Here are the materials in State of Missouri v. Webb (E.D. Mo.):
DCT Order Remanding Mo. Complaint to State Court
Here are the materials in State of Missouri v. Webb (E.D. Mo.):
DCT Order Remanding Mo. Complaint to State Court
Here is the order.
This could be a case to watch if the dicta in United States v. Lara is to be believed.
Here are the materials:
Here. Or just go to Google news and enter “hualapai grand canyon”.
An excerpt:
The legal battle is testing the limits of business partnerships between tribes and non-Indians and is pitting tribal government leaders against one another. At stake are future profits of the lucrative Skywalk and at least $10 million in profits that the bridge has accumulated—now locked in an escrow account while the tribe fights with Mr. Jin.
“Our business is being destroyed by a handful of self-interested [tribal] government officials who are stealing our business and trampling our rights” said Troy Eid, a lawyer for Mr. Jin and former U.S. attorney for Colorado.
The tribe argues that it is Mr. Jin who “makes a promise, breaks it, then changes his story,” said Paul Charlton, the tribe’s lawyer and former U.S. attorney in Arizona.
Here are the materials in Herrera v. Alliant Specialty Insurance Services (D. Colo.):
Alliant Notice of Removal to Federal Court
Alliant Removal Notice Exhibit
DCT Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss
From the order:
In this case the plaintiff alleges that she was employed by the Southern Ute Tribe and the Southern Ute Tribe Growth Fund. However, she does not specify whether her employment was within or outside the confines of the reservation. The defendants seem to assume that the plaintiff’s employment was within the confines of the reservation. However, the defendants do not provide any declarations or other evidence to support this assumption. The locus of the plaintiff’s employment is a potentially pivotal jurisdictional fact.
The issues outlined above relate directly to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Those issues must be resolved before the court may address other issues presented in the motion to dismiss. Thus, I deny the motion without prejudice and grant [8] the defendants an opportunity to file a renewed motion that addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent specific facts are relevant to the determination of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, I note that the “court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1).” Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). If the defendants choose to file a renewed motion to dismiss, I direct the defendants to address the scope and limits of tribal jurisdiction, as outlined in Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1068 (10th cir. 2007), and related cases. Of course, the analysis of this issue must be focused on the jurisdictional facts of this case.
A publication of the State Court Administrative Office (SCAO), The Pundit is primarily for those working on child support issues, including Friend of the Court. The editors asked for an article detailing how tribal courts recognize foreign (state) court child support orders. All of the information came from inquiries to the tribal courts in Michigan. The article includes detailed contact information for the tribes as well.
The publication is here. (PDF)
Here is the news coverage.
An excerpt:
In her decision handed down on March 12, Judge Wahwassuck found:
1. The Plaintiffs (have) failed to carry their burden of establishing that the Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas and/or its agents (the Defendants herein) have waived tribal sovereign immunity in this matter.
2. The Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have a “property” right to their positions on the Gaming Commission, and thus have failed to demonstrate that their due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act were violated.
With these findings and her conclusion of law that the Defendants action was protected from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice, meaning it cannot be refiled.
Here are the materials in Admiral Ins. Co. v. Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Court (N.D. Cal.):
From the order:
Admiral seeks a TRO enjoining the Defendants from exercising tribal court jurisdiction over Admiral and conducting any further proceedings against Admiral. Proposed Order, ECF No. 10-4. Admiral argues that a TRO “is needed in order to preserve the status quo so that the jurisdictional issues can be determined first. If this request is not granted, Admiral is forced to submit to the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court without due process or be subject to sanctions for failing to file a substantive motion on whether Admiral owes a duty to defend and indemnify WRI and have a motion for summary judgment be pending against it to which it cannot oppose, since an opposition would be viewed as subjection to the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction.” TRO Appl. 7
We should add that at least one legal commentator and at least one other tribal court has previously discussed non-Indian consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction. The article (which is about more than simply consent, and which was authored by Chris Chaney) is here:
And the case is here:
Hunter seems to be about implied consent, while Hjert seems to be about express consent (which was ruled by that court to be invalid).
Every now and again we like to highlight an interesting tribal court opinion. Personally, I’ve been waiting for many years to see an opinion on this subject, answered in the negative by the court.
Here is the opinion in Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe v. Hjert.
This case seems almost easy given that the tribal constitution self-limits tribal jurisdiction by referencing federal law, suggesting that Oliphant could control this case (see page 4, quoting the PGST Const.).
What about tribes that do not have such language?
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