Federal Court Rejects Fourth Amendment and Double Jeopardy Challenges to Federal Prosecution for Robbery at Red Lake Subsequent to Tribal Prosecution

Here are the materials in United States v. Stately (D. Minn.):

1 Indictment

39 Motion to Suppress

40 Motion to Suppress

43 Motion to Suppress

50 Government’s Response

52 Government’s Response

118 Motion to Dismiss

129 Memorandum re Motion to Suppress

130 Memorandum re Motion to Suppress

134 Memorandum re Motion to Dismiss

138 Government’s Response to 118

139 Government’s Response to 40

140 Government’s Response to 43

141 Memorandum in Support of 118

142 Magistrate Report

144 Objections

148 Government’s Response

149 Objections

153 Government’s Response

158 Reply

161 DCT Order

Federal Court Suppresses Key Evidence Procured in Stop of Non-Indian by Tribal Police

Here are the materials in United States v. Cooley (D. Mont.):

34 Motion to Suppress

41 Response

46 Reply

48 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Normally, under Bressi, Officer Saylor would be required to determine whether Cooley was non–Indian shortly after seizing him. 575 F.3d at 896. However, Officer Saylor determined Cooley was non–Indian when Cooley initially rolled his window down. Because Cooley was non–Indian, Officer Saylor had the authority to detain Cooley only if it was “apparent” Cooley had violated state or federal law. Bressi, 575 F.3d at 896. Officer Saylor’s observations up to that point fell considerably below an “apparent” state or federal law violation. When Officer Saylor seized Cooley, he had observed bloodshot and watery eyes, no odor of alcohol, possible but unconfirmed slurred speech, two semi-automatic rifles, wads of cash in Cooley’s pocket, and answers to questions that seemed untruthful to him. Officer Saylor had also heard Cooley explain that he pulled over because he was tired—an occurrence Officer Saylor acknowledged was common on Highway 212—and that the vehicle did not belong to him but instead to a Thomas Spang or Thomas Shoulderblade, one of whom Officer Saylor suspected of drug activity and one of whom was a former probation officer. None of Cooley’s actions, whether taken individually or cumulatively, establish an obvious state or federal law violation. The Court holds Officer Saylor exceeded the scope of his authority when he detained Cooley. All evidence obtained subsequent to Cooley’s seizure is suppressed because it is “fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Ramirez–Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).

Tulalip Member/Company Seek Mandamus to Bar Searches by Fish and Wildlife Officers

Here is the petition in Paul v. Gain (Wash. S. Ct.):


An excerpt:

The novel twist in this case is the “gag order” in the Search Warrant. Because recipients of the Search Warrants risk violating a court order if they disclose the Search Warrants, their silence is secured. The Order sealing in perpetuity the Search Warrants Files guarantees that no public scrutiny can ever occur. The “gag-order” and the Order, in combination, create a Star Chamber within which law enforcement officers can operate without accountability, to the extreme detriment of their targets and the public, who may never know who invades their personal affairs, or why. This is particularly true here where Petitioners have already successfully sued the law enforcement agency to secure return of personal property seized via an earlier search warrant arising from the same investigation.

Interesting Tenth Circuit Appeal on Confessions at Kewa Pueblo

Here are the materials in United States v. Aguilar:

Unpublished opinion

Aguilar Opening Brief

US Appellee Brief

Aguilar Reply

From the opinion, which in part dealt with a motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment’s voluntariness requirement:

Aguilar argues his consent to the agents to enter his home and view the eagle feathers was involuntary when considering the totality of the circumstances. In particular, Aguilar argues the district court understated the significance of his belief that the agents were acting under the authority of the Pueblo Governor, whom, he argues, he was bound to obey according to Pueblo custom and tradition. In response, the government argues Aguilar’s subjective beliefs are irrelevant to the issue of voluntariness of consent insofar as there is no indication the agents were aware of or took advantage of them.


The district court arrived at this finding by noting that, prior to the agents’ arrival, Aguilar had already spoken with the Governor about his having killed eagles on tribal land. From this, the court found it was possible Aguilar thought the Governor informed the USFWS about his killing of eagles, but that it was equally likely Aguilar considered the matter to have been resolved to the Governor’s satisfaction during their meeting.

Second Circuit Decides Fourth Amendment Dispute over Search by Tribal Police

Here is today’s opinion in United States v. Wilson:

US v Wilson CA2 Opinion

An excerpt:

The United States of America appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (David N. Hurd, Judge), suppressing  evidence found following the stop and subsequent search of a vehicle driven by defendant Eric C. Wilson. See United States v. Wilson, 754 F. Supp. 2d 450 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). The vehicle stop was executed by two tribal police officers, one of whom was cross-designated as a U.S. customs officer. The district court concluded that the vehicle stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers acted without valid law enforcement authority, having stopped the vehicle in breach of jurisdictional boundaries set by state law and without having obtained prior authorization to exercise customs authority as required by federal policy governing designated customs officers. On appeal, the government does not dispute that the officers stopped Wilson in violation of state law and federal policy but argues that neither breach violates the Fourth Amendment. We hold that the violation of the federal policy governing designated customs officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that the stop and subsequent search comported with the Fourth Amendment because they were justified by probable cause. We do not reach the question whether the stop was also a constitutional exercise of the officers’ New York police authority. Reversed and remanded.

Briefs here.

Federal Court Admits Criminal Evidence Obtained Illegally under Tribal Court Search Warrant

Here are the relevant materials in United States v. Youngbear (N.D. Iowa):

Magistrate R&R in Youngbear

Youngbear Objection

DCT Order Adopting Magistrate Report