tribal courts

North Dakota Supreme Court Decides Child Support Jurisdiction Case

Kate Fort

Here.

[¶15] B.B. argues that because custody has already been determined in the tribal court, the tribe has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over paternity and support.

[¶16] We specifically held in Kelly, 2009 ND 20, ¶ 22, 759 N.W.2d 721, that custody can be bifurcated from other proceedings in marriage. “Thus, even if the district court determines that the reservation is the child’s home state and that the tribal court therefore has jurisdiction over child custody, the district court retains concurrent jurisdiction over the remaining incidents of the marriage and may choose to exercise that jurisdiction . . . .” Id. Although B.B. and A.T.H. never married, the bifurcation principle of Kelly nevertheless applies in this case because multiple parties and jurisdictions are involved and each has an interest in the outcome of the proceedings. We conclude that under Kelly, the paternity and support claims brought against B.B. in state court can be bifurcated from the custody action brought in Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court.

[¶17] Recognizing that paternity and support claims are divisible from custody determinations, and in view of the factual similarities between this case and Doe, we conclude the state court has subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

Wrongful Termination Suit against Oglala Lakota College Filed in Federal Court Dismissed

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Wilson v. Shortbull (D. S.D.):

13 Motion to Dismiss

18 MJ R&R

21 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Ms. Wilson does not object to the magistrate judge finding she failed to exhaust her tribal remedies. Rather, Ms. Wilson objects on the basis that she does not believe the tribal courts can be impartial because of their connection to OLC. (Docket 19). Ms. Wilson asserted this same argument in her response to defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Docket 16). This contention does not fall within any of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement noted above. In addition, the court agrees with the magistrate judge in finding exhaustion of tribal remedies in this case is particularly appropriate because Ms. Wilson’s allegations are premised on the employment action of a tribally chartered organization. The court finds Ms. Wilson is required to exhaust her tribal remedies. Because Ms. Wilson has not exhausted those remedies, this court lacks jurisdiction over her action.

Nooksack Tribal Court Materials on Disenrollees Motion for Contempt

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the new materials in St. Germaine v. Kelly (Nooksack Tribal Court):

St Germain v. Kelly Motion for Order to Show Cause Re Contempt

St Germain v. Kelly Declaration of Leah Zapata

St. Germain v. Kelly Declaration of Agripina Smith

St. Germain v. Kelly Response to Plaintiffs Motion of Ord to Show Cause Re Contempt

Previous materials in this case are here and here.

 

Nooksack COA Rules against Nooksack Disenrollees

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the opinion in Lomeli v. Kelly (Nooksack App.):

Lomeli v Kelly COA Opinion

An excerpt:

This appeal is from the Tribal Com1’s order dismissing Appellants· second amended complaint. Appellants requested the Tribal Court enjoin members of the Nooksack Tribal Council from conducting disenrollment proceedings against them. Appellants are understandably gravely concemed at the prospect of disenrollment. We understand how serious the prospect of disenrollment is to Appellants. and how it impacts their cultural. social and political identity.

We also recognize that determining its own membership is a hallmark of a tribe’s sovereignty. It is one of the few aspects of tribal sovereignty that has withstood the  relentless attempts by outside forces to tear down tribal self-governance, and one of the  few aspects of tribal sovereignty that has not been eroded by the federal government.

Judges are not sages. We do not delude ourselves into believing we have the wisdom of a Solomon. It is not our role to insert ourselves into the Tribe’s political fray. or second guess  the political judgments made by the Tribe’s elected leaders or its voting members, even if  we believe those judgments unwise. We, like the trial court. are limited to resolving legal questions where authorized by the Tribe’s Constitution and laws.

The nature of this dispute requires us to find the delicate balance between Nooksack lawand politics keeping in mind the equal importance attached to both Tribal membership and Tribal sovereignty. The Tribe’s Constitution guides us in this difficult task. which we are duty bound to perform.

The Nooksack judiciary is not the only Nooksack governmental body whose decisions are tethered to the Tribe’s Constitution and laws. The decisions of its elected officials are as well. The trial judge expressed it well and it is worth repeating:

The Tribal Council members named in this Complaint hold an obligation to act in the best interests of the Nooksack Indian Tribe. Membership and enrollment decisions impact individual lives in the deepest possible ways and those decisions cannot be taken lightly. This Cotut recognizes the serious implications of this case and its decision on this motion and all the others that have preceded it. It is the solemn obligation of this Court to follow the law of the Nooksack Indian Tribe and it is the obligation of the Tribal Council to do the same.

