In the I-Can’t-Believe-I’m-Posting-This-Shit-Today File, Clarkson v. New Mexico Board of Regents

Here:

Clarkson Cert Petition

Appendix

Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Cert.

Just taking out the trash today.

Whistleblower Prevails in Suit against Cherokee Nation

Here are the materials in Comingdeer v. Cherokee Nation (Cherokee Dist. Ct.):

Complaint

Motion to Dismiss

Nation Motion to DQ Attorney Smith

Objection to Cherokee Nation s Motion to Deem Objection Confessed

Objection to Motion to Dismiss

Order Denying Motion to DQ Attorney Smith

Order Overruling Defendant s Motion to Dismiss and Ruling on Other Pending Motions

Reply in Support of Defendant s Motion to Dismiss

Jury Instructions

Final Judgment Under Advisement, Verdict Form 1, and Verdict Form 2

D.C. Federal Court Remands NCAI Suit to D.C. Superior Court

Here are the materials in Desiderio v. National Congress of American Indians (D.D.C.):

1 Notice of Removal

1-1 DC Superior Court Complaint

7 Order to Show Cause

9-1 NCAI Motion to Dismiss

10 NCAI Response to Show Cause Order

11 DCT Remand Order

Grant Christensen on Cooley and Tribal Law Enforcement

Grant Christensen has posted “Getting Cooley Right: The Inherent Criminal Powers of Tribal Law Enforcement,” forthcoming in the UC Davis Law Review, on SSRN.

Abstract:

While the Supreme Court regularly decides cases defining the limits of the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts, when it heard United States v. Cooley in 2021 it had not decided a case about the procedural powers of tribal law enforcement in more than a century. Across more than five decades lower courts at all levels struggled to decide whether the inherent criminal powers of tribal law enforcement are coterminous with the jurisdiction of tribal courts or whether tribal officers may have their own set of inherent powers distinct from the power to prosecute. This Article examines the inconsistent split in authority that existed before Cooley and anticipates the future misreading of inherent criminal power by lower courts. It argues that now that the Court has divorced the inherent criminal power of tribal law enforcement from the criminal jurisdictional power of tribal courts, tribal officers may stop, detain, search, and investigate anyone whose criminal conduct poses a danger to the health and welfare of the tribal community. The Article bolsters its application by using the first cases decided by lower courts in the post-Cooley era as artifacts to examine the full implications of the recognition of inherent criminal power exercised by tribal law enforcement.

Join the MSU Indigenous Law and Policy Center

The Michigan State University Indigenous Law and Policy Center (ILPC) and College of
Law seek entry-level and lateral candidates for full-time, tenure system faculty positions with
research and teaching interests related to federal Indian law, tribal law, or the international
human rights of Indigenous peoples.

A successful candidate will form an integral part of the Indigenous Law and Policy Center
community. This will include teaching, research, and participation in the Center’s
programming and external engagement.

An important part of the Center’s purpose is to educate Native law students and to train
lawyers prepared to work on behalf of tribes around the country, whether for tribal, federal,
or state governments, private law firms, or non-profit organizations. The Center also oversees
MSU law’s Indigenous Law Certificate Program which exists to prepare students to practice
Indigenous law by providing rigorous and comprehensive training in Indigenous law, policy,
and practice.

The Center hosts an annual Indigenous law conference and a yearly speaker series, both of
which bring speakers from around the country to discuss issues involving Indigenous justice
systems, tribal sovereignty, and self-determination. The ILPC also hosts Turtle Talk, the
leading blog on legal issues in Indian Country. In addition, the Center is affiliated with an
Indian law clinic at the Law College.

MSU encourages applications from and nominations of women, persons of color, veterans
and persons with disabilities. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for
employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity,
national origin, citizenship, age, disability or protected veteran status.
Please email application materials, a letter of interest and cv, or nominations to Professor
Tiffani Darden, Co-Chair of Faculty Appointments Committee, dardent@law.msu.edu. More
information about the Law College can be found at http://www.law.msu.edu.

View the PDF here.

Montana Federal Court Dismisses Contract Claim over Sale of C-Store on Trust Land at Blackfeet [interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1353]

Here are the materials in Kumar v. Schildt (D. Mont.):

1 Complaint

13 Motion to Dismiss

16 Response

17 Reply

24 DCt Order

Luckily for all parties, the tribal court appears to be across the street from the store.

Interior Prevails in Most Trust Breach Claims Brought by MHA Nation Oil and Gas Lessors

Here are the materials in Birdbear v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

147 Third Amended Complaint

177 Plaintiffs Motion for Summary J

180 Federal Cross-Motion

187 Plaintiffs Reply

191 Federal Reply

207 CFC Opinion

Grant Christensen on the Extradition Clause and Indian Country

Grand Christensen has posted “The Extradition Clause and Indian Country,” forthcoming in the North Dakota Law Review, on SSRN.

The abstract:

This article looks at the enforceability of the Extradition Clause in the federal courts of the United States. In 1861 the Supreme Court held in Dennison that the federal courts could not be used to enforce a request made by one state governor to another state governor for the extradition of a suspected criminal under Article IV Section 1. In 1987 the Supreme Court reversed the Dennison decision and for the first time since the Civil War held that the federal judicial power includes the power to enforce the Extradition Clause. This article takes the position that federal judicial power is limited to cases where the state governor has both territorial and personal jurisdiction over the accused. When an individual is on an Indian reservation, even Article IV does not authorize the governor of a state to enter the reservation and return the accused subject to an extradition request. Article IV’s Extradition Clause provides a constitutional duty for the executive of one state to remit to the power of a sister state someone located within its borders and subject to its jurisdiction. Critical to the exercise of this power is the dual understanding that the individual sought must be both within the state territory and subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Indian country lies outside the general jurisdictional power of the states. States may not enter Indian country and remove persons found there absent cooperation with or permission from the Tribe. Doing so infringes upon the Tribe’s right to make its own laws and be governed by them.

Utah Federal Court Orders Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in Ute Banishment Case

Here are the new materials in Chegup v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Unitah and Ouray Indian Reservation (D. Utah), formerly Chegup v. Ute Indian Tribal Court of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation:

Tenth Circuit materials here. Earlier materials in the district court here.

Angela Riley to Deliver Stevens Lecture at Colorado Law School 10/18/22

Register here.