primeval” or, at any rate, “pre-existing” sovereignty: A tribal prosecution, like a State’s, is “attributable in no way to any delegation . . . of federal authority.” Id., at 320, 322, 328; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at 56. And that alone is what matters for the double jeopardy inquiry.

Slip. op. at 9-10. So now we can say tribal sovereignty is “primeval”: whether we should is another question.

The dissent, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Sotomayor, argues that tribal sovereignty actually does derive from Congress, by virtue of Congress not divesting it completely:

But as the Court today recognizes, this prelapsarian independence must be read in light of congressional action—or, as it were, inaction. That is because—whatever a tribe’s history— Congress maintains “plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the [tribes’] powers of local self-government,” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56 (1978), and thus the tribes remain sovereign for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause only “until” Congress chooses to withdraw that power, ante, at 10. In this sense, Congress’ pattern of inaction (i.e., its choice to refrain from withdrawing dual sovereignty) amounts to an implicit decision to grant such sovereignty to the tribes. Is not Congress then, in this way, the “source” of the Indian tribes’ criminal enforcement power?

Dissent at 5. No no no!!!!

Fortunately, the Court rejects this formulation, calling it “deeply disturbing”:

This Court’s reasoning could not have been plainer: The States (all of them) are separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes not (as the dissent claims) because they exercise authority over criminal law, but instead because that power derives from a source independent of the Federal Government. See Heath, 474 U. S., at 89. So too for the tribes, see supra, at 9–10; and, indeed, here the dissent’s contrary reasoning is deeply disturbing. According to the dissent, Congress is in fact “the ‘source’ of the Indian tribes’ criminal enforcement power” because it has elected not to disturb the exercise of that authority. Post, at 5. But beginning with Chief Justice Marshall and continuing for nearly two centuries, this Court has held firm and fast to the view that Congress’s power over Indian affairs does nothing to gainsay the profound importance of the tribes’ pre-existing sovereignty. See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559–561 (1832); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, 384 (1896); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip op., at 4–5). And once again, we have stated in no uncertain terms that the tribes are separate sovereigns precisely because of that inherent authority.

Slip. op. at 11 n. 5. Whew!