Briefs are here and here.

Lower court materials are here.

Nebraska COA Orders Transfer of ICWA Matter to Tribal Court

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in In re Jayden D.

An excerpt:

Because the State did not meet its burden of establishing good cause to deny transfer to tribal court, the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying Yolanda’s motion to transfer. We reverse the order of the juvenile court and remand the cause with directions to sustain the motion to transfer.

Fletcher: “A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction”

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Please see “A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper addresses one of the most dynamic and useful areas of American Indian law. I situate my arguments between two competing and intractable theories dominating the field – the consent theory, which limits tribal jurisdiction to those who expressly consent to tribal governance; and the territory theory, which expands tribal jurisdiction to anyone in Indian country. The consent theory unnecessarily undercuts tribal authority on Indian lands, assuming without evidence that nonconsenters will not receive a fair shake in tribal forums. Meanwhile, the territory theory unnecessarily exposes nonconsenters to Indian authority on non-Indian owned land, where tribal power is weakest and least justified.

I propose a simpler solution that unites the two theories and brings realism to the discussion. Where activities occur on Indian lands, tribal jurisdiction should be presumed subject to a simple fairness test any court could conduct, but that is currently (and ironically) barred by the Supreme Court. The reality is that tribal governments are already successfully exercising this power, but the common law is lax in its recognition of tribal governance, generating unpredictability and confusion.

Substantive comments welcome.

Fletcher Paper on “Tribal Justice Systems”

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

I drafted a paper titled “Tribal Justice Systems” for the Allegheny College Undergraduate Conference “Democracy Realized? The Legacies of the Civil Rights Movement” and posted it on SSRN. You can download here.

Here is the abstract:

This short paper is produced for the Allegheny College conference Democracy Realized? The Legacies of the Civil Rights Movement (March 28-29, 2014).

United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan, authored the Court’s opinion in Williams v. Lee, a decision hailed as the opening salvo in the modern era of federal Indian law. The Williams decision was the work of the liberal wing of the Court, with important input by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas. Williams, a ringing endorsement of inherent tribal governance authority, more specifically endorsed tribal justices systems as embodied in tribal courts. Without Williams and similar cases, it is unlikely that tribal governments and Congress would act to develop tribal justice systems. Williams, and the tribal courts that arose as a result, was a powerful civil rights decision that commentators rightfully have linked to Brown v. Board of Education.

This paper will survey several tribal justice systems in an effort to identify commonalities and complexities. There are hundreds of tribal justice systems in the United States; each of them unique in the details, but many of them similar to other tribal, state, and federal courts.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first two parts include a section on adversarial tribal justice systems and a section on non-adversarial tribal justice systems, often called restorative justice systems. The third part involves greater discussion of the complexities of incorporating tribal customary and traditional law into tribal common law.

In case one wonders, “Representing Justice” by Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis influenced the paper.

 

Colville Seeks Chief Judge

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the announcement:

Chief Judge JA

 

Federal Court Rejects Narragansett Effort to Dismiss Attorney Fees Suit on Immunity Grounds

Matthew L.M. Fletcher3 Comments

Here are the updated materials in Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe (D. R.I.):

18-1 Narragansett Motion for Reconsideration

19-1 Luckerman Response

20 Narragansett Reply

22 DCT Order Denying Reconsideration

An excerpt:

On August 29, 2013, this Court denied Defendant Narragansett Indian Tribe’s (“Tribe”) motion to dismiss, but stayed adjudication of the case pending tribal exhaustion.1 Now, the Tribe has filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision (ECF No. 18), re-emphasizing the Tribe’s position that its tribal sovereign immunity bars the instant lawsuit, and asking again that the Court dismiss the claims brought by Plaintiff Douglas J. Luckerman. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

Earlier, the federal court remanded the case to tribal court for exhaustion purposes, post here. Other lower court materials here and here.

Osage Supreme Court Decision in Red Eagle v. Red Corn & Osage Nation Congress

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

SPC-2013-03 Slip Opinion

News coverage — “Path cleared for Osage chief’s impeachment trial” — here.