District of Idaho – Page 5

The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes earned a winning decision in a hard-fought battle in the Idaho District Court today. The case was about exhaustion of tribal court remedies. The specific issue was whether the Tribes could enforce their land use laws against a non-Indian who built a single family residence on fee owned land on the Fort Hall Reservation. The Tribes attempted to enforce their building permit and business licensing laws against the builder and his contractors and when their efforts were ignored the Tribes filed suit in tribal court. The non-Indian landowner and contractors (backed by the surrounding county and non-Indian businesses) sued in federal court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Tribes filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that exhaustion of tribal court remedies was required. The non-Indian landowner and contractors argued the Reservation was ‘open’, or diminished, and that the tribes initiated the suit in bad faith. The case came down to whether it was plausible that tribal jurisdiction existed under Montana’s second exception. The federal district court found that the Reservation area in question was not open, that jurisdiction was plausible, and granted the tribes’ motion to dismiss, requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies. Significantly, the Court confined the ‘catastrophic’ consequences language in Plains Commerce Bank relating to Montana’s second exception to land sale cases and distinguished the analysis required for land use cases. Here is the Court’s decision and the Tribes’ supporting briefing: (attached). The Tribes have been fighting with Power County for years about land use jurisdiction. There aren’t many favorable exhaustion cases that focus on Montana’s second exception, so this may be helpful to other Tribes.

Gambling Addicts Challenge to Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ Video Gaming Compact Proceeds

December 30, 2010December 30, 2010Matthew L.M. Fletcher

The State of Idaho and the Dept. of Interior had filed motions to dismiss. The district court granted Idaho’s motion, but held that the gambling addicts, who are neighbors to the tribal casino, had standing to challenge the compact approval by the Secretary.

The plaintiffs had previously challenged the compact under Idaho state law, losing in the Idaho Supreme Court.

Here are the materials in Knox v. Interior (D. Idaho):

DCT Order on USA and Idaho Motions to Dismiss

Idaho Gov. Motion to Dismiss

Knox and Dotson Opposition to Idaho Motion

Idaho Reply

USA Motion to Dismiss Knox Complaint

Knox and Dotson Opposition to US Motion

US Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Knox Complaint

Idaho Federal Court Applies Tobacco MSA to Native Wholesale Supply

June 10, 2010Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in State of Idaho v. Native Wholesale Supply (D. Idaho): Idaho v NWS DCT Order

Lil’ Brown Smoke Shop v. Wasden — Challenge to Idaho Tobacco Statute

February 3, 2010Matthew L.M. Fletcher

The court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction by a smoke shop seeking to prevent enforcement of Idaho’s Minor’s Access Act. Here are the materials:

Lil Brown Smoke Shack DCT Order

Lil Brown Smoke Shack Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Idaho Opposition

Lil Brown Smoke Shack Reply

An excerpt:

Here, Defendants argue that, if the Bracker balancing test applies, the permit requirement is an important state interest outweighing the tribal interests. Specifically, Defendants argue that the permit requirement allows the State of Idaho to control the ability of minors to obtain tobacco by ensuring that the Department of Health and Welfare has a central repository of all businesses marketing tobacco to Idaho residents with a uniform set of data which facilities compliance and monitoring. Defendants contend this interest outweighs the relevant tribal interests identified by Plaintiff, partially because the burden on Plaintiff in submitting annually to a no-charge permit is non existent. However, Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s contention that the right to make employment decisions, business decisions, and the right to exclude persons from the reservation are longstanding tribal interests that, although they do not singularly justify non compliance with the MAA, must be balanced in the Bracker test particularly with respect to the other contested provisions of the MAA. The Court agrees that the Bracker test should be applied.

The Court finds that, even though the Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the permit requirement is low, the likelihood of success with respect to the other provisions of the MAA is more plausible. However, Plaintiff has failed to clearly demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on these claims. Thus, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Plaintiff’s tribal sovereignty challenges will be denied.

Idaho Federal Court Declines to Issue Order to Tribal Court in Criminal Case

November 13, 2009Matthew L.M. Fletcher

In Chippewa v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Fort Hall Indian Reservation (D. Idaho), the court held that it has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a tribal court — Chippewa DCT Order

An excerpt:

Lara, Wheeler, and Enas clearly illustrate that tribal courts and courts of the United States each have separate jurisdiction to prosecute offenses against their respective sovereigns. A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a tribal court prosecution. Furthermore, a tribal court is not an inferior court to the federal court. Therefore, the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing the Tribal Court to either act on Chippewa’s motions or run three Tribal sentences concurrently with the now expired federal sentence.

Although the Court has not located any cases specifically holding that a federal court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to a Tribal Court, it is clear by analogy to cases addressing the issue in the context of state courts that it cannot. See, e.g., Craigo v. Hey, 624 F.Supp. 414, 416 (S.D.W.Va. 1985) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus finding that the Court had no original jurisdiction over a matter filed in state court and because it did not sit “as an appellate or supervisory tribunal” for the state court). See also Harris v. Department of Corrections, 426 F.Supp. 350 (D.C.Okl. 1977) (same; federal district courts do not sit to review actions taken in state court and do not have jurisdiction to compel a state or its officers to perform any duty owned to a plaintiff under state law). Accordingly, Chippewa’s Petition shall be dismissed.

Idaho Federal Court Refuses to Dismiss Smokeshop Case

July 14, 2009July 14, 2009Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Lil’ Brown Smoke Shop v. Wasden (D. Idaho) in which the court rejected a motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment and Young absention grounds. An excerpt:

Based on the aforementioned cases and standards, and the arguments of the parties with respect to whether the Act regulates on or off reservation activity, the Court disagrees with Defendants and finds that the issue of the state’s jurisdiction is not conclusive. Here, like in Fort Belnap, Sycuan, and Seneca-Cayuga, the question of whether the state law is enforceable against Plaintiff is a federal question in an area, tribal law, where federal interests predominate. Thus, the Court finds that the State of Idaho’s interest in this litigation is not sufficiently important to warrant Younger abstention in light of the predominant federal question regarding the State of Idaho’s jurisdiction to enforce the Act. Thus, as Defendants have failed to prove all requirements for Younger abstention, the Court will deny Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 8 ) with respect to Defendants Wasden and Armstrong.

Lil Brown Smoke Shack DCT Order

Idaho Motion to Dismiss

Smoke Shack Opposition

Idaho Reply Brief