ICWA Notice Case Out of New Jersey

Here.

To minimize the delay in securing permanency and stability for Ann, the trial court shall ensure that the notices are sent forthwith. The judgment terminating parental rights shall be deemed affirmed if after being served with the requisite notices under the ICWA: (1) no tribe responds to the notices within the time provided under the ICWA; (2) no tribe determines within the time allotted under the ICWA that Ann is an Indian child as defined by the ICWA; or (3) the court determines, after the tribes have been given an opportunity to intervene, that the ICWA does not to apply to this matter. If Ann is determined to be an Indian child under the ICWA, the judgment terminating parental rights shall be vacated and the trial court shall hold further proceedings consistent with the ICWA. All proceedings shall be conducted as expeditiously as practicable in accordance with the overarching goal of attaining permanency for Ann.

NJ appellate court reverses ICWA case because of failure to notify Cherokee Nation

Here and here.

Three (Unpublished) California ICWA Cases

One notice opinion involving relationships with the Pala Band of Mission Indians and perhaps a Cahuilla tribe, but of course, the department would have to send notice to determine that.

A second opinion holding the rules requiring CPS to help enroll a child in her tribe (Cherokee) as active efforts are valid

Consistent with this state interest in protecting an Indian child’s interest in tribal membership, rules 5.482 and 5.484 impose an affirmative duty on the juvenile court and the county welfare department to make an active effort to obtain tribal membership for a child when the tribe has notified the county welfare department that the child is eligible. To the extent the rules require CPS to make a reasonable, active attempt to obtain tribal membership for a child, we conclude the rules do not expand or conflict with the state or federal statutory definition of an Indian child. The rules’ requirement that CPS “provide active efforts under rule 5.484(c) to secure tribal membership for the child” (rule 5.482(c)) furthers the objective of ICWA and has no bearing on the ICWA definition of “Indian child.”

***

CPS received four requests to complete an enrollment application, beginning in December 2012, and still had not done so over six months later. The record does not show any reason for CPS not providing the Tribe with a completed, signed enrollment application by the time of the section 366.26 hearing in June 2013.
We therefore conclude CPS failed to comply with rules 5.482(c) and 5.484(c) by not taking reasonable, active steps to secure tribal membership for the children. Such error was not harmless. Active efforts to obtain membership for the children likely would lead to the children becoming Tribe members subject to ICWA protections, and would enable the Tribe to intervene if it so chose.

Finally, a fairly standard ICWA notice case, where even after the following, the parents were asked in court to stipulate that this was not an ICWA case.

In this case, Father provided the name and contact information for his uncle who he believed could provide more information about the children’s grandmother who was alleged to have Cherokee ancestry. There is no evidence in the record the Agency contacted the uncle. Further, the agency did not respond to the repeated requests from the Cherokee Nation for additional information. The Agency failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain any additional family history. Under these circumstances, we find the ICWA notice was inadequate because the Cherokee Nation was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to determine if M.S., E.S., and A.S. were Indian children.

Published Definition of Indian Child Case out of California

Here.

Termination ICWA Case Out of Texas Court of Appeals

Here.

The opinion is 28 pages long and the court addresses notice (actual notice was sufficient even if not strictly ICWA compliant), active efforts (happened), state law requirements (harmonious with ICWA), standard of proof (met), jury instructions (adequate), expert witness testimony (was interesting) . . .

Having viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the Department proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful, (2) that the continued custody of K.S. by D.S. is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to K.S., and that (3) the finding is supported by testimony from an expert witness. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1912(d), (f); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.

Michigan COA Decides ICWA/MIFPA Active Efforts/Qualified Expert Witness Appeal

Here is the opinion:

In re Arnold

 

Kristen Carpenter and Lorie Graham on Human Rights and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Kristen Carpenter and Lorie Graham have posted a very compelling and powerful paper about the Supreme Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. It is required reading for anyone interested in the case, and is destined to be the definitive paper on the international human rights aspects of the case.

The article is titled Human Rights to Culture, Family, and Self-Determination: The Case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. Here is the abstract:

The well-being of indigenous children is a subject of major concern for indigenous peoples and human rights advocates alike. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not prevent the adoption of a Cherokee child by a non-Indian couple. This occurred over the objections of her Cherokee biological father, extended family, and Tribal Nation. After the decision, Baby Girl’s father and the adoptive couple contested the matter in a number of proceedings, none of which considered the child’s best interests as an Indian child. The tribally-appointed attorney for Baby Girl, as well as the National Indian Child Welfare Association and National Congress for American Indians, began examining additional venues for advocacy. Believing that the human rights of Baby Girl, much like those of other similarly situated indigenous children, were being violated in contravention of the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples Rights, and other instruments of international law, they asked us to bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples Rights (“UNSR”). We prepared a “statement of information” to alert the UNSR of the human rights violations occurring in the case. With the permission of the attorneys and organizations involved, this chapter introduces the Baby Girl case, contextualizes the claims in international human rights law, and then reproduces the statement of information, and portions of the UNSR’s subsequent public statement. It concludes with an update on the Baby Girl case and broader discussion about the potential for using international law and legal forums to protect the human rights of indigenous children.

Cherokee Nation Changes Placement Preferences Under ICWA

Article here.

The tribal resolution, which passed unanimously, states: “In any adoptive placement of a Cherokee child under state law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with a biological parent or parents; a member of the child’s extended family; other members of the Cherokee Nation; or other Indian families.”

Dustin Brown to Stop All Legal Proceedings

Tulsa World coverage here.

Ending a custody battle that stretched across two states and dragged on for nearly four years, Dusten Brown will drop all litigation in the “Baby Veronica” case, he announced Thursday.
“I cannot bear to continue it any longer,” Brown said, holding back tears. “I love her too much to continue.”

Dissents in the Lift of Stay in Baby Girl Case and Additional Coverage of Proceedings

From the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Here.

 In addition to Veronica’s interests, the Cherokee Nation has been a party to all of the proceedings in the courts of South Carolina, in the United States Supreme Court, and in the courts of this State. As such, the Cherokee Nation has a direct and substantial interest in seeing that Veronica’s rights as an Indian child and member of the Cherokee Nation are fully protected, including the right to the special best interests determination under the law of the case. It would be virtually impossible for any court to make this special best interests determination without hearing from the Cherokee Nation.

Reif, V.C.J.

 

Everything in the life of Baby Girl has changed since 2011, and therefore, I cannot join the majority’s decision to dissolve the temporary stay and to deny original jurisdiction.1 Although this is a complicated case, we should accept our legal responsibility to follow established law in making a determination having such a profound impact on the life of this child.

Gurich, J.

H/T Constitutional Law Prof Blog

Today’s Tulsa World coverage here (including a discussion of the contempt charges in South Carolina).