Companion Case to Miranda on Tribal Court Authority to Issue Consecutive Sentences

This one is called Bustamante v. Valenzuela, and will be decided by a different judge than the Miranda case. Here are the materials:

PYT Motion for Summary Judgment

Bustamante Response and Cross Motion

PYT Reply

Bustamante Reply

Federal Court Rejects Stacked Sentences in Tribal Courts — UPDATED

Here is the order in Miranda v. Nielson [Pascua Yaqui Tribe] (D. Ariz.): Order MSJ Granted.

The Magistrate’s report is here.

Briefs are here:

Tribes X Motion Summary Judgment Habeas-Miranda

Miranda Motion for Summary J

PYT Objection to Magistrate Report

Federal Objections to Magistrate Report

PYT Court of Appeals Brief

Ninth Circuit Declines Jurisdiction over Pechanga Disenrollments

Here is the opinion in Jeffredo v. Macarro. There was a dissent (by a district court judge sitting by designation), however, which seemed to focus on the apparent “greed” of the Pechanga people in disenrolling tribal members.

Here are the briefs:

Jeffredo Opening Brief

Macarro Answering Brief

Jeffredo Reply Brief

An excerpt from the majority: Continue reading

Miranda v. Nielson — Tribal Court Authority to Stack Consecutive Sentences

A federal magistrate has issued a report and recommendation (something not yet binding until the federal judge signs it) holding that Indian tribes do not have authority to sentence convicted criminals to consecutive sentences amounting to more than 1 year (the limit set by the Indian Civil Rights Act).

Here is the report and recommendation — Magistrate Report

Bolstering Federal Law Enforcement in Indian Country Nice, but Misplaced

Indianz (and the SF Chron) report that the Department of Justice and AG Eric Holder will be taking efforts to bolster federal law enforcement capabilities in Indian Country. This is good news, to some extent. The federal government should be focusing on the very, very serious problem of Indian Country crime. But we suspect increasing federal law enforcement still has serious limitations and will not do a whole lot to reduce Indian Country crime.

Consider last year’s testimony from Drew Wrigley, Tom Heffelfinger, and others on the reasons why Indian Country U.S. Attorney’s Offices are forced to decline to prosecute most Indian Country crimes.

Several points:

  • AUSAs decline many Indian Country cases because of the difficulty in proving additional elements of Indian identity and Indian Country status. Additional resources won’t improve that much.
  • AUSAs decline many cases because they don’t meet statutory requirements like the extent of serious injury in assault cases.
  • AUSAs decline cases because of the time and distance required to secure evidence needed to convict. Resources could help, but we believe they would have be sufficient to actually house a federal law enforcement agency on the doorsteps of every reservation to be effective.
  • According to Drew Wrigley, “The issue of resources is never a basis for a declination of a case in North Dakota, but violent Indian crime cases, we never decline any cases for resources.” If so (something Tom Heffelfinger rebutted somewhat), then more federal resources seems an unusual solution.
  • Nothing in the federal project does much to reduce the epidemic of violent crime against Indian women. Like Sen. Dorgan’s Tribal Law and Order Act, we think AG Holder’s initiative will focus on drugs, immigration, and the like. And that’s what the DOJ is best at doing, not violent person-to-person on-reservation cime.  Hopefully, tribal leaders will point the government to other serious crime problems. We’ll see.

Frankly, the real solution is tribal criminal jurisdiction. Once federal and state policymakers quit focusing on irrelevancies like the qualifications of tribal judges and the difficulty in finding tribal law or civil rights protections — all of which can be solved by recourse to the habeas remedy in the Indian Civil Rights Act — then we’ll see a real reduction in Indian Country crime.

Federal Court Dismisses “Habeas” Claim against Pechanga Band

Here is the opinion in Liska v. Macarro, where a non-enrolled Pechanga man tried to enter the reservation, was turned away, and sued in federal court (S.D. Cal.) on a habeas theory — Liska v Macarro DCT Order

The materials:

Liska Complaint (Habeas)

Pechanga Motion to Dismiss

Liska Response Brief

Pechanga Reply Brief

Federal Court Dismisses Civil Rights Claim against Menominee Jail

Here is the opinion in Lyons v. Menominee Tribal Jail (E.D. Wis.) — DCT Order Dismissing Lyons Complaint

The petitioner claimed to have been jailed for four months without seeing a judge — Lyons Pro Se Complaint. One hopes that isn’t true.

An excerpt from the order (technically, an order refusing the petitioner to waive filing fees):

Moreover, the complaint does not appear to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Section 1983, the civil rights statute, imposes liability on individuals who act under color of state law, but it does not apply to those acting under color of tribal law. Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174 (10th Cir.2006) (“A § 1983 action is unavailable ‘for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.’ ”) (quoting R.J. Williams Co. v. Ft. Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1983)). Accordingly, it will be dismissed for that additional reason. “Because plaintiff does not allege that defendant acted under color of state law, the district court was correct to grant summary judgment to defendant on that basis.” Pounds v. Killion, 35 Fed. Appx. 819, 821, 2002 WL 1038774, *1 (10th Cir.2002).

The court also noted that no jurisdiction existed under the Indian Civil Rights Act:

Similarly, the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) does not provide a remedy. The only remedy provided in ICRA is that of habeas-style relief (i.e., release from custody)-it does not authorize damages actions after release. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.2005) (“We acknowledge that in the civil context, habeas corpus relief generally is the sole federal remedy for a violation of ICRA.”); Stevens v. Skenandore, 2000 WL 1069404, * 1 (7th Cir.2000) (“Stevens cannot sue the individual Oneida defendants under the ICRA because the only remedy authorized by the statute is a habeas corpus proceeding brought against the tribe pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1303.”)

Banished Snoqualmie Citizens Win Case

Here is the opinion in Sweet v. Hinzman (W.D. Wash.) — findings-and-conclusions

Here is our earlier post, with links to materials.

Federal Court Upholds Indian Country Crimes Act Conviction but Holds State Law Punishments Control

Here is the opinion in United States v. Langford (us-v-langford-dct-opinion), and its companion case, United States v. McHone (us-v-mchone-dct-opinion), out of the Western District of Oklahoma. The claimant, a non-Indian prosecuted under the Indian Country Crimes Act and the Assimilative Crimes Act, unsuccessfully argued that the federal court had no criminal jurisdiction over him (the underlying crime was cock-fighting, illegal under Oklahoma law).

However, the court also held that the magistrate judge erred in sentencing the defendant to a fine larger than that allowable under Oklahoma law.

Finally, the court dropped an interesting footnote in the Langford opinion:

In his brief, defendant asserts that pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act, he is entitled to all rights afforded to tribal members. The Indian Civil Rights Act, however, undertakes to single out the more important civil rights contained in the United States Constitution and to make those applicable to tribal members. See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1042 (10th Cir.1976). Because defendant is not a tribal member, the Court finds the Indian Civil Rights Act is inapplicable in this case.

The citation is to the Martinez panel opinion, not the Supreme Court opinion. I wonder if other circuits have found the same.

South Dakota Supreme Court Suppresses Evidence Taken by Tribal Law Enforcement under the Indian Civil Rights Act

Maybe I’m missing something, but HOLY COW! Now state courts have jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act?!?!? I thought Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez settled the question, holding that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over ICRA claims.

This case, State v. Madsen, decided two days ago by the South Dakota Supreme Court, has no discussion of the court’s jurisdiction to apply ICRA to tribal law enforcement, so maybe there’s some agreement or something in which the tribe (Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe) agreed to state court adjudication of ICRA claims arising out of police activities at the tribe’s casino.