Here is the order in Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley v. Jewell (N.D. Cal.):
Briefs are here.
trust relationship
Trust Breach Claims for Compensation re: Flooding of Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation Dismissed
Here are the materials in LeBeau v. United States (D. S.D.):
An excerpt:
Plaintiffs’ claims accrued decades ago and are therefore barred by the statute of limitations. As this court stated in 2013, it is sympathetic to the claims made by plaintiffs. But even sympathetic claims must comply with jurisdictional requirements. Because there is no valid waiver of sovereign immunity, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Plaintiffs may deserve compensation, but that compensation must come from Congress.
Prior suit materials are here.
Gila River Trust Breach Claim against IHS Dismissed; Claim for Reimbursement May Proceed
Here are the materials in Gila River Indian Community v. Burwell (D. Ariz.):
Bakken Shale Allotment Owners’ Class Action against US for Trust Breach Dismissed
Here are the materials in Two Shields v. United States (Fed. Cl.):
12 Two Shields Motion for Discovery
14 US Reply in Support of Motion for Summary J
15 US Opposition to Motion for Discovery
16 Two Shields Reply in Support of Motion for Discovery
17 US Request for Judicial Notice
17-1 Cobell Fairness Hearing Transcript
18 Two Shields Response to Request for Judicial Notice
19 US Reply in Support of Request for Judicial Notice
20-1 Two Shields Surreply in Opposition to Request for Judicial Notice
An excerpt:
This case is one of the myriad of breach of trust claims brought by Native Americans against various federal agencies.1 Paradoxically, the parties present very little in common. Like the proverbial two ships passing in the night,2 plaintiffs and defendant here present the court with two competing narratives that raise entirely different legal issues.
Plaintiffs Ramona Two Shields and Mary Louise Defender Wilson claim that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) breached its fiduciary duty to prudently manage their mineral rights, which are held in trust by the United States. Plaintiffs include a detailed narration of the depredations experienced by their tribes, and characterize the BIA’s alleged breach as “the latest chapter of United States mismanagement or outright abuse regarding the members of the Three Affiliated Tribes.” Compl. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs seek damages on behalf of themselves and their purported class.
Defendant presents an entirely different story. Defendant does not dispute plaintiffs’ characterization of the BIA’s actions; in fact, defendant barely mentions them at all. Rather, defendant argues that the BIA’s alleged misdeeds are immaterial because plaintiffs’ claims have already been litigated and settled. Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ claims were subsumed by the Cobell class action suit against the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), and that plaintiffs’ claims have already been settled pursuant to the $3.4 billion settlement (“Settlement Agreement”) that brought the Cobell suit to a close in 2011, after more than a decade of litigation. According to defendant, plaintiffs forfeited any right to pursue their claims by failing to opt out of the class action Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs, in contrast, hardly mention Cobell at all in their complaint, and argue in their opposition brief that their claims are entirely unrelated to the Cobell litigation. It is the role of the court to determine which of these two narratives prevails.
This litigation has given rise to a myriad of claims and motions. Before the court are defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary claim (Count I), defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiffs’ alternate breach of fiduciary duty claim (Count II), and defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim plaintiffs’ legislative takings claim (Count III). Also before the court are plaintiffs’ motion for discovery, defendant’s motion for judicial notice and plaintiffs’ motion for a sur-reply concerning defendant’s motion for judicial notice.
For the following reasons, as fully explained below, the court shall grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding Count I, as well as defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts II and III. Furthermore, the court will deny plaintiffs’ motion for discovery, yet will grant their motion for sur-reply. Finally, defendant’s motion for judicial notice will be granted-in-part.
AG Guidelines Stating Principles for Working with Federally Recognized Indian Tribes
Here:
New Indian Law Scholarship in the Tulsa Law Review
Federal Court Rebuffs Feds’ Effort to Modify Phase 1 Judgment in Jicarilla Trust Breach Case
Here are the materials in Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States (Fed. Cl.):
405 Govt Motion to Modify Phase 1 Ruling
408 DCT Order Denying Govt Motion
An excerpt:
In the guise of a motion under RCFC 54(b) and 59(a)(1), defendant would have the court consider issues that were not raised during the trial in this case – issues that defendant could have raised, but did not. As plaintiff makes perfectly clear, defendant is seeking to litigate in this tranche issues involving intra-pooling of funds, when the issues before this first stage of the case involved the inter-pooling of funds. Compare Jicarilla Apache Nation, 112 Fed. Cl at 301-02. Defendant could have raised these issues in discovery or even during the pretrial filings in this case, but did not. Nor does defendant rely upon any newly-discovered evidence. The court will not allow defendant to raise these issues at this late stage.
And:
Because of the complexity of this case, the court dealt with this case in stages – and plaintiff and defendant clearly understood this. The court will not allow defendant to alter the stages in this case, as defendant deems fit. Therefore, defendant’s motion is DENIED. Further violations by defendant of this court’s orders, both for discovery and pretrial filings purposes, may lead to the imposition of sanctions.
A technical ruling to be sure. Here is a quick primer:
The boldface reference to “inter-pooling of funds” concerns pooling of trust accounts among tribes for better investment returns, as has been done with IIM accounts since their inception. On cross-motions for summary judgment before trial, the Court held that the intertribal pooling claim fell within Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction even though there was no statutory reference to such a duty, and notwithstanding the then-recent Supreme Court decision in the same case, but that fact issues precluded summary judgment as to whether there was such a duty here. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 739-40 (2011). After trial, the Court held that Jicarilla did not prove such a duty. See the reference in today’s order to the post-trial decision.
In the motion for modification, the US sought to have the phase 1 trial ruling also preclude intra-tribal pooling of trust accounts, when concerns pooling of Jicarilla’s multiple trust accounts (as above, to obtain better returns). At trial, Jicarilla basically presented its damage calculations based on that, without objection by the US. Not surprisingly, the Court rejected the recent motion as seeking to challenge something that the US had failed to address in discovery or before (or during) trial.
We posted on the Phase 1 judgment here.
Federal Government Liable for Ruination of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation Sacred Site
Here are the orders in Quechan Tribe v. United States (S.D. Cal.):
282 Quechan Memorandum of Facts and Law
283 US Memorandum of Facts and Law
Federal Court Affirms Interior Withdrawal of Grand Canyon Lands from Uranium Mining
Here is the order in Yount v. Jewell (D. Ariz.):
NYTs Editorial: “Delayed Justice for the Navajos”
Here.
Turtle Talk 
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